Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday, 12th March at Seven o'clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

School Building Programme

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Education how many local education authorities in England and Wales failed to commence projects for which allocations were made in the 1961–62 building programme; and what was the total amount involved.

The Minister of Education (Sir Edward Boyle): At 31st March, 1962, 97 authorities had not started projects in their 1961–62 major school building and further education programmes, valued at £39·5 million.

Mr. Fitch: Will the right hon. Gentleman warn those local authorities that unless they carry out their building programmes their allocations will be reassessed and given to local authorities which are willing and able to do the work?

Sir E. Boyle: There is always some time lag between the end of the programme year and the actual starts on the projects in that programme. It would not be fair to assume that all authorities that fail to begin their projects in the programme year are to be criticised because, in many cases, it is impracticable to start owing to site acquisition problems or planning difficulties. However, I agree that if it is clear that a project is not going to start within a foreseeable time

and there is a need for another one which can be fitted in, whether in the major programme or that for minor works, we should bear that possibility in mind.

Mrs. Slater: Can the right hon. Gentleman say if any of these local authorities are affected by the shortage of, for in-stance, architects? Because of that shortage and acquisition of land problems, have they found it difficult to make a start in the programme year?

Sir E. Boyle: The hon. Lady knows that site acquisition problems can be very difficult. I think that it is usually because of either site acquisition problems or planning difficulties that projects get delayed.

Mr. Sydney Irving: asked the Minister of Education what changes in the cost of building have occurred since the original £300 million school building programme was announced in 1958; by how much would the £300 million have to be increased to produce the amount of building which it would have produced if prices had remained steady; and what adjustments have been made to annual programmes during the five years to allow for the increase in costs.

Sir E. Boyle: The official index of cost of new construction has risen by 8 per cent., and my cost limits, which were unchanged between 1955 and 1960, have risen by an average of 15 per cent. To allow fully for these changes, the £300 million school building programme would have to be increased to £316 million or to £344 million respectively. The answer to the last part of the Question is, "None, Sir".

Mr. Irving: The amounts have not been increased. Does not this confirm that not only was the programme inadequate when it was conceived in 1958 but that the targets then set have been eroded by the rising cost of living? Does not this clearly show the need for expanded capital investment in school building?

Sir E. Boyle: Of course, this is a point I shall bear in mind when settling with my colleagues the size of the programme, but I must ask the hon. Gentleman not to confuse starts with work done. Although we are now considering the last year, 1964–65, in terms of starts, we


are barely half-way through the programme in terms of work done. While we try to keep within our authorisations, as one must, it is too early to forecast precisely the final value of the projects authorised during the five years 1960–61 to 1964–65.

Mr. Willey: But will not the Minister agree that, if we are considering the next two years, we can consider only starts, and it is not likely that over the next two years he will complete more than he starts? In view of this, will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that there is a serious shortfall on the programme envisaged in 1958, and will he bring the utmost pressure to bear on his colleagues to see that the programmes for these two years are considerably increased?

Sir E. Boyle: It is too late now to reconsider the 1963–64 programme, but, as the hon. Gentleman knows, I have not stated to the House a final figure for the 1964–65 programme. I made the announcement when I did because it is very important for local authorities to be able to get on with some planning ahead with projects for the following year.

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Minister of Education if he will state the school building programme agreed for the county borough of Tynemouth, and for the Northumberland County Council as it affects Whitley Bay.

Sir E. Boyle: The major building programmes for 1964–65 recently announced include the extension of the Tynemouth High School for Girls and the completion of the Briardene County Primary School at Whitley Bay.

Dame Irene Ward: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that Answer, may I ask him whether this includes anything in addition under the money which is supposed to be allocated to the North-East Coast in support of the noble Lord who is looking after our interests?

Sir E. Boyle: We are talking about the 1964–65 major building programme. With regard to the North-East, what I have done is to allow more for minor works which can be started during the current financial year. That is a rather different matter. I am glad that I seem to have given my hon. Friend more satisfaction than I have given her for what seems like some years.

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Education if he will now increase the allocation for school building in those areas where unemployment is over 5 per cent.

Sir E. Boyle: As part of the Government's measures to relieve unemployment, I removed last December the limit on the amount of minor works costing up to £20,000 which certain authorities in the North-East and Merseyside might start by 31st March next, provided the period of construction would not exceed six months. As a result extra building valued at £2 million is likely to he undertaken.
Increases in major projects, which take longer to plan and build, are not suitable for relieving temporary unemployment.

Mr. Fitch: Would not the Minister agree that in areas of high unemployment, one often finds out-of-date school buildings? Is it not a question of killing two birds with one stone?

Sir E. Boyle: It is exactly because the Government fully realise the point that we made the relaxation concerning minor works, which could be undertaken fairly quickly. As my Answer shows, that will result in quite a lot of extra work being done over and above the programme originally announced.

Dr. Bray: Is the Minister saying that it is not possible to look forward even one year on the load that will be placed upon the building industry in areas of high unemployment? Is he saying that there will be no unemployment in the North-East and on Merseyside in a year's time when this school building programme starts to take effect?

Sir E. Boyle: No. What I am saying is that when one considers the major building programme for 1964–65, for example, it will affect mainly the load on the building industry for 1965 and 1966. I assure the hon. Member that the picture then of the construction industries must be considered carefully and might be very different from what it is today.

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Education the value of the projects started or to be started in each of the years of the building programme for primary and secondary schools during the five years from 1960–61 to 1964–65.

Sir E. Boyle: Actual starts were £57·2 million in 1960–61 and £66·4 million in 1961–62. Authorised starts for 1962–63 and 1963–64 are £64 million and £55 million, respectively. The programme for 1964–65 has not been finally settled, but as I informed my hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. van Straubenzee) on 12th February the value of school projects to be started in that year will be at least £55 million.

Mr. Willey: Does the Minister appreciate that this is a serious cut in school building over the next two years and that we simply cannot justify it by an economic crisis twelve months ago? Will he see that this decision is reversed and the figure at least brought up to that decided in 1958?

Sir E. Boyle: I have already said in answer to an earlier Question that it is too early to forecast precisely the final value of the projects authorised during the five years 1960–61 to 1964–65. No doubt it has not escaped the hon. Member's attention that last year work done on school building reached the figure of £66 million, which was £17 million higher than in the year before?

Mr. Willey: Does not the Minister appreciate that it is precisely because local education authorities were able to do more than he estimated they could do that we ought to be more ambitious about the programme for the next two years?

Sir E. Boyle: The hon. Member must look at the position in the context of educational building as a whole. As he knows, next year there will be a 50 per cent. rise in starts for teacher training, university building is also increasing and we have today a considerably higher level of further education building generally than when the 1958 White Paper was prepared.

Nursery Education

Mr. W. T. Rodgers: asked the Minister of Education whether he will consider taking steps to encourage the provision of facilities for nursery education on such a basis as would both relieve the pressure on the primary schools and recruit competent supervisory staff which would not otherwise be available for teaching purposes.

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Minister of Education if arrangements are in hand to increase the number of nursery schools.

Sir E. Boyle: So long as the primary schools remain seriously short of teachers, I cannot allow any general expansion of nursery education. However, where suitable accommodation is already available, I am ready exceptionally to consider proposals for the extension of nursery class provision, where the local education authority can satisfy me that this will release qualified married women with young children to teach in maintained primary and secondary schools.

Mr. Rodgers: While appreciating the difficulty of the Minister because of the failure of the Government to train an adequate number of teachers for the immediate needs of the country, would he not agree that in the long run it is desirable that as much provision as possible is made available for children under the age of 5? Would he not agree that the latter part of his Answer represents an advance on Circular 8/60 of May, 1960, which indicated that the Ministry was very unwilling to see an advance in this field?

Sir E. Boyle: I would like to study that circular. It was a very limited administrative concession that I was thinking about. I think that it was first made in the case of Huddersfield in 1961. As to the first part of the hon. Member's supplementary question, as he knows, we are now in the process of expanding the training colleges at an unprecedented speed.

Mr. George Craddock: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that we should have more nursery schools and that they should be integrated into our education system? Since the Government have so far lacked initiative in this connection, will the right hon. Gentleman please get on with this job because nursery schools are needed not only by society in general but particularly by the parents of many youngsters?

Sir E. Boyle: I must ask the hon. Gentleman to look at my original Answer in which I regretted that so long as the primary schools remain seriously short of teachers we cannot allow any general expansion of nursery education.

Private Nursery Establishments

Mr. W. T. Rodgers: asked the Minister of Education whether he is aware of the success of play-groups for under-fives established under the auspices of the Save the Children Fund; and if he will take steps to establish such play-groups as an educational experiment.

Mrs. Butler: asked the Minister of Education what arrangements he is making for the inspection of private nursery schools and nursery groups.

Sir E. Boyle: My powers do not extend to private nursery establishments, which are not schools as defined in the Education Acts.

Mr. Rodgers: I understand that, but will the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the admirable initiative taken by the Save the Children Fund is something to be encouraged? Is it not within his power to draw the attention of local authorities to the success of play groups established by the Fund, bearing in mind his answers to the previous Question and the fact that progress with nursery education in the formal sense appears to be unlikely within the next few years?

Sir E. Boyle: I will certainly bear in mind what the hon. Member has said. Proprietors of private nursery schools can apply for recognition by my Department, and if they do I arrange for them to be inspected.

Mrs. Butler: Is the Minister aware that the number of private schools and play groups is growing considerably to meet the increased need and the lamentable lack of provision by his Department? Is it not essential that the right hon. Gentleman should institute a proper system of inspection of the schools so that they can reach and maintain high standards, in addition to the need for them to satisfy medical officers of health that they are in suitable premises?

Sir E. Boyle: I am sure the hon. Lady is aware that the responsibility of dealing with the registration of these establishments under the Nurseries and Child Minders' Regulation Act, 1948, rests with local authorities.

Mr. Willey: Will the right hon. Gentleman seriously consider what

encouragement he can give to such bodies as the Save the Children Fund and the Free School Play-Grounds Association, and will he also consider withdrawing Circular 8/60 to see whether he can allow building in exceptional cases? Will the right hon. Gentleman inquire into the conditions of children under 5 in heavily populated urban areas as there is possibly a major social scandal here that has not been revealed?

Sir E. Boyle: I will bear in mind all the points raised this afternoon, and particularly the first point which the hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) raised in his supplementary question. As to the general question of nursery education. I do not think that the time has come for me to withdraw that circular, although I am sure that the authorities will notice the very limited concession I have announced this afternoon in connection with the all-important problem of teacher supply.

Benton Road School, Ilford

Mr. Iremonger: asked the Minister of Education if he will make a statement on the future of the Benton Road, School, Ilford.

Sir E. Boyle: This is at present a school for handicapped pupils. Those pupils will move to a new school later in the year and I understand that the Roman Catholic authorities hope to buy the Benton Road site from the local education authority and establish a primary school there. No formal proposal for the establishment of the primary school has yet been put to me.

Mr. Iremonger: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he is aware that the Essex County Council is asking the Roman Catholic community to pay a price for this school at residential use price instead of at educational price and that this will cost the community an extra £18,000? As the Essex County Council can ask the Minister of Housing and Local Government for consent to sell at a lower price, is not this a monstrous imposition on a community which already has to pay for services which the rest of the community receives free? Cannot the right hon. Gentleman do something about it?

Sir E. Boyle: The local education authority is fully within its rights in asking for residential use value as the price of the property, acting in accordance with Section 26 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959. It is open to the local education authority to ask my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government for his consent to sell at less than the best price, but I have no power to require it, nor would it be right for me to require it to do that, and it would be wholly non-consonant with the spirit of the 1959 Act, debates on which in the House I remember very well.

Mr. Iremonger: On a point of order. In view of the highly unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I intend to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Technical Education

Miss Quennell: asked the Minister of Education what administrative machinery he has established to effect liaison with the Ministry of Labour in connection with the problems associated with technical education.

Sir E. Boyle: There is regular and frequent consultation between officers of the two Departments.

Miss Quennell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour has recently propounded a series of proposals which will materially affect the whole concept of industrial and technical training and education in this country, especially for young people? Is my right hon. Friend further aware that if these proposals are to be fully effective it is essential that the links between the two Ministries should be close, strong and capable of quick, efficient and supple action?

Sir E. Boyle: I quite agree. There is no hard and fast line between technical education and industrial training, and both my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and I recognise that there are many problems which must be looked at by both Departments. The recent White Paper was based on the whole concept of a partnership between Government, industry and the education services. I hope that there will be no misunderstanding about this in this House or in another place.

Adult Education (Staffing and Accommodation)

Mr. Boyden: asked the Minister of Education which proposals he has accepted of those on staffing and accommodation in adult education recently made to him by the National Institute of Adult Education.

Sir E. Boyle: The main proposals about accommodation are being considered in the light of capital investment policy, and I have no statement to make about them at present. As regards the staffing proposals, I intend to provide for the 1963–64 session some additional grants which will enable the universities extra-mural departments, the Workers Education Association districts and other responsible bodies to increase the total number of their part-time tutors. I hope that local education authorities, to which I have sent copies of the report, will study those recommendations in it which affect their own staffing arrangements.*

Mr. Boyden: This is a disappointing reply. Is the right hon. Gentleman going on with the same line of policy as that pursued by his predecessor, namely, to make vague innuendos about adult education being a good thing and do little about it?

Sir E. Boyle: I ask the hon. Member to await the publication of next year's Estimates. I should have thought that providing the additional grants which I have mentioned could hardly be regarded as a vague innuendo.

Mr. Willey: Will the right hon. Gentleman anticipate those Estimates by saying how much these are worth?

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir. I would ask the hon. Member to await publication of the Estimates.

Day Release Courses (Admiralty)

Mr. Boyden: asked the Minister of Education which local education authorities are unable to provide suitable day release classes for Admiralty juveniles aged 15 to 18 years; and what are their reasons.

Sir E. Boyle: I am not aware of any.
*[See Official Report, 15th March, 1963, Vol. 673 c. 207.]

Mr. Boyden: In view of that, could the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that if the Admiralty should bring its number of day release students up to the Civil Service average of about 80 per cent., local authorities will be able to cope? Does the right hon. Gentleman share the view of the Civil Lord that further education for 16 to 18-year-old non-industrials is hardly worth pursuing?

Sir E. Boyle: In reply to the first part of that supplementary question, I have made inquiries of local education authorities which are at present providing day release courses attended by students from some of the larger Admiralty depots and I understand that they have not found difficulty in providing suitable courses. If the hon. Member has any case to which he wants to refer, I will look at it.

Mr. Boyden: I was referring to what the Civil Lord said in the House.

Sir E. Boyle: I will look at that.

Minor Works Programme

Mr. Webster: asked the Minister of Education if he will take steps to increase the minor improvements grants given to county councils.

Sir E. Boyle: The level of educational minor works for 1963–64 has already been settled at £16 million. A decision on the allocations for 1964–65 will be made in the context of the general review of public investment.

Mr. Webster: Is my hon. Friend aware that in some cases at least these grants seem to have been whittled down in recent years? Is he aware that because of lack of work done under this category some schools were late opening this year and some were opened at great discomfort to pupils and teachers? Will my right hon. Friend bear this in mind in future negotiations?

Sir E. Boyle: I will fully bear in mind the strong feelings which are constantly expressed in all parts about minor improvements. Somerset, I think, had an allocation of £100,000 for 1963–64, which was fully in line with its total school population. The level of minor works starts for 1962–63 has been increased by special concessions to authorities in the North-East and Merseyside. These are

likely to produce additional minor works costing about £2 million.

Mr. Hilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of us consider that he is grossly neglecting local education in rural areas? Would he not agree that to make more of the minor works grants available would be the best way of improving the standard of many primary schools in rural villages, many of which are in slum categories? Could the right hon. Gentleman not have another look at the suggestion made by his hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster)? Is he aware that we believe that steps should be taken now to bring these primary schools up to decent standards and that it could be done with the help of these grants?

Sir E. Boyle: I agree that the minor works programme is very important from the point of view of the primary schools. After the five-year programme announced in the 1958 White Paper, we must have a special look at the needs of primary schools, especially in the light of the survey which we have undertaken. I am sure that the hon. Member, on his part, would agree that completion of the reorganisation of village schools has also made a considerable difference in rural areas.

Faircross Special School, Barking

Mr. Driberg: asked the Minister of Education if he is aware that the Fair-cross Special School, Barking, built in 1921, is in need of modernisation, and that a satisfactory plan exists for its development to provide for the accommodation of 180 physically handicapped children; and if he will approve this project so that work may begin on it as soon as possible.

Sir E. Boyle: The Essex local education authority put forward this project for the 1964–65 building programme, but it was not satisfactory in its original form. My Department has recently received modified proposals which are still under discussion with the authority.

Mr. Driberg: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this school was originally designed as an open-air school, that its central heating is quite inadequate and that it recently had to close for a number of days during


the bad weather? While many other schools had a similar experience, is not this particularly unfortunate in the case of a special school for educationally subnormal children? As soon as the plans are satisfactory, will the right hon. Gentleman expedite things a bit? Also, will he say whether he approves of the general idea that it should be transformed into a school for physically handicapped children?

Sir E. Boyle: This is a difficult problem. I assure the hon. Gentleman that I am giving the case my special attention. This school is certainly in need of improvement. There are two difficulties. The original scheme was estimated to cost about £30,000, but it now appears that it will be necessary to spend more than twice as much, nearly as much as a new school would cost. The Essex authority has placed this project only third in priority in a list of four special school projects in their area. As the hon. Gentleman says, the plan is rather changing. The authority's plan involves reorganising this school and also a school at Dagenham. One has to consider whether, looking to the future, this is the best solution, bearing in mind other provision in the area. But I shall certainly pay careful attention to the question of this school.

Maintained Schools (Building Survey)

Mr. Sydney Irving: asked the Minister of Education when he proposes to publish the building survey of the 30,000 maintained schools in England and Wales recently completed by his Department.

Sir E. Boyle: Work on the assembly and analysis of the survey material is progressing. I hope to publish a summary of the results within a few months from now.

Mr. Irving: As the report is likely to follow the lines of the survey conducted by the National Union of Teachers which disclosed a shocking state of affairs in many of our schools, will the Minister press his colleagues in the Government now to permit an enlarged school building programme so that we may get rid of some of the bad schools in the shortest possible time?

Sir E. Boyle: As I said last week, we must reach a final conclusion, in the light of available resources, on the school building programme for 1964–65 before I can say anything about the programme for subsequent years. In answer to the first point which the hon. Gentleman makes, the material published by the N.U.T. covered only a sample of schools. My Department's survey embraces every maintained primary and secondary school in England and Wales. As the House knows, I am keen that, when the time comes, it shall have the results as soon as possible.

Teachers' Salaries

Mr. Wainwright: asked the Minister of Education if owing to the heavy cost of education that is being borne by local authorities, he will take immediate steps to ensure that the cost of teachers' salaries shall now become the responsibility of the central Government.

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir.

Mr. Wainwright: Does the Minister realise that the cost of teachers' salaries is imposing a very heavy burden on education throughout the country? In so far as he himself thinks that he is justified in interfering with the conditions attached to the Burnham Committee's award and his predecessor thought himself justified in intervening over the total amount which was granted, ought not the Government now to take over the responsibility of teachers' salaries throughout the country?

Sir E. Boyle: This would be a very serious decision from the point of view of education as a local government service. While I felt it necessary to intervene on this occasion, nothing I have done, in my view, makes it any the less important that education should be for the future also a national service administered locally.

Cost (Central Government Contribution)

Mr. Wainwright: asked the Minister of Education if he is aware that the cost of education is becoming a financial burden on local rates; and if he will now take steps to ensure that the Government's financial contribution of 50 per cent. of the cost of education shall be substantially increased.

Mr. D. Smith: asked the Minister of Education what proposals he has for transferring a further part of the cost of education to the national Exchequer, thus relieving the burden on ratepayers.

Sir E. Boyle: Education is one of the local government services covered by the general grant, and about 60 per cent. of total relevant expenditure on these services is borne by the Exchequer. I see no justification for changing this arrangement.

Mr. Wainwright: Does not the Minister realise that even the West Riding County Council is being continualy embarrassed by the cost of education? This year, even after pruning, its expenditure will be £35¼ million, a reduction of £2,850,000 from the previous figure. Does not the Minister consider, therefore, that inasmuch as we want more education for our children, the Government ought to stand a greater portion of the cost than they do now?

Sir E. Boyle: I understand the financial problems of local authorities caused by the very rapid expansion of the education services at the present time. One cannot advance the share of the national product from 4·1 per cent. to 4·9 per cent. over three years, which is what we shall be doing and what the country wants, without creating problems. I must say, however, that this is a problem for central Government finance as well as for local government finance. In 1962–63, the current financial year, total expenditure for education relevant to the general grant was £785 million. The general grant represents about 55 per cent. of the estimated expenditure on all the relevant services, and rate deficiency grant covers a further 5½ per cent. In addition, my own Ministry's direct expenditure in the current financial year is about £60 million, and school milk and meals account for about £66 million in addition. I should not like the House or the country to think that the central Government were not themselves paying very large amounts of money for the education service.

Mr. Smith: Although the difficulties of expansion are appreciated, will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the colossal imbalance in local authority spending today through education swallowing up something like two-thirds of the rate product? In view of this, will he look at the matter again? Before very long, many

people living on restricted incomes will be extremely severely hit by rate rises.

Sir E. Boyle: I appreciate the difficulties caused to ratepayers by the rapid expansion of the service. I was concerned only to point out that central Government expenditure itself is going up very rapidly. Of course, education expenditure as a whole has risen as a demand on our resources more rapidly than any other main block of demand in recent years. I myself do not believe that it would be right to make a drastic change here if we believe that education should continue as a national service, and as I told my hon. Friend the Member for Esher (Sir W. Robson Brown) on 12th December, local rates are less of a burden now in real terms than they were before the war.

Mr. F. Harris: I ask my right hon. Friend not to underestimate the very strong feeling on this matter. Does he realise that, if the whole question is not completely reconsidered and the burden reallocated, rates will go up and up?

Sir E. Boyle: I assure my hon. Friend that I do read the newspapers. I think that that, perhaps, is in itself an answer to his question.

Junior Mixed School Pupils (Uniform Clothing)

Mr. Jeger: asked the Minister of Education to what extent he advises junior mixed schools in rural areas regarding uniform clothing for the pupils.

Sir E. Boyle: I do not issue any advice. This is a matter which is best left to the discretion of individual local education authorities.

Mr. Jeger: Is not the Minister aware of the discrepancies and differences which occur throughout the country in regard to the clothing allowed for children going to school? Is he aware that in the village of Womersley in my constituency the local headmistress has been sending home, even during the recent weather, two children who were going to school in jeans and wellingtons? These children have to walk a mile and a half from the farm where they live to the school. Will he issue some sort of advice to village schoolmistresses that they should temper their authority with a certain amount of common sense?

Sir E. Boyle: If one is to have a system of national education administered locally, circulars must not be multiplied overmuch. I should hesitate before sending out a circular to village schoolmistresses telling them what children should wear.

Burnham Committee (Minister's Letter)

Mr. Spriggs: asked the Minister of Education how many young teachers will be affected by his decision to reject the Burnham Committee's recent award; and what representations he has received about it.

Sir E. Boyle: The number of teachers, both young and old, who would be immediately affected would depend on how the Burnham Committee decided to modify its proposals in the light of the general principles which I outlined in my letter to the Chairman. Some younger teachers would receive smaller increases on the basic scale, but some of them could benefit from improvements in above-scale payments. Future prospects for all teachers who stayed in teaching would be improved.
I have received many letters both for and against the views I have expressed, but so far no formal representations.

Mr. Spriggs: Is the Minister aware that his action has been very detrimental to the matter of teacher supply and our efforts to overcome oversized classes and that his interference with the machinery of negotiation is yet another example of Government interference with machinery which they themselves are responsible for setting up? Their action will destroy all confidence in this machinery and will affect any hope of unity in the teaching profession.

Sir E. Boyle: I dealt fully with this matter last Thursday. I do not want to say very much more this afternoon, only the day before the Burnham Committee is due to meet tomorrow to consider my letter to the Chairman. I would, however, remind the hon. Gentleman of one sentence of my letter to the Chairman, which said:
I believe that the expansion of the profession, as well as the esteem in which it is held and thus its attraction for potential recruits of high quality, depends quite as much on the opportunities it offers of advancement

for the most able, best qualified and most ambitious of its members as on the level at which the more junior are paid.
Incidentally, payments for higher qualifications and longer training and greater responsibility are not limited to any small minority of the teaching profession. Rather more than half of all the teachers get one or more of them.

Mr. Willey: As the Minister has had time to reflect, will he consider, since this matter will be considered tomorrow, withdrawing his intervention? Does he realise that this very ill-timed intervention has created the impression that it is his purpose to humiliate and divide this profession?

Sir E. Boyle: Certainly not. I am glad to think that the hon. Gentleman's views are not shared by a very large section of informed public opinion in Britain, including some very sensible leading articles in all sections of the daily Press. I did not prescribe in detail what the revised proposals should be. I only indicated in general terms, after having given the matter considerable thought, the kind of modified pattern which I thought able to approve. I have written my letter and I must take my stand on it.

Mrs. Castle: asked the Minister of Education what reply he has received from the Chairman of the Burnham Committee to his letter of 20th February.

Sir E. Boyle: None, Sir.

Mrs. Castle: Does not the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that he has put the Chairman of the Burnham Committee in a quite impossible position? What is the use of having the Burnham Committee if the Minister is going to step in and interfere with its conclusions as to the best way to distribute salary increases? What does he intend to do if tomorrow the Burnham Committee decides to stand by its proposals, as it is perfectly entitled to do as the accredited and recognised negotiating machinery for the profession?

Sir E. Boyle: I am not going to answer the hypothetical question which the hon. Lady asked. I answered the first part of her supplementary question fully last Thursday. Section 89 of the Act leaves it open to me to reject proposals if I so wish on whatever grounds seem to me to be reasonable. It seemed to me that, once it became clear that this provisional


agreement would be ratified, it would have been wrong for me to delay intervening; I wanted teachers to have their pay increase, on lines which I could approve, on 1st April. With regard to the Chairman of the Burnham Committee, I think it is a funny state of affairs if one is told that one has put a chairman in an impossible position by communicating with him as chairman. It seemed to me the obvious thing to do. I have told the Chairman in my letter that I shall most certainly meet the whole Burnham Committee if it thinks that this will help.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: With regard to so-called interference with the Burnham Committee, has not the person who pays 55 per cent. of the bill some right to express his views?

Sir E. Boyle: I said last week to the House that I do not believe that any Minister of Education can disengage from consideration of the structure of teachers' salaries, which may affect teacher supply and the staffing of the schools for which I am charged with a public responsibility.

Mr. Holt: Many hon. Members would not disagree with the last sentence expressed by the Minister. Can he make one thing absolutely plain? Prior to 20th February, was the Burnham Committee aware in any detail of his views on the salary structure?

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir. There was no constitutional machinery whereby I could make it aware of my views before that date. At the moment, there is no constitutional provision whereby I can officially communicate my views to the Burnham Committee before an agreement is reached.

Mr. Mendelson: Why does the Minister continue to argue as though he wishes to give the impression that he is the only one interested in giving proper awards to the more mature members of the teaching profession? Is not the real issue that most teachers feel with regard to this award that it would be advantageous and fair to give the greatest encouragement to the new entrants to the profession? Is not the way out to increase the sum of money available to a figure between the two figures which have been argued about so that the policy which he desires and

the policy which the profession desires can be implemented?

Sir E. Boyle: I made my views on the amount of money clear in my letter to the Chairman. I hope that I have never suggested that I was the only person who felt concern in this matter. I pointed out to the House that I had a special responsibility here.

Expenditure, Essex and Leyton

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Minister of Education by what amount the Essex County Council and the borough of Leyton would benefit if 5 per cent. of educational expenditure now borne by local authorities became a further national charge.

Sir E. Boyle: Five per cent. of estimated expenditure by local authorities on education in 1963–64 is £42·63 million. If this amount were added to the general grant and distributed in proportion to the present distribution Essex would receive an additional £1·8 million. The Borough of Leyton does not receive general grant and would, therefore, benefit only through a reduction in the county precept.

Mr. Sorensen: In view of the figures which the right hon. Gentleman has given, and in view of the fact that rates are rising in Essex and, incidentally, in my own borough, partly due at least to Government policy, would it not be prudent, beneficial and appropriate if to ease the burden he recommended to the Treasury that this 5 per cent. should be transferred to the national Exchequer?

Sir E. Boyle: It was agreed by the Government, including my right hon. Friends at the Treasury, that we should work on the basis of a sum of relevant expenditure for general grant of £852 million in 1963–64. I looked on that as a quite substantial increase, 5½ per cent. over the present year. If I were to urge that the formula should be changed, I do not think I should be very popular in certain quarters.

Mr. Lagden: Essex is particularly proud of its record in education over the last five years. Owing to the exceptional building and exceptional population increase, should not my right hon.
Friend consider this matter quite separately from some other counties?

Sir E. Boyle: I do not want to be flippant, because I know the problems of Essex and many other authorities. As my hon. Friend has said, Essex has had a very fine record in education over many years, but if I were to make selective arrangements under the general grant procedure for counties in accordance with the quality of their problems I should defeat the purpose of the whole system.

Mr. Sorensen: Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter at the earliest opportunity.

U.N.E.S.C.O. Convention (Article 5)

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Minister of Education (1) what consideration has been given by the United Kingdom National Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation to the provisions of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation convention against discrimination in education; and what recommendations it has made about fulfilling in this country the provisions of Article 5 of the convention relating to the importance of education in racial tolerance in schools;
(2) what steps are being taken by his Department to encourage research into methods of teaching to overcome racial prejudice.

Sir E. Boyle: The main purpose of the U.N.E.S.C.O. Convention is to ensure that all pupils have equal opportunities for education. This is inherent in Her Majesty's Government's educational policies and in our educational legislation, and I see no need to consult the U.K. National Commission of U.N.E.S.C.O. on the provisions of this convention.
I am sure that the teachers and the schools exert a great deal of useful influence in promoting tolerance and discouraging racial prejudice, though this is not a matter which can be dealt with as an individual item in a school syllabus, nor is it suitable as a subject of research into teaching methods.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Minister aware that that is a rather disappointing and unimaginative reply? Is he aware that the Government keep on telling my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) and others who suggest legislation against racial discrimination that this is a matter which must be dealt with by education? In the light of those comments from the Government, would they not consider, for example, encouraging special courses for teachers in the many schools where there are nowadays a great many Commonwealth immigrant children?

Sir E. Boyle: I am well aware of the importance of this matter concerning immigrants, not least from my constituency experience. I believe that the record of schools in this matter is good, and admirable work is done also by the Council for Education in World Citizenship through the provision of lectures and material. The hon. Member and I are absolutely agreed about the importance of this matter. I am merely a little doubtful whether it would make a suitable individual item in a school syllabus. Surely, racial tolerance is something that should inform the whole of the school syllabus and should not be regarded as a special subject.

Mr. Dugdale: Would the Minister agree that small children have absolutely no racial prejudice whatever and play quite happily with children of another colour? The trouble arises as the American song says:
If you can be taught before it's too late, Before you are six or seven or eight,
To hate all the people your relatives hate,
If you can be taught to be afraid of people whose skins are a different shade.

Sir E. Boyle: The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right when he says that in schools British-born children and West Indian children, for example, play happily side by side. I believe that as the years go on it will not be long before it is a regularly accepted practice for children with different colour skins to attend one another's birthday parties. That will be the sign that integration is developing.

Students (Local Authority Grants)

Mr. Spriggs: asked the Minister of of Education if he is aware of the considerable differences in the amount of


grants made to students by different local education authorities; and if, as a preliminary to legislation, he will institute an inquiry into the matter.

Sir E. Boyle: All authorities make awards in accordance with the Education Act, 1962, and Regulations made under it, which impose a duty in respect of students with specified qualifications attending recognised courses and also prescribe the level of grants. The Act leaves to the authorities discretion as to other students and other courses and I do not propose to interfere with that discretion or to suggest a change in the law.

Mr. Spriggs: This information is needed urgently because many students attending art colleges cannot get financial assistance. Will the Minister reconsider his Answer, hold an inquiry and get the information for which I ask? If he does, we can possibly put before him proposals whereby students who choose the arts as a subject will not be left out.

Sir E. Boyle: The hon. Member is, no doubt, aware that this matter was fully discussed during the passage of the 1962 Act. I appreciate that the decisions of education authorities in relation to nonequivalent courses—that is principally further education courses below degree standard—will vary, but the courses cover such a wide range that it would not be practicable to prescribe suitable awards by regulation. I am not yet convinced that the inquiry would be worth while, but if the hon. Member would like to see me or write to me about it I will, of course, be perfectly ready to discuss the matter with him.

Oral Answers to Questions — V-BOMBERS AND THOR ROCKET BASES

Mr. Swingler: asked the Prime Minister why he did not inform the nation that on 20th October, 1962, he had given authority for alerting all V-bomber crews and Thor rocket bases in preparation for nuclear war.

Mr. Zilliacus: asked the Prime Minister for what reason he authorised the Thor rockets and the V-bombers in this country to be put in a state of instant readiness for attack during the United States' arms blockade of Cuba.

Mr. Warbey: asked the Prime Minister why, during the Cuban crisis period last October, he ordered the 60 Thor missiles in East Anglia to be held at instant readiness for firing, and the V-bomber force to be held at instant readiness for despatch to targets in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. Driberg: asked the Prime Minister what steps he took during the Cuba crisis to alert Thor rocket bases and V-bomber crews in preparation for nuclear war: and why official denials that any such action had been taken were issued at the time in response to Press inquiries.

Mr. Grimond: asked the Prime Minister whether there was a full airborne alert of the British strategic bomber force at the time of the 'Cuba crisis; and what steps Her Majesty's Government are taking in concert with their allies to develop more effective joint planning and control of the nuclear weapons used by the alliance, so that the allies may share with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in major foreign policy and defence decisions.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): The V-bomber force and the Thor rockets in this country are always at a very high state of readiness. During the period of tension, though not, in fact, on the date mentioned by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler). certain precautionary steps were taken, but more than this was not necessary.
As regards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we are discussing with our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies a whole range of problems arising from the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nuclear force foreshadowed in the statement on nuclear defence systems which I agreed with the President of the United States at Nassau in December last year.
Mr. Swingler: No doubt the Prime Minister will have seen the detailed allegations made by Mr. Stevenson Pugh, the Daily Mail Defence Correspondent, on 18th February. Is the Prime Minister calling Mr. Pugh a liar and saying that his detailed allegations are false or does the Prime Minister's Answer about precautionary measures contain a formula


for concealing the fact that the Government were preparing a national suicide threat at the time of the Cuban crisis?

The Prime Minister: Naturally, if the deterrent is to play its rôle it is always kept at a high state of readiness. During a period of tension certain additional steps were taken, but they are of a kind which is merely intended and normal and were no more than normal.

Mr. Zilliacus: Is the Prime Minister telling the House that he was prepared to enter into a nuclear war which would have destroyed the people of this country in support of an act of aggression by the United States, which had resorted to force in violation of the United Nations Charter? Why did the Prime Minister deny that any such action had been taken? Was that just a diplomatic courtesy to the people of this country?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The hon. Member is making a quite false deduction from what I have said or from what was done.

Mr. Warbey: Exactly what was the purpose of these precautionary measures? Were they directed towards ensuring that the missiles and V-bombers could be more instantly used for attack or were they directed towards ensuring that they could be immobilised so that in the event of nuclear war ensuing from the Kennedy-Khrushchev dispute over Cuba, this country would have been able to stay out and the lives of its people protected?

The Prime Minister: I am not prepared to add to what I have said. Any weapon of this kind must, of course, always be, if it is to exist at all, at a high state of readiness. In certain periods of tension, it is quite natural that certain normal precautionary measures should be taken in addition.

Mr. Driberg: Would the Prime Minister at least be good enough to answer the second part of my Question? Since he has said today that certain precautionary steps were taken, could he say why categorical denials were given at the time that any preparations were being made? These denials were put out to reputable defence correspondents, as he perhaps knows, by Ministry of Defence and Bomber Command spokesmen.

The Prime Minister: What was denied was that some abnormal action was taken. This was the normal procedure of a force which is kept at a much higher normal state of readiness than is perhaps the case with other forces.

Mr. Grimond: Will the right hon. Gentleman be more explicit about what is meant by the word "normal"? This seems to have been a very abnormal situation. Surely people are entitled to know what abnormal steps were taken. Is it not usual that any crisis in the West affects all nations of the West if they are of any power whatever? If that is so, is it not vital that the nations of the West should consult not only about the final crisis but about the diplomatic and defence decisions which lead to it? The Prime Minister has stated that discussions are proceeding. Can he say what proposals the Government are making and what progress is being made with the discussion of guide lines?

The Prime Minister: On the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I have nothing to add to what I have said. It is clear that with weapons of this kind, if one has them they must, if they are to be credible, be kept at a very high state of readiness. At certain periods of tension certain additional steps are taken. That is not unreasonable. With regard to the second part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, that would arise in the discussions which will take place—in the next week or two, I believe—in Paris. Our proposals are, broadly, those which are set down in the Nassau Agreement.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is not one of the lessons of the Cuban affair that the deterrent does indeed deter? Is my right hon. Friend aware that very many people in this House and throughout the country fully endorse the unflinching support given by Her Majesty's Government and the Royal Air Force to the United States in this matter? Furthermore, is he aware that we would welcome reciprocal American support in regions such as the Middle East which are vital to us?

The Prime Minister: The lesson of Cuba is certainly that the strength of the alliance as a whole was of very great value in reaching a settlement. It is also a fact that these terrible forces on


both sides did deter war, because all Governments must shrink from any action which could bring them into play.

Mr. Healey: On the question of the collective control of the alliance's nuclear forces, why is the Government's representative on the N.A.T.O. Council opposing the American proposal for a multilateral N.A.T.O. deterrent? Is it because Her Majesty's Government insist that every participant in a collective force should have the right to withdraw it in case of national emergency? Does not this open up the gravest dangers in case West Germany, for example, participates in such a multi-national deterrent?

The Prime Minister: As far as I know, there is no question of a proposal that non-nuclear Powers should have a national control of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Zilliacus: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech of the Foreign Secretary, read for him at the Wilton Park Conference at Steyning, Sussex, on 18th February, regarding resort to nuclear weapons against attacks by conventional forces, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Zilliacus: Is it, then, the Government's policy to resort to nuclear weapons first in case of a conflict involving only conventional arms?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. That is not the necessary deduction. I must repeat what I have said before. It seems to me very unwise to inform a possible aggressor in advance of the precise circumstances in which he can or cannot make an aggression without danger of retaliation.

Mr. Healey: But would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the level of conventional attack which the West is capable of withstanding without resort to nuclear weapons will depend on the level of the West's own conventional forces? Is it not the case that the failure of the Government to make their proper contribution to the N.A.T.O. conventional forces, as agreed in the Paris Treaties in 1954, and the proposal of the Government to withdraw yet another brigade group from West Germany, are likely dangerously to lower the level at which the West will be obliged to respond with nuclear retaliation?

The Prime Minister: I understand that we are to have a two-day defence debate next week. For the moment, I can only say that the hon. Gentleman appears to rest upon rumour and, from rumour, to draw false conclusions.

Mr. H. Wilson: Will the right hon. Gentleman at any rate make it clear that the policy of the Government is, and should be, based on the principle that the conventional forces of N.A.T.O. should be adequate to resist conceivable conventional attacks, so that we are not automatically driven into escalation and into the use of nuclear weapons?

The Prime Minister: That opens up very wide questions. What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by the words "adequate to resist"—a week, two weeks, a month, a year, or two years?

Oral Answers to Questions — N.A.T.O. (NUCLEAR FORCE)

Mr. Warbey: asked the Prime Minister what consultations he has had with President Kennedy and General de Gaulle in regard to the President's proposal that he or General de Gaulle should be delegated to decide, on behalf of the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, when the proposed multilateral nuclear force should be used.

The Prime Minister: As far as I am aware, President Kennedy has not made any such proposal. In any case, these questions are for decision by the North Atlantic Council as a whole.

Mr. Warbey: I take it, then, that the Prime Minister has not studied the suggestion made by President Kennedy at his Press Conference about ten days ago when he put forward this idea. May we take it that the President has now dropped the rather fatuous suggestion !that the West might elect a "press-button king", whether it be President de Gaulle, the Prime Minister or my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson)?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I do not understand that to be the situation at all. I understand that the President was merely describing what might happen if other countries were to delegate their authority to Britain or France. He was not proposing that anyone should do so.

Oral Answers to Questions — DISARMAMENT

Mr. Henderson: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the latest Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact, he will discuss with President Kennedy the inclusion of such a pact as part of an agreement on general disarmament.

The Prime Minister: The Soviet proposal concerns our other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies as well as the United States and ourselves. We shall be discussing all aspects of it with them.

Mr. Henderson: Would not the serious negotiations to which the right hon. Gentleman referred last week be more likely if the Government were to produce a draft agreement drawing on the best of both the United States and Soviet plans, as was suggested by the Foreign Secretary in March last year? Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the excellent document issued by the Labour Party yesterday constitutes the basis of a new British initiative?

The Prime Minister: With regard to the first part of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's supplementary question, that is exactly what our proposals are. They are based on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' proposals and are all amalgamated in the plan put forward by the Americans with our support. Discussions are now proceeding on a test ban agreement, and I should not like—nor would it help towards a solution for me to do so—to make any statement today.

Mr. H. Wilson: In view of the statement by President Kennedy in his interview with, I believe, Izvestia, that he would welcome a non-aggression pact between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact countries, will the Prime Minister say whether he has lent his support to what the President said?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. This matter is related to three questions. First, the non-aggression pact adds to some degree, but not really much, to the obligations we all have under the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, I would welcome it. Secondly, and perhaps much more important, there are the disarmament discussions. Thirdly, there is the test ban agreement which is now at a

stage when I do not think that it would be helpful for me to say anything today.

Mr. Henderson: Will the right hon. Gentleman clear up one point? Did he not refer last week to a proposal in relation to surprise attack? Do we understand from his reply today that the Government have put forward a compromise plan, based on the other two plans, in respect of general disarmament as distinct from merely surprise attack?

The Prime Minister: I should have added that the fourth issue is the question of surprise attack. All this would be comprised, if negotiations can proceed effectively, in a plan which could include them all.

Oral Answers to Questions — ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: asked the Prime Minister what scientific advice he has received about the danger of accidental nuclear war.

The Prime Minister: This is not primarily a matter for scientific advice although of course technical factors are involved. Any Government, particularly in these days when total war would have such terrible consequences, will take the most stringent precautions that are possible against war breaking out by accident. To this extent the very existence of nuclear weapons deters war by accident as much as war by deliberate intent or miscalculation. In fact the procedures on the Western side, and I have little doubt elsewhere, would be most effective against hazards from the breakdown of equipment or human mistakes.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am obliged to the Prime Minister for that Answer, which is rather different from what he said last week. Has his attention been drawn to a declaration by many scientists who have worked on weapon production that the danger of accidental war is now serious, and to the recent statement by Mr. Dean Rusk that as weapons grow more complex the danger of accidental war grows much greater?

The Prime Minister: Perhaps I was misunderstanding what was meant by the words "accidental war". They might mean one of two things, and perhaps I read


both meanings into them. One is that because of a stage of negotiations and tension and bluff and counter-bluff, war could come about without that being the real intention of the Governments concerned. That is one sense. The other sense, which I thought the right hon. Gentleman had in mind, was that by some human error, by some mistake, some of these weapons might be exploded contrary to the wishes of the Government. With regard to the second part, the measures taken—and if the right hon. Gentleman wishes to have further information, I shall be glad to give it to him personally—are of a kind which, I think, prevent that from happening.

Mr. Noel-Baker: As the Prime Minister invites me, I will submit further evidence to him if I may. What he is now saying is rather different from what he said last week when he endorsed the view that the risk of accidental war was infinitesimal.

The Prime Minister: I meant by the second of the two meanings, by mistake in the sense of a mistake not of the Government but some human mistake by some minor officer.

Mr. Ballenger: Does the Prime Minister think that he can distinguish between accidental nuclear warfare mentioned in the Question and threats of wilful nuclear warfare emanating from certain quarters?

The Prime Minister: Perhaps that is where the misunderstanding has occurred. There is a very great distinction if by "accidental war" is meant war coming about without it having been the full intention of the Governments concerned to bring about war. I have always thought that the war of 1914 almost fell into that category, and that it might not have happened if there had been modern methods of communication and flight, and so on. We then had mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, but it was not in that sense the wish of the Governments concerned to have war, and it was accidental in that sense. That is another and separate question. I am afraid that I became confused about which was meant. I thought that it was being suggested that because of the technical character of the weapons today, by some

man who was mad, or through some mistake made by an officer or man, a chain of events would be set off. We have provided for the prevention of that by every human means possible.

Sir C. Osborne: As my Question of last week has been mentioned, may I ask the Prime Minister whether the House can be assured that in the second category, that is, the category of human mistake with machinery, there is no risk of accidental war? It is that of which we wish to be assured.

The Prime Minister: As I said, training procedures and procedures laid down —and this is a safeguard—are such that it would not be within the power of a single man who went mad or who made some idotic mistake to set off any weapon of this kind.

Mr. Driberg: When the Prime Minister says that the existence of nuclear weapons is itself a deterrent against accidental nuclear war, can he explain how nuclear war could happen, by accident or otherwise, if there were not any nuclear weapons?

The Prime Minister: I think that I would like notice of that question so that I could study exactly how it was framed before I answered it.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am much obliged to the Prime Minister for his answers. Will he study carefully what Mr. Dean Rusk said about the present great complications, not only of the weapons themselves but of the chain of command and the fact that that might lead to war by accident, unintended war by accident, of a kind of which, he said, there is now not a serious risk?

The Prime Minister: I will study that. Perhaps the chain of command is a third category. What I think the right hon. Gentleman has in mind is that some order might be given for which the officer concerned had no authority. That is not an accident but a mistake of orders, but I will study that. I thought that what was mainly in the minds of hon. Members was some accident caused by an officer or man, in a moment of madness almost, setting off a weapon by his own power. That is well provided against.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. H. Wilson: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week?

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 4TH MARCH, and TUESDAY, 5TH MARCH—Debate on Defence, on a Government Motion inviting the House to approve the White Paper (Command No. 1936).

At the end on Tuesday, the remaining stages of the Purchase Tax Bill [Lords], which is a Consolidation Measure.

WEDNESDAY, 6TH MARCH—Remaining stages of Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Bill.

THURSDAY, 7TH MARCH—Supply [8th Allotted Day]: Air Estimates, 1963–64 will be considered in Committee on Vote A.

FRIDAY, 8TH MARCH—Private Members' Bills.

MONDAY, 11TH MARCH—The proposed business is Supply [9th Allotted Day]; Navy Estimates, 1963–64 will be considered in Committee on Vote A.

Mr. Wilson: Can the Leader of the House say whether it is the intention to suspend the Rule for the debate on the Air Estimates on Thursday and for the debates on the Navy Estimates for the fallowing Monday and for the Army Estimates when they come along?

Mr. Macleod: Yes, Sir. In each case we propose, as has been the custom for the last five years, to have a suspension for two hours.

Dame Irene Ward: Can we have a debate on the Atomic Energy Authority so that I may be provided with an opportunity of thanking Captain Atkins for preventing the Government from becoming pompous on this matter?

Mr. Macleod: I doubt whether we need a full day's debate for that.

Mr. Wade: May I draw the attention of the Leader of the House to a Motion on the Order Paper on the subject

of rates, which stands in the names of my right hon. Friend, my hon. Friends and myself'? Is he aware of the growing concern in many quarters about the increasing burden of rates and the steep increases which some ratepayers will have to suffer? Can we have a debate so that this whole subject can be fully aired?

[That this House expresses its concern that the establishment of the new rating valuations has been accompanied by substantial increases in the overall rate burden and is creating serious hardship for many ratepayers; calls on Her Majesty's Government as a matter of urgency to reform local government finance by making available new sources of income to local authorities and by ensuring that a larger share of the cost of education is borne by the Exchequer; and in the meantime calls on Her Majesty's Government to take urgent steps to mitigate cases of hardship under the new valuations.]

Mr. Macleod: I am certainly aware of the concern. The hon. Member probably heard a short time earlier Members of the Opposition urging vastly increased expenditure, for example, on education, the additional expenditure on which, above everything else, has been put forward as the reason for the increase in rates.

Mr. J. Howard: When may we expect a statement on the Government's decision on the Rochdale Report?

Mr. Macleod: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport hopes to make a statement on that next week, probably on Wednesday.

Mr. Zilliacus: As it is now plain that in the recent Cuban crisis preliminary steps were taken in the military field for instant action but no precautions were taken in the field of Civil Defence, will the right hon. Gentleman find time for a discussion on Civil Defence, which has not been debated for a long time?

Mr. Macleod: I imagine that any comments which the hon. Member wishes to make on that subject would be in order in the debate on Monday and Tuesday.

Mr. Leavey: Can my right hon. Friend give any indication when we might expect to receive the report from Lord Radcliffe


and his colleagues and when we might expect to have an opportunity to discuss it?

Mr. Macleod: I have no knowledge of that subject. The report will be made to the Home Secretary and, apart from any parts which cannot be laid on security grounds, it will then be laid before Parliament. At that time it would be appropriate to consider a debate. I recognise that the House will want to discuss the matter, but I would not have thought it likely that the House will have an opportunity for a debate on it before Easter.

Mr. Albu: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider having a debate on the Report of the Advisory Committee of Scientific Policy, especially so that we can discuss the complacent attitude of the Minister for Science towards the drain of scientists from this country and the petty, small-minded attack which the noble Lord made on the American educational system which was unworthy of a Minister?

Mr. Macleod: My noble Friend's attack was not on the American system but in praise of our own, which is no bad thing to do. On the other point, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows, in the next few weeks there will be opportunities on Supply, when I dare say that could be arranged.

Sir C. Osborne: May I make another plea that my right hon. Friend should find time to discuss exports, especially in view of the economic statement issued only yesterday saying how important this is for everything else in the nation? Can we have time to discuss it, please?

Mr. Macleod: I recognise that. The position, as those who study the procedure of the House know—and I am glad that on 15th March we are to have an opportunity for a debate on some of these matters—is that this is the time of the year when there is least flexibility of all in the programme and most of the initiative for debates lies not with the Government but with private Members and with the Opposition.

Mr. W. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that for many months the Members for Scotland have been waiting for a statement by the Government on what the Government intend to do to remedy the now parlous state of the economy? Can the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that the Secretary of State for Scotland will make a statement on this issue in this House next week?

Mr. Macleod: No, Sir. I cannot give such an undertaking. There was some discussion on this point last week, and I think that since then there have been certain discussions between the two sides of the House about future Scottish debates. If it would help, we could have discussions through the usual channels.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that up to now they all seem to be emergency measures which are proposed to deal with the situation in Scotland, while in fact there has been a fundamental decline in employment in Scotland for many years? Will the Government set up a committee to study more fundamental remedies for a rather serious situation?

Mr. Speaker: We cannot, on business questions, consider the setting up of independent committees.

Mr. F. Harris: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be returning from Kenya next week and whether a statement will be made on the possibility of self-government in Kenya in the near future?

Mr. Macleod: I think that my right hon. Friend is returning within a few days. I shall put to him the point relating to Kenya, and, indeed, other matters arising out of his trip and the question whether it would be convenient for a statement to be made to the House.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[7TH ALLOTTED DAY]

REPORT [26th February]

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATE FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 1963–64

(VOTE ON ACCOUNT)

Resolution reported,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,654,095,100, be granted to Her Majesty on account for or towards defraying the charges for the following Civil Departments and for the Ministry of Defence for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1964.

CIVIL ESTIMATES


CLASS I



£


1. House of Lords
97,000


2. House of Commons
580,000


3. Treasury and Subordinate Departments
1,500.000


4. Privy Council Office
17,000


5. Post Office Ministers
2,500


6. Customs and Excise
7,200,000


7. Inland Revenue
21,000,000


8. Exchequer and Audit Depart-ment
280,000


9. Civil Service Commission
258,000


10. Royal Commissions, etc.
250,000


CLASS II


1. Foreign Service
11,750,000


2. Foreign Grants and Loans
12,300,000


3. British Council
1,554,000


4. Commonwealth Relations Office
7,530,000


5. Commonwealth Grants and Loans
9,090,000


6. Colonial Office
3,298,000


7. Colonial Grants and Loans
5,900,000


8. Development and Welfare (Colonial Office)
5,800,000


9. Department of Technical Co-operation
12,000,000


10. Central African Office
935,000


11. Development and Welfare (Central African Office)
650,000


12. Commonwealth War Graves Commission
405,000


CLASS III


1. Home Office
2,600,000


2. Scottish Home and Health Department
780,000


3. Home Office (Civil Defence Services)
4,200,000


4. Scottish Home and Health Department (Civil Defence Services)
231,000


5. Police, England and Wales
24,650,000


6. Police, Scotland
170,000


7. Prisons, England and Wales
8,500,000


8. Prisons, Scotland
800,000

£


9. Child Care, England and Wales
2,084,000


10. Child Care, Scotland
200,000


11. Supreme Court of Judicature, etc.
100


12. County Courts
216,000


13. Legal Aid Fund
1,500,000


14. Law Charges
295,000


15. Law Charges and Courts of Law, Scotland
111,000


16. Supreme Court of Judicature, etc., Northern Ireland
31,000


CLASS IV


1. Board of Trade
2,230,000


2. Board of Trade (Promotion of Trade, Exports and Industrial Efficiency and Trading, etc., Services)
3,800,000


3. Board of Trade (Promotion of Local Employment)
9,000,000


4. Export Credits
100


5 Export Credits (Special Guarantees, etc.)
100


6. Ministry of Labour
8,904,000


7. Ministry of Aviation
90,000,000


8. Ministry of Aviation (Purchasing (Repayment) Services)
12,500,000


9. Civil Aerodromes and Air Navigational Services
4,000,000


10. Ministry of Transport
1,599,000


11. Roads, etc., England and Wales
55,000.000


12. Roads, etc., Scotland
5,500,000


13. Transport (Shipping and Special Services)
323,000


14. Transport (Railways and Waterways Board)
60,000,000


15 Ministry of Power
1,100,000


CLASS V


1. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
7,800,000


2. Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland
3,000,000


3. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Agri-cultural Grants and Subsidies)
50,000,000


4. Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (Agricultural Grants and Subsidies)
4,300,000


5. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Agri-cultural Price Guarantees)
74,000,000


6. Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (Agricultural Price Guarantees)
8,000,000


7. Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (Agri cultural and Food Services)
5,500,000


8. Food (Strategic Reserves)
800,000


9. Fishery Grants and Services
1,900,000


10. Fisheries (Scotland) and Herring Industry
1,100,000


11. Forestry Commission
4,600,000

CLASS VI



£


1. Ministry of Housing and Local Government
4,500,000


2. Scottish Development Department
910,000


3. Housing, England and Wales
28.000,000


4. Housing, Scotland
9,000,000


5. General Grants to Local Revenues, England and Wales
188,663,000


6. General Grants to Local Revenues, Scotland
21,375,000


7. Rate Deficiency, etc., Grants to Local Revenues, England and Wales
47,126,000


8. Equalisation and Transitional Grants to Local Revenues, Scotland
6,948,000


9. Ministry of Education
45,000,000


10. Scottish Education Department
9,480,000


11. Ministry of Education (Teachers' Superannuation)
100


12. Scottish Education Department (Teachers' Superannuation)
100


13. Ministry of Health
1,550,000


14. National Health Service etc. (Hospital Services, etc.), England and Wales
156,300,000


15. National Health Service (Executive Councils' Services), England and Wales
54,000,000


16. Miscellaneous Health and Welfare Services, England and Wales
14,079,000


17. National Health Service (Superannuation, etc.), England and Wales
100


18. National Health Service, etc., Scotland
29,000,000


19. National Health Service (Superannuation, etc.), Scotland
100


20. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
2,800,000


21. National Insurance
73,250,000


22. Family Allowances
49,500,000


23. National Assistance Board
77,500,000


24. War Pensions, etc.
38,750,000


CLASS VII


1. Universities and Colleges, etc., Great Britain
36,000,000


2. Office of the Minister for Science
50,000


3. Atomic Energy
40,000,000


4. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
6,700,000


5. Medical Research Council
2,450,000


6. Agricultural Research Council
2,462,000


7. Nature Conservancy
250,000


8. Grants for Science
175,000


CLASS VIII


1. British Museum
481,000


2. British Museum (Natural History)
220,000


3. Science Museum
125,000


4. Victoria and Albert Museum
225,000


5. Imperial War Museum
27,000


6. London Museum
20,000


7. National Gallery
169,000

£


8. National Maritime Museum
40,000


9. National Portrait Gallery
16,000


10. Tate Gallery
56,000


11. Wallace Collection
20,000


12. Royal Scottish Museum
50,000


13. National Galleries of Scotland
47,000


14. National Library of Scotland
46,000


15. National Museum of Antiquities of Scotland
13,000


16. Grants for the Arts
2,000,000


CLASS IX


1. Ministry of Public Building and Works
8,780,000


2. Public Buildings, etc., United Kingdom
13,663,000


3. Public Buildings Overseas
1,772,000


4. Works and Buildings for the Admiralty
6,507,000


5. Works and Buildings for the War Office
20,631,000


6. Works and Buildings for the Air Ministry
15,815,000


7. Houses of Parliament Buildings
158,000


8. Royal Palaces
260,000


9. Royal Parks and Pleasure Gardens
457,000


10. Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments
443,000


11. Rates on Government Property
11,500,000


12. Stationery and Printing
8,200,000


13. Central Office of Information
2,050,000


14. Government Actuary
19,000


15. Government hospitality
70,000


16. Civil Superannuation, etc.
15,350,000


17. Post Office Superannuation, etc.
100


CLASS X


1. Charity Commission
95,000


2. Crown Estate Office
58,000


3. Friendly Societies Registry
42,000


4. Royal Mint
100


5. National Debt Office
100


6. Public Works Loan Commission
100


7. Public Trustee
100


8. Land Registry
100


9. War Damage Commission
90,000


10. Office of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements
50,000


11. Ordnance Survey
1,253,000


12. Public Record Office
62,000


13. Scottish Record Office
23,000


14. Registrar General's Office
270,000


15. Registrar General's Office, Scotland
31,000


16. Department of the Registers of Scotland
100


17. National Savings Committee
480,000


CLASS XI


1. Broadcasting
17,100,000


2. Carlisle State Management District
100


3. State Management Districts, Scotland
100


4. Pensions, etc. (India, Pakistan and Burma)
3,636,000

£


5. Supplements to Pensions, etc. (Overseas Services)
750,000


6. Royal Irish Constabulary Pensions, etc
400,000


7. Irish Land Purchase Services
565,000


8. Development Fund
600,000


9. Secret Service
3,000,000


10. Miscellaneous Expenses
220,000


Total for Civil Estimates
1,647,495,100


Ministry of Defence
6,600,000


Total for Civil Estimates and Estimate for the Ministry of Defence
1,654,095,100

Resolution read a Second time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Mr. Speaker: Does the right hon. Gentleman rise to speak?

3.43 p.m.

The First Secretary of State (Mr. R. A. Butler): I was under the impression that the subject being an Opposition choice, the Opposition would lead in the debate, but I am ready to open it and, I hope, to set the tone of it. I hope that this debate may follow a constructive course and that hon. Members will address themselves to constructive steps which would help us towards a solution of the problem in Central Africa.
Before I come to the constructive steps, hon. Members have taken an interest in the White Paper which was published on the subject of statements which were made during the Conference of 1953, and while I do not intend to spend very much time on this subject, I wish to devote the first few minutes of my speech to deal with them.
Allegations have been made that in accepting that Nyasaland should withdraw from the Federation Her Majesty's Government have not held to undertakings given in 1953. This matter has been dealt with in the White Paper, to which I refer hon. Members. References were made in relation to the Review Conference which was to be held in seven to nine years' time.

Sir James Duncan: On a point of order. As I understood it, Mr. Speaker, you put the Question on Report

on the Vote on Account and collected the voices. You were then in somewhat of a dilemma because nobody rose to speak. The next item——

Mr. Speaker: I beg pardon if I did so. I did not realise that. I hope that the House will treat it as a folly on my part. I was thinking about the next thing. We are, in fact, discussing the Question arising on whether or no we agree with the Resolution. I beg pardon if I did something so foolish.

Mr. Butler: On that assumption, I shall proceed with what I was saying.
At the time, the British Ministers referred to the undeniable power of this Parliament to legislate in whatever way it might think fit for the Federation which was then being established. This power was referred to by one of the Southern Rhodesian Ministers as that of the United Kingdom Parliament and Government to give and to take away. It was also made clear that Parliament would not act irresponsibly or high-handedly to bring the Federation to an end.
As hon. Members who have read the White Paper realise, the discussion was in somewhat colloquial terms, and it may be that the informal nature of the language used has given rise to later misunderstanding as to what was intended at the time. But what I regard as a matter of the greatest significance—and I am sure that hon. Members will agree—is that the two Secretaries of State who took part in this discussion have publicly made it clear in another place that they did not regard themselves as having given a pledge of the kind which the Federal Government claims has been given. The Secretaries of State freely acknowledge, as we all do, that the Federation was founded in a spirit of hope that the new society being created in Central Africa would prosper and endure; but they also insist that nothing in that discussion was intended as a pledge so as to fetter the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament.
I am sure that hon. Members wish to respect the statements to which I have referred which have recently been made by the former Secretaries of State, and while I do not want to spend a long time on this aspect, as I wish to discuss the future, I wish to adduce one or two


extra arguments, because these statements are borne out as being correct by what happened subsequently to the colloquial interchanges to which I referred.
The Conference was followed by an enabling Act—the Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Federation) Act—which authorised the making of the Federation of Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953. Section 1 (2) of the Act provided that the Order in Council might authorise the Amendment or revocation of any of its provisions, but went on to use the following words
but save as may be so authorised, that Order in Council shall not be capable of being revoked or amended except by Act of Parliament".
This Section of the Act removes any doubt, if doubt there be, that the United Kingdom Parliament could revoke or amend the Constitution Order in Council.
If I may summarise briefly what I have said, it is that neither the verbatim record nor the formal instruments which were enacted as a result of its report support the assertion that any undertaking limiting the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament was given at that time. Had such an undertaking been given, as has been claimed, it would have amounted virtually to a pledge of indissolubility and permanent veto, which I do not think was envisaged by anybody.
There is one other claim that is made, and that is that the Federation Constitution made no provision for secession from the Federation, and the then Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1953 endorsed the view that no such provision should be made, but it is borne out quite clearly in the White Paper that it cannot be argued that the omission of a provision for secession itself implies a guarantee of permanence.
The really important point to bear in mind in this context is the one which is so clearly expressed in paragraph 14 of the White Paper, namely, that the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the inhabitants of Nyasaland as a territory under the special protection of Her Majesty remained unimpaired by the establishment of the Federation. Given the express wish of the majority of the inhabitants of

Nyasaland to withdraw from the Federation, it would, in the Government's view, have been a breach of their obligations to the people of the Protectorate to disregard that wish.
During recent public discussion, it has been said that whatever were the obligations of Her Majesty's Government—with which I have dealt quite shortly—whether to one party or another, the acceptance that Nyasaland should withdraw from the Federation ought to have been made as a result of consultation and agreement. I have not had an opportunity of speaking on this matter, although I have read or listened to many public statements in this sense. The implication is that there was no consultation and, in particular, that there was no consultation between Her Majesty's Government and the Federal Government in this matter. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ever since I became the Minister responsible for Central Africa, I have been most careful to keep the Federal Government informed of my view of the situation. As long ago as 8th May, 1962, I made it clear that Her Majesty's Government recognised the position of the Malawi Ministers, namely, that they were not prepared to remain within the present Federation.
In my first visit to the Federation in that month which followed shortly after that debate, I put this point to the Federal Government. Indeed, I have a strange proof that all this is correct, because it emerges in the White Paper which the Federal Prime Minister laid before the Federal Assembly on 19th December. The White Paper in fact constitutes a record—although an ex parte record—of a continuous process of consultation over the whole period which led up to my announcement about Nyasaland on 19th December. It must be rare for a Minister to find himself quoted with such accuracy in a document published by another Government, and find nothing to which to object in that document.
I will not, therefore, weary the House with lengthy extracts from the White Paper. I would, however, mention in passing paragraph 54, in which I am recorded as having informed Sir Roy Welensky, in discussions which took place in London in September of last year, that as I had told him previously,


opinion in the Federation had to accept that Nyasaland was already virtually an African state and that it was therefore a special problem.
I am on record then as having gone on to express my hope that if the emotional issue of secession could be buried the present Nyasaland leaders might be persuaded to adopt a constructive attitude towards the retention of trade and other links with the two Rhodesias, but that I did not think that there was any hope for this unless the right to secede was granted.
Succeeding paragraphs in the White Paper record consultations through the British High Commissioner in Salisbury. Finally, in paragraph 77 of the White Paper published by the Federal Government, there is a reference to the fact that for virtually the whole week immediately preceding that in which I made my statement in the House I was in consultation with three Federal Ministers who came to London specifically for that purpose.
If there was consultation on this scale —as there was—it is natural to ask why, in the event, Her Majesty's Government had to take action without obtaining the Federal Government's agreement. I have never had an opportunity of explaining this, although it has been explained for me in another place on other occasions. I will now answer the question quite simply. During the consultations—particularly those which immediately preceded my statement on 19th December—the Federal Government made it quite clear, as is shown from paragraph 74 of their own White Paper, that they would not be prepared to accept any announcement which conceded secession to Nyasaland unless it incorporated what they would regard as—and these are their words:
satisfactory guarantees for the continuance of a strong political and economic association between the two Rhodesias.
That is brought out quite clearly in the Federal Government's own White Paper.
Anyone who has studied this subject must be well aware of the importance and of the merits of such a strong and continuing link between the Rhodesias, but I must make it clear to the House that it was not within the power of Her Majesty's Government to give a firm

guarantee on the lines required by the Federal Government. We could not have promised that at the time because we were not in a position to give that promise. In short, the position is that we consulted, we tried to reach an agreement, but were unable to do so. My duty to Nyasaland remained, and I acted according to my duty. That is all I need say on the subject of consultation, and on the subject of the White Paper published by the Federal Government. If there are any other matters requiring an answer in this connection my right hon. and learned Friend will be replying at the end of the debate.
There are various other aspects of the situation in Central Africa which I want to put before the House. First, before I turn to my recent visit to Central Africa I should like to refer to Southern Rhodesia. I am certain that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) will raise matters relating to Southern Rhodesia, and I should like to refer to them ahead. Since my visit the House will be aware that the Legislative Assembly has met in Southern Rhodesia. Their Government, as is healthy, is facing a vigorous Opposition—unlike our Opposition—which includes the first Africans ever to sit in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament.
I realise that hon. Members may criticise very strongly certain pieces of legislation proposed by the Southern Rhodesia Government. In particular, I have had a great deal of correspondence on the subject of the amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, which are under consideration at the moment, and which provide for a mandatory death penalty for certain offences involving the use of petrol bombs and explosives. Any hon. Member of this House is fully entitled to his views on these matters, but the point I want to stress is that the real forum for their discussion is the Southern Rhodesia Parliament itself.
I will, if pressed, expand on what I said in a previous debate upon the position of this Parliament vis-à-vis the Southern Rhodesia constitution, and the very little power we have to intervene. When I last spoke I explained this relationship very closely. When I was in Southern Rhodesia on this occasion I was able to meet Mr. Nkomo and his main associates and lieutenants, and—as I shall explain later, when I am going into more detail


of my tour—other representative people, and I took every opportunity of passing all their views to the Government concerned, with a view to their registering the feelings held on these subjects.
I shall no doubt be asked questions about Mr. Nkomo and the incident in which he and his companions were concerned, at Rusape, on 9th February. The proceedings in which they were involved later that day led to their arrest for an offence under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, and they are also appearing in court on an alternative charge of common assault. My latest information is that the case has been postponed until the end of March, and therefore it is still sub judice.
I want to make one matter clear, even if I cannot go into the court case, and that is that we have been able to ascertain that no restriction on Mr. Nkomo's general political activities is intended. Indeed, Mr. Dupont, who as hon. Members will know is the Minister of Justice in the present Southern Rhodesia Government, said in the course of the Second Reading debate in the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly on the Unlawful Organisations Amendment Bill—I quote his actual words:
I wish to make it perfectly clear that it is not the Government's intention in any way to stifle opposition or to prevent the creation of political parties provided that those parties act constitutionally, and I would point out that the amending Bill places no obstacle whatever in the way of the formation of those parties…
He went on to say that such parties should act without intimidation and without violence. I hope that Mr. Winston Field's Government are prepared to see Mr. Nkomo and his associates return to active political life, provided—and I think hon. Members will agree that this is a reasonable proviso—that they act constitutionally. In conversations and contacts I had with Mr. Nkomo I put this point of view to him as well.
I do not doubt that in the course of the debate reference will be made to the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia on the lines which the hon. Member has put to me on previous occasions, namely that it should not be granted except on certain conditions. I cannot say anything more than what I said on 3rd December, namely, that this

issue is not at present before us. All I can say is that if it does come up I shall have to discuss it with the Governments, and I shall naturally have to listen to this debate before I can take up any further position. If the hon. Member has any points to put on this perhaps he will bear that in mind.
I also want to make a short reference to the case which I am sure will be raised—I am trying to put for him some of the points which the hon. Member may raise—of Dr. Terence Ranger, because there has been a great deal of feeling and interest in this case in this country. I ought, first, to make clear that his deportation was not initiated by the present Southern Rhodesian Government but by the previous one. A deportation order was served on Dr. Ranger on 11th January. He had at that time recently completed a period of restriction following the banning of Z.A.P.U. Dr. Ranger appealed, but the Federal Supreme Court has recently ruled that the Federal Government acted lawfully in declaring him a "prohibited immigrant". I understand that Dr. Ranger has been granted a year's sabbatical leave from University College. I must make it clear—I am mentioning this because I realise that the feelings about it, which have also been brought to my attention in my office and which will be raised in the debate this afternoon—that this decision is from the constitutional point of view wholly within the competence of the Federal authorities.
I thought it right, however, to approach our High Commissioner in Salisbury and to ask him to get in touch with the Governments concerned; that is when the decision an the appeal became known to me. I arranged that the High Commissioner should convey to them the depth of feeling there is in this country on this subject. The Federal and Southern Rhodesia Governments have now informed the High Commissioner that they would wish Dr. Ranger to make application to return to the Federation on the termination of his sabbatical year and they have gone so far as to say that his application will then be considered on its merits. I am sorry that I cannot take the case further, but I have at least done my best by making representations to show the importance I attach to it.
Now I should like to make a survey of a rather more protracted nature of my recent visit and share with the House what I think the situation is in Central Africa so that, together in the course of this debate with any constructive ideas which are put forward from either side of the House, we may approach nearer to a solution. I did not say much in my statement when I got back, so I shall endeavour to bring out the facts as I see them rather more clearly now that we have the opportunity of a debate. To that extent I am glad that we are having this debate today. I undertook the tour because I wished not only to carry forward the arrangements for the secession of Nyasaland, but also to meet the two new Governments recently elected in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and renew contact with the Federal Government.
I therefore visited all three territories and met a great variety of persons and organisations. As I have said, I met Mr. Nkomo and his principal lieutenants and representatives of the Pan-African Socialist Union and of liberal organisations in the territory. If the claims on my time had not been so pressing in the various interviews I was obliged to hold, I could have met more people, but I think that on this occasion I managed fairly widely to meet both those who agree and who disagree with the regimes in existence. In Nysasland I met representatives of the opposition United Federal Party, the Settlers' and Residents' Association and the tea planters. who naturally discussed with me the question of safeguards for the European minority. I discussed with them the proposals for a Bill of Rights which had been agreed at the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference. They were particularly concerned about the security of freehold title in the territory, on which Dr. Banda made a reassuring speech on the occasion of his assuming the office of Prime Minister on the last Friday of my visit.
In Northern Rhodesia I met the Litunga of Barotseland, who travelled from his capital of Mongu to meet me in Lusaka. There are two main features of the Barotse problem; first, the question of its internal administration, and, second, the question of Barotseland's future relations with Her Majesty's Government and with

Northern Rhodesia. On the first matter, that of internal administration, I encouraged the Litunga to pursue measures of internal reform which were already under consideration, but which had not been carried very far. I also recommended him to appoint a new Prime Minister. Whatever the future of the country, it is important that the internal administration should be brought up-to-date, and with this the Litunga agreed.
I also pointed out the importance of establishing a development plan for Barotseland since its economic future must depend upon its own efforts as well as upon its contacts with Northern Rhodesia. The more one sees of the place the more one realises the importance of those contacts owing to the size of the economy and the size of the country. The major problem, that is the constitutional future, is at present under study and further discussions with the Litunga and the Northern Rhodesia Government will be necessary. It is one of the matters which will have to be resolved as part of the future constitutional pattern of the region in conjunction with the constitutional issues to which I shall now refer.
In Northern Rhodesia I met members of the United Federal Party opposition as well as members of the Government, to whom I shall refer later. I never intended during the tour that final decisions should be reached since it was essential to ascertain differing points of view. I must stress, first, that the points of view as to the course to be adopted in the future vary considerably. I did, however, find a general disposition among all the Governments to look to the future and not simply to live in the past. I found that invariably to be the case.
As regards Nyasaland, I discussed with the Federal and the Nyasaland Governments the setting up of a working party. This, I hope, will shortly be able to start its work, after further discussions to be undertaken with the Federal Government about its terms of reference, to carry out an examination of the various practical aspects of the secession exercise.

Mr. Denis Healey: I am sorry to intervene, and I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. Could he say whether it is intended to bring the other territorial Governments


into these discussions? If, as seems to be the case, the Federation itself is not likely to last very much longer, is not the division of its assets essentially a matter for the three Governments concerned rather than for the Federal Government and one of the territories?

Mr. Butler: I was coming to that and to the arrangements we have made to bring them in as necessary. I was just going to say that this working party will be presided over by a United Kingdom Chairman, Sir George Curtis, and will consist of representatives of the Federal and Nyasaland Government, backed by the necessary territorial and other experts. This is the sentence that I was just coming to: to the extent that matters affecting Southern and Northern Rhodesia arise, arrangements will be made in consultation between the Chairman and the Governments concerned for representatives of those Governments to take part in the discussions as necessary. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman.
I have been asked by the Governments principally concerned, namely, the Federal Government and the Nyasaland Government, whether matters which arise which are of first-class importance will be referable to the respective Government as necessary as the work goes on. This, of course, will be the best way to resolve the major issues involved. I need only add that we shall attach the technical, official and other advisers to the team necessary to carry out the work of the working party. There is no doubt that a great deal of hard and intricate work will have to be done. The whole range of financial and administrative problems will have to be covered.
There is the question of the adjudication of a fair proportion of the Federal debt which can or should be apportioned to Nyasaland. There is the question of the transfer to Nyasaland of the great services at present carried out by the Federal Government, such as the health service. These services, as hon. Members will realise, employ a great many public servants, both European and African. We are naturally very anxious about their future, and we are anxious that the transfer of such officers shall be effected in the most sensible manner possible, both in regard to the future of the services and of the officers

themselves. Therefore, it is important that this aspect of the work should be carried out in a just and humane way.
There is at the moment a great deal of pressure for a date to be given for the final secession of Nyasaland from the Federation. I must say that it is impossible to fix a date at the present time. The work must be thoroughly and conscientiously done and, whatever arrangements are made, I think that we must keep our minds open as to the final date when secession can be formally effected.
Hon. Members have shown an interest in the effects on Nyasaland of the withdrawal in the financial sense. These are bound, as I have said before, to be very serious, but I believe that there is a readiness on the part of Malawi Ministers to face their problems in a realistic way. Until the consequences of withdrawal have been worked out in detail, it is not possible to judge to what extent and over what period the Nyasaland Government may need financial help in addition to their own efforts to bridge the gap. Our approach to this aspect of the question when it is reached will, of course, be sympathetic. So much for the work of the Nyasaland secession exercise which is likely to be laborious and difficult.
I now come to the problem of the two Rhodesias. The attitude of Her Majesty's Government is to do all we can to secure an acceptable form of association in the future which will preserve the very real benefits which past association has procured. It would be short-sighted not to attempt to secure really valuable links for the future in the interests of all races.
Let us now therefore consider in more detail than I was able to do when I made my statement the point of view of the Southern and Northern Rhodesian Governments. Since our last debate, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston Field, has made a speech in his own Parliament. He said that the decision of the British Government to allow the secession of Nyasaland and the accession to power of the new Coalition Government in Northern Rhodesia brought the whole question of the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the fore. Little as Southern Rhodesia wanted to become involved in more constitutional crises, it was obvious


that I, as the First Secretary, would be attempting to find a solution to the whole problem of the future of the three territories, or at any rate two of them, probably with a looser arrangement for the third, that is, Nyasaland.
Mr. Field went on to say that he had never made any proposals to take Southern Rhodesia out of the Federation or to break it up. He said that he had worked hard to make the Federation succeed. However, it was also his duty to say openly that for various reasons the Federation was not working smoothly. It became obvious to him in each of his tours of the Northern Territories.
He went on to say that an economic association is best supported by a political tie. Nevertheless, in this speech he questioned whether, in the light of the attitude of political leaders in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the political association between the two Rhodesias should be allowed to deteriorate until the final break-up of the Federation was arrived at with the loss of all friendly relations between the territories.
He went on to ask whether the maintenance of economic association and future economic links should not be a matter of direct negotiation between the Governments concerned. Mr. Field also stressed the importance of handling these matters without delay in the interests of the certainty which is so much desired not only by the business world but by the Governments and by members of all races in Central Africa.
Mr. Field had already met Dr. Banda. I am in the priceless position of having had a report of the conversations from both of them, and I am sure that hon. Members will be glad to hear that the reports tallied very closely as to what happened. I am sure the conservations were very useful. I do not doubt that Mr. Field will be ready to engage in talks with the leaders of the Government in Northern Rhodesia.
When I met the members of the Executive Council in Northern Rhodesia the elected Ministers made their views very plain to me. These views were expanded and made even plainer at a meeting which I had with representatives of the A.N.C. and U.N.I.P. following on a caucus meeting which lasted four hours, the whole of that morning. I was able

to meet many of the Parliamentary Secretaries and I was struck by their vigour and enthusiasm. They made it plain that they did not wish to continue with the Federation and that they wanted a new Territorial Constitution providing for universal adult suffrage, an enlarged Legislative Council, and a considerable reduction in the powers of the United Kingdom in relation to the territory.
These views were embodied in resolutions which have since been carried in the Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia. I must make it plain that they were carried by the elected members, the official Ministers refraining from taking part in the debate, and remaining thereby outside. These were the views of the elected members as passed by two resolutions through the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council. As regards the question of constitutional change, everyone recognises that the present Constitution is a very complicated one, but it has produced a legislature which reflects the main shades of political opinion in the country on the major political issues of the time, and also a new African Coalition Government which is setting about its tasks in a constructive manner. Opportunity should be given to the new constitution to work and establish thereby the experience necessary for further advance. At the same time, the House must be in no doubt that the aspirations of the new Government towards future constitutional advance are pressing upon us.
I was also informed that, subject to the views which they had expressed, elected Ministers were prepared to attend a conference to be followed by the appointment of a Commission to work out new links between the two Rhodesias. In the light of the statement which I have made about the points of view which have been put by both the Southern and Northern Rhodesian Governments, I will say that Her Majesty's Government have been giving careful consideration to both those points of view and I am at present in contact with, and I will maintain contact with, the Governments concerned. I repeat that it is Her Majesty's Government's position that we should like to see the best possible association negotiated. It is also important that the


Federal Government should have full opportunity to express its own views about the future, and to that end I am also maintaining contact with the Federal Government.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East and the House may well ask whether I have a conference in mind. I shall be glad to listen to the opinions of hon. Members on this subject, because I wish to obtain the voices and views of the House on the important matters which we are discussing this afternoon. But I thiink that the House will agree, having heard the impressions which I have given of my visit, which are borne out by public statements made in both of the territories with which I am concerned, that our objective should be to bring the parties together so that they may, with us, plan their future association together.
We can obtain a lasting settlement only if it is acceptable, and this makes it all the more important that the parties principally concerned should meet each other. We should bring them together on as constructive a basis as possible. I think that there is a general feeling in Central Africa that, given the difficulties of the problems which face us, some preparatory work will be necessary before any formal conference can be held. This, I think, is a sensible way of proceeding. I am therefore at present urgently considering the initiation of such preparatory talks. I think that the House will agree that, the difficulties being as they are, a sense of urgency must be tempered with patience if we are to achieve results.
In concluding my opening speech, I should again like to repeat that I wish to hear the points of view expressed by hon. Members before I take the next step. When I heard that the Opposition had decided to select this subject for today on the Vote on Account, I thought that it was timely and suitable, in order that hon. Members on both sides of the House could express their views about a constructive attitude to the future. I have spent a little time on the White Paper which we published, but most of my time has purposely been spent on the attitude which is being taken up in Central Africa at present.
I should like to say a further word about the position of Her Majesty's Government. During the past weeks and months we have been accused of yielding to pressure, of dilatory tactics and even of not carrying out our duty in the territories concerned. These accusations and complaints have no foundation whatever, and the one which has the least foundation is the allegation that the difficulties of the situation in Central Africa are due to Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Government alone. This is quite untrue. The difficulties of association which now face us spring from the realities of the situation. They spring from facts which the House must meet and face. They spring from the complete alteration in the whole attitude of Africa itself, which has grown particularly strong in the last few years.
In saying these things, I do not wish for one moment to underrate the great achievements which have been accomplished in the last ten years; particularly on the fiscal and economic side, they have to be seen to be understood, and when they are understood, all praise goes to those leaders who have brought them about. Nevertheless, when I said that there is a feeling of looking into the future, I included all the Governments. I believe that there is a general realisation today that it is reasonable to look at some new form of association. It is because I believe that there is a general feeling to this end, and because I believe that the more people study this the more they understand that the facts spring from the Central African situation itself and not from any particular mismanagement on any side, that I believe that we can have a generous approach to this problem and, with the aid of the House, perhaps have a constructive settlement. At any rate, I am glad to have opened the debate with an appeal for a constructive attitude.

Mr. R. T. Paget: On a point of order. The right hon. Gentleman indicated earlier in his speech that we could not discuss the position of Mr. Nkomo, since he has been arrested and charged and we were therefore precluded from discussing the matter by the sub judice rule. In my submission the sub judice rule has never applied to foreign tribunals. As far as I remember,


we had a debate on the arrest of the Vickers' engineers in Russia before the war. In my submission, that situation also applies to self-governing Dominions which, for this purpose, count as foreign courts, since their jurisdiction lies outside the area of our power. Speaking from recollection, I think I am right in saying that we have touched on the arrest of the Opposition leaders in Ghana and, I think, in Nigeria in the last Session or two Sessions. In my submission, the same situation applies to Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. Speaker: I did not understand that the right hon. Gentleman said that our sub judice rule applied in this case. As far as I recollect his words, they were that the matter was sub judice and that he would not discuss it. What the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said to me about our rule is quite right; we can discuss this matter. But I did not understand the right hon. Gentleman to be asserting the contrary.

4.27 p.m.

Mr. Denis Healey: Hon. Members on both sides of the House welcome the first Secretary back from his tour of Central Africa. We feel that he has a political style and personality of a consistency which is rare on the Government benches, and his speech this afternoon will give us a number of new Butlerisms to add to our treasury.
Nevertheless, it was very disappointing. We had all hoped and had been given to believe by the First Secretary when he spoke in the last debate two months ago that his forthcoming tour of Central Africa would make it possible for him to take certain decisions as to the Government's policy on the future of the Federation, decisions which have been overdue for a very long time. Yet in the course of his speech he gave us very little beyond a travel diary, and in the course of this diary he told us a great deal about what other people had said to him and virtually nothing about what he had said to them.
He spent a great deal of time on the things which Her Majesty's Government are forbidden to do by constitutional considerations. He gave us no clue whatever as to how the Government propose to exercise the very important legal powers and responsibilities which they still exercise in Central Africa. In spite of what he said in his concluding remarks, the exercise of these powers and responsibilities

will be absolutely decisive on whether the peoples of Central Africa are to live in peace or whether the whole area is to fall into political and economic chaos.
I well understand that the First Secretary did not want to spend a great deal of time on the affair of the pledges. I do not want to spend a lot of time on it either, but I must spend some time on it. I sympathise with him in his embarrassment. As he said in his concluding remarks, he is dealing with a situation in Central Africa today which is totally different from that which obtained when the Federation was set up in 1953, although we on this side of the House have always maintained—and we have been proved right—that the situation which has developed is the inevitable consequence of mistaken decisions taken by the Government 10 years ago.
I do not think that even the right lion. Gentleman personally can escape responsibility for the decisions taken in 1953 or for the pledges, if pledges there were, which were made by Ministers at that time. After all, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Government which decided to bring in the Central African Federation, and I must presume that he was privy to and a party to the statements which were made by Ministers in the discussions which led to the Federation being set up. He cannot now escape responsibility for those errors of judgment any more that he can escape responsibility for Suez or for the mismanagement of the whole affair of Britain's relations with the Common Market.
The question of these so-called pledges is not just a matter of historical interest. I believe that the House should insist on establishing the facts in order to know, not only whether Her Majesty's Government have behaved wisely or foolishly but also whether they behaved honestly or dishonestly. I do not believe that anybody can dispute the justice of these remarks which appeared in an editorial in The Times last week:
It is important, in reaching a verdict in this matter, not to be deflected by the notion that if the pledges were admitted, they would have to be implemented to the extent of maintaining the Federation by force. They cannot be but that is no reason to deny that they were given. It is just as necessary to decide


whether the Government's honour was pledged by Ministers who, while not seers, were supposed to take eventualities into account. It is an issue of honour, not policy —but that does not mean that it is irrelevant or unimportant.
I believe that it is in this spirit that we should examine the facts which were set before us in the Government's own White Paper and speeches by the ex-Ministers concerned in the House of Lords. I do not believe that anybody can read the White Paper published by Her Majesty's Government without deciding that pledges were given by Her Majesty's Ministers at that time. The question as to the precise juridical status of those pledges is one which can be argued, but that those pledges were binding in common honour and decency and that they were given in that sense is absolutely beyond dispute. It is only necessary to read the paragraph quoted by the White Paper, which runs as follows:
The general view expressed by delegates was that, since any proposal to terminate the Constitution could only be put into effect with the concurrence of the Federal Government and all three Territorial Governments, and of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it was unlikely that investors would consider the proposed review clause a reflection on the permanence of the Federation.
Indeed, it is not necessary to labour the point. Every British newspaper, in commenting on the Government's own White Paper, has admitted that, right or wrong, the White Paper shows that pledges were given which have later been broken.
Indeed, the pledges were confirmed in the House of Lords debate on 19th December of last year by all the ex-Ministers concerned. They were confirmed by Lord Chandos, who was Secretary of State at the discussions. They were confirmed by Lord Colyton, who was Minister of State at the discussions. They were confirmed by Lord Malvern, who was the leading representative of the Central African Territories, and later first Prime Minister of the Federation. They were confirmed by the Marquess of Salisbury, who was Secretary of State when the Federation was being set up in 1952. They were confirmed by Lord Boyd, who was Minister of State at that time and later became, in turn, Secretary of State himself. They were confirmed

in letters to The Times by Sir Albert Robinson, who was present at the talks, and by Sir Gilbert Rennie. On 18th February, only 10 days ago, those Ministers who were taking part in the discussions under review confirmed that pledges had been given, although one of them maintained that the precise juridical status of the pledges was not quite so unassailable as he had earlier imagined.
There is not the slightest doubt that the Ministers of Her Majesty's Government did express their intention not to change the Constitution of the Federation without the concurrence of all the four Governments in Central Africa, and I believe, with The Times newspaper, that Lord Salisbury's verdict holds, namely, that "the point is not whether the United Kingdom could do what it has done. The point is that the Government said that they would not do it and yet they have done it".

Mr. Humphry Berkeley: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will understand that all of us are most concerned about the honour of the Government and, indeed, of Ministers of the Crown. I think that he has not been quite fair either to Lord Swinton or to Lord Chandos. I have with me two extracts from their speeches in the debate on 18th February to which I had proposed to refer in my speech. If the hon. Gentleman will allow me just to make one brief quotation from Lord Chandos's speech——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir William Austruther-Gray): Order. I am afraid that the hon. Member will get into difficulties if he does that. It would not be in order to quote from a speech in the current Session made by a noble Lord unless he was speaking on behalf of the Government. It would be better if the hon. Member who has the Floor were allowed to continue his speech.

Mr. Healey: I am not sure, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether you are not showing a certain political partiality in ruling the hon. Member's quotation out of court on that ground. With respect to the point which I think the hon. Gentleman intended to make, I did not refer at any stage to what Lord Swinton said. It is clear from Lord Swinton's speech in another place that he understood the undertakings given to be


different in their purport from the significance given to them by Lord Colyton, Lord Salisbury and Lord Boyd. Lord Chandos, whom I did quote, in the debate 10 days ago slightly corrected his memory of what had happen compared with what he had said earlier, but he himself added that it was his belief that the Federation was carried through by the African political leaders concerned on an understanding which Her Majesty's Government had later broken.
I do not believe that this is the end of the story in any case. The real question which should concern the House is why these pledges were kept secret. Why has it taken 10 years to bring out the truth? The Government's White Paper, rather naively in my opinion, makes the point that if a pledge of such vital importance was given there was no reason for secrecy with regard to it. Is that indeed the case? The plain fact is that the Government felt that it was necessary to give these pledges in order to persuade the African politicians concerned to agree to the Federation, and I believe that they gave these pledges in good faith. However, they were too cowardly to admit to the House of Commons that these pledges had been given, because they knew perfectly well that the House of Commons would not have given a Second Reading to the Bill to set up a Central African Federation if it had known that it was setting up something which the Government intended to be unconditionally indissoluble in all circumstances.
In the White Paper the Government quite rightly quote statements which were made in the House of Commons during the debates which led to the setting up of the Federation which emphasised the fact that the Federation was being set up as an experiment—that we would see how the thing got along that we would review the whole experiment after seven or eight years and if the thing turned out not to be working properly we could think again about it; that Her Majesty's Ministers emphasised again and again in the debates that the setting up of the Federation did not derogate in any way from the powers of Her Majesty's Government or of Her Majesty's Parliament in

Westminster. They emphasised that the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would remain unaffected. If they had not done so, I doubt whether the Federation would ever have come into existence.
This surely is the answer to the question so naïvely asked in the White Paper as to why the pledges were kept secret, because the Federation would never have come into existence if the people of all the territories concerned and if the people of this country and if the Members of Her Majesty's House of Commons in Westminster had known that Her Majesty's Government were not attempting an experiment in constitutional co-operation in Central Africa but were intending to create a fact which would be totally irreversible.
The fact is that Her Majesty's Ministers, not for the first time in the last 11 years, have said one thing in private and another in public. In private they have declared their intention of renouncing the sovereign rights vested in this House and, in public, they have said nothing about it whatever. They have chosen in the end to honour pledges made in public rather than those made in private.
What an appalling commentary that is on the moral standards of the Government under which this country has been administered for the last 11 years. Indeed, Sir Roy Welensky pointed out, when commenting on the Government's White Paper, that it was all very well for the Government to argue now that their responsibilities to the inhabitants of Nyasaland demanded that they should allow Nyasaland to secede from the Federation. The plain fact is, as Sir Roy said in Salisbury, that Her Majesty's Government knew in 1953, just as well as they know today, that the overwhelming majority of the population of Nyasaland was as opposed to the Federation then as it is now. My hon. Friends welcome the fact that, even though it has taken 10 years, the Government at last are prepared to face the facts of the situation in Central Africa.
But there can be no question that, in this respect, there is no essential difference in the attitude of the Africans now compared with their attitude 10 years ago. What an appalling commentary that is,


not only on the British Government's moral standards but on their political foresight. It seems to me that the way they have behaved in this matter—and it is worth reminding ourselves that we would never have known of the Government's behaviour had it not been for the accident of a situation developing in which Sir Roy Welensky revealed the pledges—is bound to create anxiety about the pledges which Her Majesty's Ministers may have made at other meetings, on other occasions and concerning other issues; perhaps at Rambouillet, perhaps in the Bahamas or perhaps in Brussels.
Did I hear the First Secretary say "Nonsense"? Our fear is that if it can happen once it might happen again and I might give notice that if, when we take office, we find that other secret pledges have been made by this Government which contradict their public obligations, we will feel it both our right and our duty to ignore them.
I pass to the future, although I confess that it is difficult to get the stench of this particular episode out of one's nostrils. I pass to the situation today in the light of the public statements of the First Secretary, including the statement which he repeated this afternoon that any solution of the problems of Central Africa must be acceptable to the peoples of the territories concerned. If he takes that view he must surely admit that the Federation is dead. Nyasaland has already been promised independence and is prepared to face the economic consequences. The people of Northern Rhodesia—even the small number of them who were permitted to express their view at the last general election—voted 88 per cent. for independence and a new constitution.
If the right hon. Gentleman is prepared to let the people of Nyasaland have independence when they want it, in spite of the economic dangers which certainly that country will incur through independence, he should be doubly ready to concede it to Northern Rhodesia because, as he knows, Northern Rhodesia has had a net loss of between £5 million and £8 million a year as a result of being in the Federation. She would have nothing but economic gain as a result of leaving it.
Then we have the statement of the new Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to the effect that there should be "a clean break now". There is now unanimity in the elected Governments of all the territories, broken only by Sir Roy Welensky—the Federal Prime Minister who was elected by 10,000 votes out of 9 million, the Leader of a party which has been rejected by Europeans and Africans alike in every territory over which he claims authority. Surely the First Secretary, if he is prepared to act on the principle which he has put to us today, must accept this verdict and not continue this dithering and shilly-shallying; for delay can only increase the risk of violence on the spot and do nothing to make the inevitable decision more palatable to his own back benchers.
It seems absolutely absurd, from the First Secretary's speech today, that he should continue this delay. It is ridiculous that the Government of Nyasaland should be negotiating with the phantom Government of Sir Roy Welensky about its relations with the Federation which everyone knows is doomed when it secedes. How much better to accept Mr. Winston Field's advice and allow the three Governments now to discuss with one another as independent countries the disposal of the assets of this constitutional corpse. This is not the only danger. The longer the right hon. Gentleman delays in taking this long overdue decision the more danger he has of an abuse of power by the Federal authorities.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the shocking case of Dr. Terence Ranger who, after six years' service to the peoples of Central Africa as a lecturer at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, has been declared a prohibited immigrant. I am speaking, of course, of a man who's devotion to the area has been so great that he applied for citizenship almost as soon as he arrived there in 1957; a man against whom no charge has been laid. He has been declared a danger to the security of the Federation simply because he is a nuisance to Sir Roy Welensky and because he chose to exercise his legal right to be a member of the Zimbabwe African People's Union when it was a legal organisation.
His university has protested against his expulsion. This man is not a Communist.
He is not even a Labourite. I understand that he is a supporter of the party opposite; and all credit to him for the courage he, like a few hon. Members opposite, has shown in pursuing the genuine ideal of racial co-operation in Central Africa rather than a false one. The only complaint against Dr. Ranger is that he tried to bridge the gulf between the races and that he was successful. I urge hon. Members to note that the African people of Southern Rhodesia went to bid Dr. Ranger farewell at the airport when he left for Tanganyika and that Mr. Nkomo offered to admit him as soon as an African majority holds power in that State.
It seems to me that there is no real case whatever in continuing with this fiction of the Federation in the circumstances. If the First Secretary is sincere—as I am sure he is—in saying that he wants to save as much as possible in the economic field from the wreck of the Federation, then I beg him to accept that the only chance of saving anything is to declare the right of secession for Northern Rhodesia now. There is no chance of any serious discussion taking place between the African Government in Northern Rhodesia and the Government in Southern Rhodesia until the Federation issue is absolutely out of the way.
Nor do I believe that there is any real chalice of rapid progress in Northern Rhodesia until that territory is given a new constitution to replace the trick constitution which has already, two years late, performed unexpectedly its only real function; which was to allow an African majority to scrape into the Legislative Council in Lusaka.
It seems to me that any further delay increases the danger of terrorism in the area itself. It increases tension between the races. It also increases tension between the Africans themselves. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman has not the slightest desire to see a situation develop in Northern Rhodesia such as unhappily faces us at present in Kenya. The best guarantee against that situation developing is to give Northern Rhodesia a constitution now which will allow the true weight of African opinion to be expressed in the Legislative Council.
The right hon. Gentleman said quite rightly that there are many tremendous

and difficult problems to be faced. There is the problem of Barotseland. This was the one case where the right hon. Gentleman told us what he had said to the people he met. Unfortunately, in this case he did not tell us what reply he got, and I wonder whether he can persuade or inveigle his right hon. Friend to tell us whether there is any chance of the authorities in Barotseland acceding to the wishes for constitutional reform which he expressed to them.
But at least the economic future for Northern Rhodesia is bright. One of the most striking developments over the last six months is the way in which the economic centre of power in the Federation has shifted from Salisbury to Lusaka. The great mining company on whose activities the prosperity of the whole area and not only that of Northern Rhodesia depends has so much confidence in the future of Northern Rhodesia that it has given £2 million to improve African housing on the Copperbelt. Northern Rhodesia is much less dependent on Southern Rhodesia now than it was, because the end of secession in Katanga means that if the Southern Rhodesia Government try to throttle Northern Rhodesia's economy by cutting off its sources of energy or preventing the passage of its goods to the outside world, there is now an alternative source of electric power and there is an alternative route to world trade open to the Government of Northern Rhodesia.
The economic co-operation between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia now depends, first, on the right of secession being immediately acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government and, secondly, upon some prospect of political advance for the African majority in Southern Rhodesia. I have consistently stated over the last 12 months that the real problem in Central Africa is the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Many tears have been cast over the defeat of Sir Edgar Whitehead in the last elections in Southern Rhodesia. But let us face it, as the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) pointed out in a recent letter to The Times, that Sir Edgar Whitehead lost the last election not because he was too keen on African advance but because he had not the courage of the convictions which hon. Members opposite had attributed to him.
If Sir Edgar had not transferred 3,500 African votes from the old common roll to the B roll he probably would have won a majority. If he had accepted a simple qualification for African voters on the B roll he would have had a number of African representatives who were really representative in the new Parliament in Salisbury and prepared to co-operate with those forces among the Europeans in favour of progress to move Southern Rhodesia in the same direction as Northern Rhodesia. The fact is that he did not show that courage, and he paid the price when the Rhodesian Front swept him out of power.
I think that all of us were surprised at the victory of the Rhodesian Front. On the surface, from a reading of the election returns, it was an overwhelming victory, but let us not forget that the Rhodesian Front was elected to power in Southern Rhodesia by 38,500 votes, that is, 1 per cent, of the total population, and we now have a new Government and a new Prime Minister. I think that all of us are puzzled to try to predict the course which Mr. Winston Field is likely to follow in that territory.
If I may be permitted a personal reminiscence, I fought alongside Mr. Winston Field in Italy over 20 years ago and I remember him well as an able and courageous soldier, and as an honourable and straightforward man. I know from talking to African leaders from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as well as from Southern Rhodesia that they have found him very much easier to work with as a man than they found Sir Edgar Whitehead. They found him straightforward in his dealings with them and betraying far less sense of racial superiority than his predecessor as Prime Minister. I think that many of the things which he has said and done since he has been elected have given some of us at least a spark of hope that he may succeed in moving the European community, which alone he represents, in the direction which Sir Edgar Whitehead may have tried to lead them but certainly failed.
We have to face the fact, however, that Mr. Winston Field and his Government were elected on a tide of racial prejudice and that there has been a great deterioration in European behaviour towards Africans in Southern Rhodesia since he

was elected. We must remember that some of the other leaders of the Rhodesian Front would be much more at home with Dr. Verwoerd than with Sir Edgar Whitehead or with the right hon. Gentleman the First Secretary. We all welcome the release of Mr. Nkomo and the Z.A.P.U. leaders, who had been even longer in gaol, and also his offer to allow Africans to form a new party.
At the same time we had the absolutely deplorable and inexcusable new hanging and flogging Bill. Although some of its more Draconian and barbaric provisions are, I believe, now likely to be amended if the Bill goes through, it is still likely to impose a mandatory death sentence for arson except, where the accused are pregnant women or youths under 16. It is likely to make a 10-strokes whipping an additional penalty for offences under the Law and Order Maintenance Act. Above all, it is likely to prohibit all public meetings on Sunday, which is the only day when Africans in the townships find it possible to meet in large numbers.
We have to note with sorrow the fact that the new Minister of Labour seems determined to keep the minimum African wage at £9 15s. a month, instead of increasing it by 50 per cent. as his predecessor intended to do. We note the shocking insult to the chief African Minister of Northern Rhodesia when Mr. Kaunda was kept under restriction for seven hours at the airport, and the cat and mouse treatment of Mr. Nkomo and nine other Z.A.P.U. leaders who are now being tried on trivial charges which would not stand up for five minutes in an English court of law.
I do not know how tragically we should take some of these events, but I cannot help feeling that some of them are due to administrative incompetence rather than to design. It seems that neither Mr. Winston Field nor Mr. Dupont, the Minister of Justice, knew that Mr. Nkomo was to be arrested or knew of Mr. Kaunda's treatment at the airport. We are sometimes misled into believing that this is a great State analogous with other great States in the European world. We forget that we are talking about a European population of a quarter of a million, with political leaders and standards not very different from those obtaining in cities of that size in Britain.
What I suggest—I was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman could not go further on this today—is that the time has come when he should make a public declaration that there will be no independence for Souhern Rhodesia until there is majority rule. I could understand, though I could not sympathise with, his reluctance to make such a statement so long as Sir Edgar Whitehead was in charge. I do not believe that he could ever excuse himself in his own conscience if he took a step in giving independence to a régime such as that which now exists in Salisbury.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman to bear an important matter in mind. Perhaps, in the light of what has been stated in the Press, I can speak a little more plainly today than I could when I raised the matter nine months ago. If, as a result of an act of the British Government or, indeed, as the result of an act in defiance of the British Government, the regime in Salisbury becomes independent or declares itself independent, it is certain that there will be set up an African Government of Southern Rhodesia in exile, perhaps in another Commonwealth country in Africa. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman and all hon. and right hon. Members know how irremediably such a development could complicate the problems which we now face in the area.
I do not deny that our ability to influence what is happening in Southern Rhodeseia is severely limited, though many of the limitations were deliberately imposed by act of Her Majesty's Government during the past few years. However, I believe that, as the months pass—this is a development which will take place in months rather than in years—it will become painfully apparent to the European population in Southern Rhodesia that their economic survival depends on achieving better relations with their neighbours in Africa and that they can achieve such better relations only if they are prepared to concede to the Africans in Southern Rhodesia the same rights and privileges as Africans have achieved in most other parts of that continent.
Already, there is the prospect that an independent Northern Rhodesian Government will end the customs union with Southern Rhodesia and so reduce, if not cut out, 30 per cent. of the territory's existing imports. Already, European business is moving day by day and week by week from Salisbury to Lusaka.
Already, private investment is dying away in the territory. I believe I am right in saying that Southern Rhodesia has a national debt of £200 million and has to pay £12 million a year in interest alone, which is nearly 20 per cent. of its potential tax revenue. There is certain to be a catastrophic fall in the living standards of the European population of Southern Rhodesia unless they can bring themselves to face the fact to which the First Secretary referred in his closing remarks, the fact that it is no longer possible to maintain a privileged status for a tiny minority in any African State such as Southern Rhodesia. The only alternative to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia is domination by an Afrikaner dictatorship, followed by bloodshed and ultimate defeat for the whole European population.
I do not claim that it will be easy for the Europeans on the spot to face these very unpalatable facts. I do not claim that it will be easy for the right hon. Gentleman or for any British Government to persuade them to face these facts, but I believe that the First Secretary knows as well as we do on this side of the House what must be done in Central Africa if the peoples of those territories are to have any chance of a peaceful and prosperous future. I pray that, even now, he will find the courage to do it.

5.4 p.m.

Sir Roland Robinson: I know that a great many of my hon. Friends wish to take part in the debate, so, with that in mind, I propose to make my own intervention a short one.
Having listened to the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), I wish to go on record as saying that I and, I believe, all my hon. and right hon. Friends have the greatest confidence in the First Secretary in his handling of the situation in Central Africa. I believe that he and those associated with him have approached their task with a degree of thoroughness and understanding which should be pleasing to this House and to those with whom they have to deal in Central Africa. There is no doubt that, in taking over the problems of Central Africa, my right hon. Friend has shouldered a very difficult task. The truth is, as he, of course, realises, that, in spite of its very great economic success, federation has not worked so


smoothly in the field of human understanding. He took on his task knowing well that some measure of change was inevitable.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East chose to look back and sought to prove that, in some way or other, the First Secretary was bound by pledges made in 1953. I was not surprised that he looked backwards. It is not the first time we have seen that kind of approach in the House. His argument was really rather extraordinary. The Government have taken the view that there was not a specific pledge. The hon. Gentleman seeks to establish that there was such a pledge, but not because he wants it kept, since, if we followed his line of argument, the pledge should be broken immediately. I cannot understand the logic of his seeking to insist that there was a pledge.

Mr. Healey: Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that it is quite unimportant and of no consequence to the House, the country or the Commonwealth whether Her Majesty's Ministers made promises and later broke them?

Sir R. Robinson: That was not the argument I used. I was pointing out that, while Her Majesty's Government said that there was no specific pledge on this matter, it was extraordinary that the hon. Gentleman, whose policy it is to say that there should be no pledge of that kind, should seek to establish that there was one. That is all.
In fairness, the hon. Gentleman should take his mind back to 1953, to the situation in which the new Federation was created. Every person who sits round the table at such a time wants the plan to work and will, if possible, visualise it lasting for ever. With that in mind, they try to make their agreement as firm as possible. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the debates following in the House when it was made clear that we had not in any way given up this country's sovereignty, which, I think, is the basis of the whole thing. However, in any case, I consider that the argument about whether there was or was not a pledge is, in the light of the circumstances of Africa today, a purely academic matter.
After 10 years, the situation in Africa is completely and radically changed.
When the Federation was formed, who among those sitting round the table would have thought of the great surge of African nationalism which was to take place?

Mr. Healey: We did. We told the Government so.

Mr. John Stonehouse: Blind and stupid.

Sir R. Robinson: I repeat that the great surge of African nationalism was not foreseen by those who were sitting round the table forming the Federation at the time. They did not see the great growth of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations and all the influence which goes with it. Things have changed so radically that, even if any pledges were given, they would be utterly unrealistic today and impossible of fulfilment. We must take the view that the Africa of 1953 has gone and will not return. We must face the facts of Africa in 1963 and see what we can do for its future.
Changed circumstances of this nature are not altogether unusual. I ask hon. Members to take their minds back to the days of the beginning of the Second World War. On both sides of the House it was made abundantly clear that we made a pledge that we would wage war until the frontiers of Poland were restored to what they were in 1939. But, six years later, after the war was over, no one felt that such a pledge was realistic and could be enforced. I do not think that anyone in this House, or in Rhodesia—the Rhodesians were part of our effort—would have thought that we should have gone to war to fulfil a pledge which had been given in entirely different circumstances.
I think that my right hon. Friend must look to the future. I believe that his task in Central Africa is to try to reach an agreement on a new form of association which can replace the old federal system. There is no doubt that there were many real and great economic advantages in federation, and in the interests of the people of Central Africa we should try to find a way in which we can keep them. I do not think that a difficult task like this is helped by speeches from the other side of the House saying that there is no chance of


this or no chance of that and that Southern Rhodesia may well consider throttling the great copper industries of the north for its advantage. Statements like that make my right hon. Friend's task more difficult.
We should not speak in that way and we should not seek to encourage extravagant claims by any party. The future of the Central African countries surely can be settled only in the spirit of give and take and by a determination to reach some kind of agreement for their mutual benefit. We should avoid recriminations at this stage. The position there today is very fluid. My right hon. Friend has his teams out working now. The negotiations are delicate. I think that practically all of the political leaders on both sides are a little bit prickly, and we have to be careful how we handle the situation.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East mentioned the mistakes that have been made. They have been made on both sides and probably more will be made in future, but we should, as far as possible, not be turned aside from the main task by that kind of thing. We should go ahead with our efforts to try to achieve understanding. I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to get a measure of agreement and a new kind of association which will be in the interests of all the people in Central Africa. I believe that he can play a part in building a prosperous and happy Central Africa for the future.

5.14 p.m.

Mr. John Stonehouse: I have seldom heard a more platitudinous speech than that just completed by the right hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson). What he was saying was that we must continue to have undimmed confidence in the Ministers on the Government Front Bench. On what basis can we really have faith in their performance? They have made many deplorable mistakes over the last 10 years, both in creating the Federation and in attempting to sustain it by a series of hypocritical acts and evasions, by using political power and suppression in order to keep this monster in existence. For how long can back bench Members opposite continue to have faith in the Ministers who have let them down so badly and who have brought this country into such disrepute?
The First Secretary gave us a mournful, funereal oration on the Federation, although he did not actually pronounce the corpse dead. We have to wait for Dr. Banda to produce the death certificate in the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation. Once Dr. Banda's Malawi has left the Federation, it in fact no longer exists. As the First Secretary said, it is impossible to stand against the overwhelming demand in Malawi for that country to secede. If there is an overwhelming demand in Malawi for secession, how can anyone deny that there is an equally overwhelming demand in Northern Rhodesia for secession?
The last election results in that country show that for the Lower Roll elections there was a total of 76,000 votes for parties which announced themselves as being opposed to the continuation of the Federation, and precisely 180 pro-Federation votes—·2 per cent. of the total poll. Even on the Upper Roll, which was predominantly European, 29·3 per cent. of the votes were cast against Federation votes for U.N.I.P., for A.N.C., and the Liberal Party. The total number of pro-Federation votes, if the Lower and Upper Rolls are brought together, represents only about 20 per cent. of the total vote, despite the fact that most of the population of Northern Rhodesia were denied the opportunity to express their opinion. If they had had the chance to express their opinion, there would, no doubt, have been a 97 per cent. vote against federation.
How long can this fiction be maintained? What is the use of assuming that this Federation can continue? The fact must be recognised that it is coming to an end, and everybody's plans for the future must be based on that. However, it would be a mistake to work out the policy on the basis of allowing independence to each of the territories on the present constitutions which have been arranged for them. This would be all right for Nyasaland. There is no doubt that there the overwhelming majority of the population is fairly represented in the Administration set up by Dr. Banda. But in Northern Rhodesia there must be a new constitution which will allow universal adult suffrage, and that territory must be allowed internal self-determination at a very early date.
Southern Rhodesia is ruled by a white dictatorship. The black members of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament do not represent their own community. They are "stooges" and they do not in any way express the opinions of the large majority of black people who have not participated in the elections to their House and have no representative there. The Constitution of Southern Rhodesia must be revised to enable the wishes of the people of that country to be fairly expressed. If the Government of Mr. Winston Field continues in power, there will be not only a continuing decline in the faith of the economic future of that territory but a development towards a political situation which could well lead to violence and bloodshed on a very large scale. It is only by revising that Constitution and allowing the mass of people there who are now unrepresented to express themselves that there is any chance whatever of bloodshed being avoided.
Mr. Winston Field has been represented as a Liberal and a Progressive. I do not accept that this is true. His actions so far since achieving power show that he is determined to maintain apartheid in the territory. We have a continuation of the Land Apportionment Act. According to the news release of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the High Commissioner which is headed, rather strangely, "Let us deserve to be great", we understand that the European land ownership will be maintained and that
only in restricted degree and in special circumstances will any land be set aside for occupation by any race".
Almost all the land in Southern Rhodesia will continue to be allocated to separate racial groups.
As the House is well aware, the Land Apportionment Act, which is not to be amended, allocates over half the total land area in Southern Rhodesia to the tiny minority of Europeans in the territory forming less than 10 per cent. of the total population—an area larger than England and Wales combined allocated to a population about 250,000 strong. This is a terrible economic injustice. It denies the African population a fair share of land resources and it denies them an opportunity of participating also in

economic activity in the towns, where this discrimination also applies.
In other words, in Southern Rhodesia the African continues to be regarded as a second-class citizen. While this situation continues, there is bound to be growing resentment on the part of the Africans. Whether their political parties are allowed to exist or not, they will organise themselves, they will develop their forces and one day they will strike and demand the rights which they are entitled to have. None of the sweet, soothing words that we hear from the First Secretary will prevent that occurring.
There is a grave possibility that with the dangers of violence growing in Southern Rhodesia and the failure of Mr. Winston Field, whose forces are not particularly strong, to cope with this situation, Southern Rhodesia will be absorbed into South Africa and become a province of Dr. Verwoerd's. That must be prevented by the Government here acting with great firmness and demanding a new constitution. If they fail to get the agreement of Mr. Winston Field and his colleagues to a round-table conference today, they must use the powers which they undoubtedly possess to suspend the Southern Rhodesia Constitution and impose a solution that will take into account the desires and the wishes of the broad majority of the population.
The recently announced intention to use a compulsory death penalty against offenders who use petrol bombs—a measure which has aroused the antagonism not only of those who are likely to be affected by this new, terrible, dictatorial rule, but also of Europeans in the territory who fear this terrible power that has been taken by Mr. Winston Field's administration—is an example of the sort of madness that is almost inevitable when a European minority is given political power against the wishes of the black majority. This sort of measure shows how desperately serious the situation will get in future years unless the Government here impose their rule and make sure that a decent, honourable constitution is devised so that people can express their own intentions.

Mr. Ronald Russell: What punishment does the hon. Member suggest for arson, or is he trying to justify it?

Mr. Stonehouse: I am saying that if political dictatorship is imposed on the black majority, if they are denied elementary human rights, they will eventually resort to unconstitutional measures to make their feelings known. This was true in Cyprus and in Kenya. It will be true in Southern Rhodesia as it was true in Algeria. Unless the Government have the sense to impose their will to prevent the situation getting worse, undoubtedly bloodshed will occur as a result of illegal acts.
I deplore that the people who aspire towards the rightful expression of their point of view should have to turn to these ways of expressing their opinions, but the situation demands that of them. If they act in this way, the law will have to be applied, but to use the death penalty for arson goes far beyond any sense of justice.
I hope, therefore, that in view of this situation, the Government will do their best to persuade Mr. Winston Field to agree to a round-table conference with the intention of devising a new and honourable constitution for the territory. Then, it will be enabled to move towards independence, in the same way that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are moving towards independence. But independence with white dictatorship would be wrong, not only for the black majority; it would not be in the interests of the white minority themselves. They can expect no permanent security if their livelihood and the future of their children depend on maintaining the dictatorship of less than 10 per cent. of the population over the rest of the community.
We must recognise that Southern Rhodesia, like Northern Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika, is an African country and Africans will rule it. The longer we delay the emergence of a constitution that will give the black people of that country the chance to play their full part in running it in association with Europeans, who will, naturally, play a minority part because they are a minority community, the more dangers there will be in the situation.
The First Secretary said, in a very frank phrase, that the situation arises from the facts. It is most regrettable that the Ministers who were responsible did not face the facts in past years. The

facts were described to them from this side of the House time and time again. They refused to acknowledge the situation that was developing, not in the last few months, but many years ago. They were warned, but they refused to accept the advice that they were given from all sides.
We had a series of deplorable statements from the Government Front Bench. The Ministers concerned and those who have succeeded them have chosen to forget about it. I refer to the stupid speeches about the massacre plot in Nyasaland and the long-winded, evasive and dishonest speeches that we had justifying the complicated constitutions for these territories which were designed to maintain white domination.
Now we have the recognition that these devices have failed, and that African rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland has come to stay. Let us sweep away the humbug as far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned as well, and acknowledge that this territory will have African rule before many years have passed and that it will be in the best interests of all concerned if we plan for it within the next few months rather than delay it for some years.
I want to refer to the case of Dr. Ranger, who has been prohibited in the most disturbing circumstances. He is not the only example of a respectable citizen who has been prevented from visiting or staying in Rhodesia or Nyasaland by the immigration powers exercised by Sir Roy Welensky's Government. I ask the First Secretary of State whether he will also investigate these other cases as well as that of Dr. Ranger which he has been good enough to take up. There are ten, if not hundreds, of other cases of men and women—professional people and others—who wish to do a job of work in these territories but who have been denied the chance to do so by the use of the immigration powers of the Federal Administration. I ask for these cases to be fully investigated and for representations to be made on their behalf in addition to those made on behalf of Dr. Ranger.
For the future, I hope that it will be possible for these territories to remain in some economic association, but we should be deluding ourselves if we thought


that association could be maintained with the continuation of a white dictatorship south of the Zambesi. Provided that there is development towards a democratic constitution fairly soon in Southern Rhodesia, I think that there is the hope that the political leaders in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will agree to a continuation of some economic association.
Then, indeed, it may be possible for the Federation to be re-created, but not just as a federation between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland but one which will take in Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and perhaps Zanzibar as well, creating a strong federation stretching from Kampala to Nairobi right down to Salisbury. I look forward to the day when this is achieved, but I do not think it can be achieved unless Southern Rhodesia itself has a democratic constitution.
I hope that the endeavours that are made during the next few months will be towards that end, not only in the interests of the long-term development of a new and more genuine federation but also in the interests of preventing bloodshed.

5.34 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Wall: The hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) referred to the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) as being platitudinous. But his own speech seemed to me to be both unbalanced and provocative, and, if I may say respectfully to him, therefore stupid in the context of the present state of relations in the Federation. It can do no good to relations in that part of the world, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend took such great care with his speech because he did not want to raise the temperature. But the hon. Gentleman's speech will raise the temperature at a very dangerous period in the history of Central Africa.
I had not intended to mention three subjects because I did not think that they were of primary importance, but they have been mentioned by every speaker so far. They are, first, pledges; secondly, Dr. Ranger, and, thirdly, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill. I will deal very briefly with them, as they have been mentioned so often.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South pointed out, it is quite clear that there were no pledges in the sense of written undertakings. I believe that in the minds of all those who sat in Westminster ten years ago there was no question of breaking up the Federation at a future 'date; they intended the Federation to remain. What amazes me is why the Government could not have taken the line advocated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South and said quite simply, "Though no written pledges were given, it is quite clear that understandings were reached, or undertakings given, ten years ago. But in the light of events in Africa and in the world during the last ten years, they cannot now be implemented."
If the Government had said that, it would have been understood by the man in the street, both in Rhodesia and in this country, and by Sir Roy Welensky as well. Unfortunately, the Government chose to take the legalistic way out, so that we have had long and very involved debates in another place which did not contribute very much to the solution of the problem.
This misunderstanding between the Federal Government and the British Government over the pledges also extends to the Monckton Commission and whether or not its terms of reference should or should not have included discussion about secession. It extends also to the many debates and the many different constitutions we have had for Northern Rhodesia and to the way in which the secession of Nyasaland was announced. I regret it, but one must face the fact that this misunderstanding exists. In deceding whether or not pledges were given in 1953, I believe that the man in the street has awarded the issue to Sir Roy Welensky on points.
I find myself in agreement with critics of the proceedings against Dr. Ranger and of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill, which is now being debated in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. I do not agree with Dr. Ranger's views, but, as far as one can see, he has broken no law and should not be expelled. But it is only fair to say that the maintenance of law and order is a territorial functions and not a Federal one. If blame is to be attributed, it must be


placed on the late Government of Southern Rhodesia rather than on the Federal Government.
I think that everyone in this House, and a large number of people in Southern Rhodesia, disagree with the mandatory death penalty proposed in this Bill. The Opposition in Salisbury is pledged to fight to the bitter end, and the Opposition includes 14 members of the African race, many of whom have personal experience of patrol bombs. I should remind the hon. Member for Wednesbury that there have been 73 cases of petrol bombing since January, 1962. I also remind him that the Government of Southern Rhodesia have already accepted certain amendments about children, pregnant women and others.
One must hope that when they read this debate and the views expressed on both sides of the House they will accept further amendments and, if possible, abolish the mandatory death penalty, which is against the traditions of this House and also the traditions of the Southern Rhodesian House, which inherited them and has preserved them faithfully since 1923.
I believe that this may be the last debate in which this House can discuss the future of so many millions of people in Central Africa. The drawback of our Parliamentary system here is that the Executive tends to make decisions and we in the Legislature tend to debate those decisions afterwards, when we cannot directly influence them. Therefore, I suggest that this debate may be the last one we shall have before decisions are taken about Central Africa which will perhaps settle the history of that part of the continent, and possibly of the whole continent, for many years to come.
I shall divide my speech into two parts, the first dealing with the background which exists in Africa today and the second discussing the Federation itself. I returned from a visit to Northern and Southern Rhodesia only last night and I can speak to the House in up-to-date terms about what the people in that part of the world are thinking today.
In discussing these problems of Africa and Central Africa, I should like to speak from the British point of view.

Time after time in the House we have heard people speaking from the European point of view or from the African paint of view, from every point of view except the British. There is a time in our history when we have to consider these problems in a selfish light, in the light of what is best for this country and its people. Having said that, I ask the House to bear with me for a few minutes while I outline what is taking place in that continent, for I think that that is a necessary background to our consideration of what is happening in 'Central Africa.
Broadly speaking, Africa can be divided into three areas. The first is the Mediterranean seaboard, the North coast of Africa which is the Arab world and concerns Arab problem, which therefore has nothing to do with Central Africa, except that we can perhaps learn one lesson. In the years between the wars and since the Second World War we heard a lot about Pan-Arabism, and in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s we saw many countries in the Arab world becoming independent and sovereign. After the end of the Second World War, in about 1947, the Arab League was formed, with our assistance and support.
One felt that as these countries became independent, they would come together in the Arab League and speak with a united Arab voice. But that has not happened. The more Arab countries which became independent, the more there was a struggle about who was to lead the Arab world—Egypt or Iraq, or, now, Algeria. There is more division in the Arab world today than at any time in recent history, and this might have some bearing on the future of Pan-Africanism.
The second region of Africa is that from South of the Sahara to the Federation. It is the region where we have black-led States, and I use the term "black-led" rather than "European" or "African" because I want to make my meaning quite clear. In that part of Africa, which is the great bulk of the continent, there will be black-led States which will be authoritarian or at least one-party States.
I quote from a speech by Mr. Abdoulaye Diallo, Secretary-General of the All-African Peoples Congress, at a


meeting in Cairo in Easter, 1961, which I attended. He said:
All the workers of a country have the same interests at heart and must organise themselves into one national syndicate of the country, must regroup themselves into one National Union—in the same way one political party in each country is more than enough; the existence of several political parties in our newly independent nations could not justify itself except by the existence of several interests; and the interests of the different social levels are practically the same. One youth organisation, one women's organisation would better answer the necessity of satisfying the economic, social and cultural aspirations of the populations.
The advice given to that conference by its Secretary-General is accepted in Africa today, and we must face the fact that the black-led States of Africa will be authoritarian, or at least one-party.
They will also have Socialist economies, and I mean Socialist in the true sense of the word, where the State owns the means of production, distribution and exchange. Thirdly, they will be unaligned in the cold war. I make it clear that I do not suggest for a moment that the three attributes which I have ascribed to those States are necessarily wrong. If I were a black African living in that part of the world, I would argue quite strongly for an authoritarian Government, for a Socialist economy and for non-alignment in the difficult world of today.
I do not think that they will achieve it. Another country we know tried to remain unaligned in two world wars, but was soon pulled in, and Africa may follow suit. But I do not say that the view is wrong. However, from our point of view as Britishers it is most unfortunate, because we do not believe in authoritarian Governments, and Socialist economies make it very difficult for us, for our exporters and our firms and businesses, and non-alignment will not be easy for us when it comes to questions of the defence of Australia and other parts of our wide-flung Commonwealth.
The third section of Africa is the white-led States of Southern Africa. One must admit a number of cases, certainly South Africa, of authoritarian government, but at least one can say that those forms of government represent the wishes of the voters—I say "voters" and not "populations", because one knows that the franchise is restricted—they have free

economies, and our trading figures with that part of the world show bow important this is, and they are fanatically pro-West. That is the background to the debate.
The real question we have to consider is whether we can avoid the division between the second and third parts of Africa which I have just described, that is, between the black-led and white-led States, by maintaining some form of nonracial association linking the two Rhodesias together and therefore separating the black-led Africa of the North from the white-led Africa of the South. This is a problem which we have to face in the next few weeks, for I agree with those hon. Members who have said that whatever decision is made, it must be made quickly.
I now come to Central Africa. The problem of Central Africa is not the problem of simple, spontaneous politics, the problem of one man, one vote, the problem of balance as we know it in this country, the problem of give and take. It is not even a problem of African nationalism. Rather is it a problem of Africanism, that is, the desire of the majority race to take over the political and economic leadership at once and irrespective of the consequences.
Africanism has strong tribalistic tendencies. For example, in Katanga the Landa tribe still supports President Tshombe, and I am not at all sure that I agree with those hon. Members opposite who think that we have heard the last of President Tshombe. We may still find him back in the newspaper headlines. In Kenya the political problem which we in the House of Commons have to face is tribalism. Everyone knows that K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U. are purely tribal. I will not develop this theme, but we have to see that the majority tribe, the Kikuyu, which is hated by most of the other tribes, is able to live in peace with them. We are trying to do so by some form of regional constitution.
But exactly the same manifestations are showing themselves in Northern Rhodesia where the two African political parties, A.N.C. and U.N.I.P., are basically tribal. These tribal tendencies are becoming stronger and, therefore, more dangerous. In Southern Rhodesia, the African Nationalist parties so far have prevented themselves from falling into


tribal divisions and therefore different camps, and one reason for this is that Mr. Nkomo, who is the leader of the Z.A.P.U., is a Matabele representing a predominantly Mashona party and therefore provides a unifying link. We must not underestimate these tribal realities in Africa, because they are realities which have existed in Africa for centuries and centuries before the coming of the white man and because they are fundamental to the people of that continent.
This complicated situation in Central Africa is even further complicated by three special factors. The first is the Afro-Asian group and Afro-Asian opinion. It exerts pressure which is both indirect and direct. I shall deal first with the indirect pressure. In the United Nations there are 110 members, 52 of whom belong to the Afro-Asian bloc. They therefore exert considerable moral pressure on the whole of the world through the United Nations. Not long ago I sat in the United Nations and watched the passing of a resolution about the Republic of South Africa. It was possibly the strongest resolution that the United Nations had ever passed. I have it here. It calls for member countries to break off diplomatic relations, to close their ports, to close their airfields and to boycott goods from the Republic. It calls for the Security Council to consider the ejection of South Africa.
That resolution has not been acted on, and I suggest that it will not be, because one has to face the fact that the United Nations can, and does, pass these rather emotional resolutions which may have great moral effect on the world but which, if they are implemented positively, mean either that they will be vetoed in the Security Council—because to impose economic sanctions or eject a member country one has to go to the Security Council; or if the Security Council is by-passed by a vote of the General Assembly it will not be acted on because of the power of the purse.
I had, perhaps, better explain what I mean by the power of the purse, because this is fundamental to a consideration of what is happening in Africa, as many people seem to think that the United Nations will come and solve these problems, that the United Nations will not allow us to give independence to Southern Rhodesia, or that the United

Nations will insist on Northern Rhodesia doing this or that.
What are the facts? They are that 67½ per cent. of the total budget of the United Nations is paid by 5 permanent members of the Security Council. This is the top end of the contribution scale. At the bottom end 53 nations paid 2·5 per cent. of the total cost of the United Nations, and most of those 53 nations are found within the Afro-Asian bloc. If the House wants approximate figures, they are as follows: United States, 32 per cent.; U.S.S.R., 17½ per cent.; United Kingdom, 7½per cent.; France, 6 per cent., and China 4½, per cent. But that is not all. Economic and technical assistance is provided mainly by the United States, which last year provided 64 million dollars, ourselves who provided 14¾ million dollars, and, thirdly, the Soviet Union which provided 4½ million dollars.
These details are relevant to a debate on Central Africa, because if these strongly emotional resolutions were implemented they could only be implemented with the agreement of some of the great Powers, namely, some of the main contributors, and if the United States did not agree, or if Britain and France did not agree, and if the United States, or Britain and France, withdrew financial support, the whole of the United Nations structure would collapse, and this is the last thing that we, and above all the Afro-Asian nations, want, because it is they who draw the greatest benefits from this world organisation.
One other aspect of financial structure of the United Nations is the money spent in the Congo. This again is relevant, because people are talking, privately anyhow, about the United Nations moving into South-West Africa and about the United Nations putting military pressure on Northern Rhodesia if it does not get independence or a new constitution.
The facts are these, and I give these figures which were checked last December. The Congo operations were costing about 10 million dollars a month. After allowing for the whole of the bond issue of 200 million dollars being taken up; if this operation continued at the same level, by December of this year the United Nations would be in debt to the extent of 220 million dollars, which is more than


the total cost of the United Nations and the Agencies. That is all I say about the United Nations. I brought this question up not as a red herring but because it is important when considering the future of Central Africa, as the veto and the power of the purse limit the practical effect of any intervention of the United Nations in that part of the world.
The Afro-Asian group also exercises direct pressure in Central Africa. During the deliberations after the first round of the Northern Rhodesia elections there was talk of a pact between the United Federal Party and the African National Congress. It is clear that the presence of Mr. Konyange, the Secretary-General of P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A. in Lusaka, and the presence of a personal representative of President Nkrumah had a considerable effect in persuading Mr. Nkumbula not to go into that coalition but rather to coalesce with the other African party. It is clear, for instance, that considerable subsidies are paid to African political parties and are often channelled through Accra or Cairo. One relatively minor political leader in Southern Rhodesia was unfortunately killed in a car crash a few months ago. The following day his wife claimed that he had had £15,000 in his pockets which had been given to him that day for his party funds. That money disappeared, but one wonders where it came from in the first place. That is what I mean by pressures exerted by the Afro-Asian bloc.
The other intervention in the affairs of this part of the world which must be noted by this House is the intervention of the United States. I believe in the great importance of the Anglo-American Alliance, but I also believe in straight talking between friends. Since I came back from three months in America people have asked me, "Is President Kennedy anti-British?" My reply has been, "Of course he is not. He is pro-American." If we are soft enough to allow him to collect parts of the Empire or Commonwealth, he will take them, because he is a good American, and it's good business. Why should he not? The responsibility to stop him is ours. It is a pity that the idealism of America's anti-colonial past, her alliance with big business and our economic situation is leading her to take a great interest in the two

Rhodesias, in the Copperbelt and in Katanga.
It is said on good authority that one of her consular officers in Nyasaland took part in the victory procession of the Malawi Party after the General Election and shouted from his car "We are in". I can understand my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) wanting to do that, but he is at least a member of the country which has the overall responsibility. But I take objection to a foreigner taking that kind of action.
Again, when Mr. Menon Williams visited Rhodesia only last week I understand that he had a meeting with leaders of Z.A.P.U. which is a proscribed organisation, and I believe that this kind of thing does no good to Anglo-American relations. We do not like seeing these things happening where Britain still has continuing sovereignty.
American information services are showing films stressing non-racialism and non-racial schools in America. Not long ago I asked a Question in the House about a certain film in the "Today" series, No. 46, which was shown 29 times in Rhodesia. The film started with the appearance of President Bourguiba of Tunisia on a State visit to America. He said that he was glad to see the United States fighting colonialism. The next part concerned "African Freedom Day" and showed President Kennedy and other Government members meeting various leaders of African States. There was then a commentary from a Mr. Herbert Humphrey who referred to the struggle and passion for freedom in Africa and said that Americans welcomed Africans both at home and in their own country and pledged themselves fully to assist Africans. Then there were shots of the independence ceremony in Sierre Leone with various African leaders meeting the American representatives, and finally, and this is the relevant point, a close-up of an inscription on a memorial at Bunkers Hill which read:
Here on 19th April, 1775, was made the first forcible resistance to British aggression. On the opposite bank stood the American militia, there stood the invading army, and on this spot the first of the enemy fell.
This story is quite true. It may be good history, but it is hardly a helpful thing to show in the territorial dependency of


an ally, particularly when political passions are being roused. Seventy-five per cent. of United States aid to the Federation now goes to Nyasaland. One wonders why. The consul-general's staff in the American Legation at Salisbury was increased from 36 Americans and 71 local members in 1961 to 48. Americans and 86 local members two years later, whereas the British High Commission staff consists of 19 Britishers and 33 local representatives—although it is we who are responsible for the area.
I will not labour this point any longer, but it is hardly surprising that the Rhodesians tend to be anti-American, especially when chrome is one of their major exports and America is now buying chrome from Soviet Russia to the detriment of the industry in the Rhodesias. There has just been an international tobacco conference in Salisbury, and there has been a threat by America to dump tobacco on the world's markets. That, again, is a threat to damage the exports of the Rhodesias. We can hardly be surprised if the Rhodesians wonder whether this is a softening up process preparatory to a take-over.
The last intervention in the affairs of Central Africa comes from the Communists. It has not yet developed, but it is there. One has only to read the proceedings of the conference held at Moshe and to see what is happening in the trade unions. But what is——

ROYAL ASSENT

6.2 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:

The House went:— and, having returned

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Consolidated Fund Act 1963.
2. Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963.
3. Betting Duties Act 1963.
4. Towyn Trewan Common Act 1963.
5. County Courts (Jurisdiction) Act 1963.
6. Commonwealth Scholarships (Amendment) Act 1963.

7. National Insurance Act 1963.
8. Clyde Navigation Order Confirmation Act 1963.
9. Scottish Pulp Mill (Water Supply) Order Confirmation Act 1963.

SUPPLY [26th February]

Question again proposed, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.

6.14 p.m.

Mr. Wall: I was trying to explain to the House the difficult situation which exists for Central Africa. I added that it was complicated by three external factors, the activities of the Afro-Asian group, the activities of America and of Communism. I was concluding by saying that the irony of the situation is that the American anti-colonial bias and anti-Communist complex are encouraging chaos in Central Africa and that alone will give Communism its chance.
I now come to the final part of my speech and to an attempt to assess the situation in the Federation as it is today. The House knows that the secession of Nyasaland has been agreed, but what the House does not yet know—and I hope my right hon. Friend when he winds up the debate will give us some information about it—is who is to pay the £5 million or £6 million a year which Nyasaland must have to sustain the present level of its economy? Dr. Banda said last week that he wanted to maintain two battalions of the King's Own African Rifles. Who is to pay for that? Who is to pay for the compensation of Federal civil servants who will not be wanted by the Nyasa Government? Nyasaland is not credit-worthy and will therefore need United Kingdom grants. Can my right hon. Friend assess what the burden on the British taxpayer will be as a result of the secession of Nyasaland? These are questions to which I should like to have an answer, as they are of interest to a large number of people, not only in the Rhodesias but also in this country.
Secondly, are the two Rhodesias to be split? When I was in Lusaka I met very few people who believed that they would not be split. They said that the independence of Northern Rhodesia was assured. There are, of course, very strong


pressures on the Northern Rhodesian Government from one side or the other. If the two countries are to be split, who is to say, and what will be the cost to the British taxpayer of maintaining the defence of Central Africa, which surely the House will agree is very important? The troubles in the Congo could easily spread across the frontier. Also what is to happen to existing communications by road, rail and air? Who is to pay up to settle the debts of the Federal Government and the three components of the Federation?
I believe that Southern Rhodesia is one of the countries most loyal to the Crown. I think the average man in Southern Rhodesia would wish to maintain the British presence. I was told only yesterday that this would be impossible for they no longer trust the Government of this country to look after what they feel are their inherited rights. Many people have already said that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia must be independent and Southern Rhodesia cannot be independent because it has not a democratic Government.
In parenthesis, I ask if anyone can tell us where there is a fully democratic Government of the Westminster style in Africa today? That is not the point, however. If Southern Rhodesia is not given independence it will take it. That fact must colour our discussions about the future of Central Africa. I hope that if the Federation splits, the three territories will be given independence by Her Majesty's Government. I should hate to see this Conservative Government going down to history as one that gave independence to two black-led countries and refused it to one white-led country.

Mr. Berkeley: My hon. Friend has said that he would hate to see our Government give independence to two black countries and not to one white country. Does he regard Southern Rhodesia as a white State?

Mr. Wall: I regard it as a white-led State. If my hon. Friend had heard the earlier part of my speech, he would have known that.

Mr. Berkeley: I heard it.

Mr. Wall: I hope that this split does not come and that we do not have to

decide on the division between black-led and white-led Africa. If the Federation does disintegrate we must act quickly and maintain common services, a common market and so on, which are essentials for the future of all the people of Central Africa. I want this Government to give Southern Rhodesia independence if it gives independence to the Northern Territories. If not, I say again that Southern Rhodesia is determined to take its independence and there is nothing we can do to prevent it, but I also ask the House to face the consequences of breaking the Federation. It would mean polarising race on either side of the River Zambesi.
I believe the line of the Zambesi would endure for a number of years and would be held by force. But this polarisation would be disastrous to the Commonwealth. It would probably mean the breaking up of the Commonwealth, and it would force both Britain and the United States in the next three or four years to choose whether to trade and work with black-led Africa in the North or white-led Africa in the South. The result of that decision cannot be doubted for a moment because both our economic and strategic interests lie to the South, whatever may be the moral considerations. The break-up of the Federation would lead to appalling consequences for Central Africa, for the Commonwealth and perhaps for the United Nations, because these racial strains once created would continue to develop with disastrous effects to that great world-wide organisation.
Therefore, my final words are these. Cannot we in the House of Commons, seeing the consequences of breaking up the Federation, try to maintain some nonracial organisation in Central Africa, something perhaps in an attenuated form of federation—but for heaven's sake do not let us call it federation—such as in Australia, where the central Government are responsible for defence, foreign affairs and communications and where the territories of North and South Rhodesia are, other than those three factors, fully independent voting that sovereignty lies with the central association which must also be independent. I believe that this is still possible.
I believe that, provided this new association is independent, Southern


Rhodesia will subscribe to it. I am sure that my right hon. Friend will agree that it is extremely difficult to get Northern Rhodesia to do this. The situation in Northern Rhodesia is, however, more complicated than we seem to think. There are great pressures between the two parties in the coalition and the external pressure of Mr. Koniange and his Pafmecsa, who have their eyes on the wealth of the Copperbelt for developing their schemes for Pan-African association.
Then there are the pressures in Barotseland. Is it a fact that there are now pressures being exerted on Barotseland to obtain new elections of the Barotse National Council? Elections took place only last year. Why should they be asked to have another election? Is it because we want to project political parties into Barotseland so that we can make it quite clear that Litunga and the Council no longer speak for Barotseland and are therefore not able to prevent the secession of Barotseland from Northern Rhodesia?
These are questions which people are asking in Barotseland, and questions which should be answered. I think that it would be very difficult indeed to maintain a link between the two Rhodesian, but I believe that the only hope for the future of that part of the world, and, indeed, for the Commonwealth because the alternative will in my view endanger the whole Commonwealth, is to create this new non-racial association. I believe that so far it is the extreme views both of black and white that have been publicised, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will now listen to the moderates of both the races. This, I say again, is the last chance in Africa to obtain a non-racial association.
There is a great need, which has been expressed on both sides of the House, for firm, rapid and positive action. I hope that my right hon. Friend will call the conference to which he referred, that he will call it in April and that it will lead to some form of association such as I have outlined. My right hon. Friend has vast experience and the responsibilities and the future of Central Africa and, indeed, of the Commonwealth is in his hands.
I apologise for speaking at length, but I believe that what I have said is of importance. I hope that the House will

take to mind the dangers that are contingent upon the complete fragmentation of the three countries which we now know as the Central African Federation.

6.24 p.m.

Mr. Donald Wade: At times during the speech of the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) I began to wonder what we were debating. I should like to take up some of the points which he made about the United Nations, but I think that I should be straying somewhat from the debate on Central Africa.
May I refer for a moment to the subject of American influence. The hon. Member referred to Nyasaland, and I believe that it provides rather a good answer to the arguments which he was deploying. Consider the situation twelve years ago. There were no people more loyal, more friendly than the Nyasas. They believed that the British Government would protect them, that the British would never let them down and that the protection of the late Queen Victoria really meant something. I remember discussing this with them not long after the Victoria Falls Conference and later when the Central African Federation was proposed. They were bewildered at the suggestion that Federation would be forced through against the wishes of the majority of their people. If their attitude has changed, if there are some who regard the Americans as more concerned about their welfare than the British, then I fear that is very much the fault of the British Government in the last ten years. This is a very unhappy state of affairs, but I do not think that we can altogether blame the Americans for it.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice also referred to the probability of authoritarian rule in some parts of Africa. I have discussed that with Africans in East, West and Central Africa, and recognise that there might well be a lung period of one-party rule in a number of countries. I had hoped that in Central Africa a form of political democracy could have developed more like our own. If we had given greater encouragement to multi-racialism earlier, I believe that that might have been possible, but maybe it is now too late.
Again, I think that we have at least to some extent only ourselves to blame,


and by that I mean the British Government. To be continually saying, "I told you so" is, I know, very exasperating to those who have to hear it, and it is not very constructive. But one cannot discuss a subject such as this without looking back to the past to see what errors have been committed. It is a tragic story. It is a story of Governments refusing to listen to the advice of many people who were deeply concerned with the interests of the Africans in Central Africa.
We have many illustrations of one great principle being flouted, namely, that we could not successfully create a political federation against the wishes of the majority of the people. I believe that there was a failure to recognise that at the time of the Victoria Falls Conference and again at the time of the introduction of Central African Federation in 1953. I took part in most of the debates on the Bill which introduced that Federation. I also went on deputations to the Colonial Office and took part in meetings, and I am quite sure that everything possible was done to make the Government of the day aware of the dangers.
I do not think that it was a fair point that was made by the right hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) that present conditions could not have been foreseen, because there were people in this country, and hon. Members who foresaw what might happen, and unfortunately, what they feared has come to pass. I remember very well the look of annoyance on the face of Lord Boyd, as he now is, at the suggestion that the British Government might be wrong. He could not believe that we who opposed that Bill were right, but I fear that we were right. There is no cause for rejoicing in that. I remember the long debates over the Preamble to the Bill and the importance which could be attached to the Preamble. But all that is now past history and it is clear that the Federation is breaking up.
I do not think that it need necessarily have been failure. If three conditions had been satisfied it might have succeeded. The first is that the majority of the African people had been in favour of it. The second is if full internal self-government had been achieved before the

completion of a political federation. The third is if emphasis had been placed on economic co-operation first, with the political development coming later. If these three conditions had been met, we might have achieved a federation, but of course a very different policy was adopted. Certain protective machinery was set up such as the African Affairs Board, but when that was overthrown—and to all intents and purposes it was overthrown—the last hope had gone.
The question is, what are we to do now? May I quote from page 37 of the Monckton Commission's Report:
Time is not on the Federation's side and the majority of us feel that to rely on the process of natural evolution would result in the early dissolution of the Federation.
I think that it has been very true in the last few years that time has not been on the side of the Federation.
We have reached the present position in which it is abundantly clear, and the Government now recognise, that Nyasaland is to secede. Inevitably, there is a demand from Northern Rhodesia to do the same, and its seems to me that one cannot approve secession in one case and deny it in the other. That, surely, is a fact which must be faced. If that is So, we are also faced with the end of the Federation, whether we like it or not. That is the situation. It is a sad story. I do not know whether pledges have been broken. I can only read and listen to what is said. Obviously there was some kind of secret understanding, and it appears to me as an onlooker that undertakings were given and have been broken. It has happened and we cannot undo it now.
What is the next step? I think that the most practical step for Nyasaland and Rhodesia is to create some kind of common services organisation. There are practical problems to be solved concerning, for example, the postal services, the telegraph services, airlines and roads. There is also the Health Service, which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned in opening the debate. Surely there is much that can be done. I suppose that these are the problems which arc being considered by the working party.
In addition, there is the great question of finance and the Federal commitments.
How much is to fall on the British taxpayer? I think that we should recognise frankly that certain obligations will have to fall on the British taxpayer. This all arose from the original event when these people put themselves under the protection of Queen Victoria. We undertook a financial obligation as well as the obligation of a protecting Power, and today this imposes certain financial obligations on the British taxpayer. I do not see how he can escape from them. I do not think that we can justifiably say that the whole of this burden must be borne by the people of Nyasaland.
How is the working party proceeding? When is it expected to report? When it reports, shall we be told the extent of the financial responsibility which will be borne by the Nyasaland Government and the extent which will be borne by the British people?
The problem of Northern Rhodesia is not so much a financial as a political problem. The question is very simple: are we to recognise that the people of Northern Rhodesia have the same rights as have the people of Nyasaland? I listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman opening the debate, and I must say that the answer was not at all clear. I cannot see what is to be gained by not being clear on this issue. Surely one of the lessons which we should have learned from the unfortunate experiences of the last ten years is that it does not pay to be vague and to make statements which have one meaning for one side and another meaning to another side. It is much better to be frank and open, and in view of the experience in Central Africa, surely it would be better to be quite frank and open about Northern Rhodesia.
The same comment could be made about Southern Rhodesia. It is true that it is the Southern Rhodesian Parliament which is concerned with legislation, but we, too, are very much concerned with the type of legislation. We are very concerned about the deportation of Dr. Ranger. We cannot do other than make our protests. But there is the ultimate future to be considered. We cannot evade responsibility for the people of Southern Rhodesia. It may be difficult, but at least let us be frank and make it clear that we cannot stand by and do nothing and say nothing if a minority in Southern Rhodesia act

as if they had it within their power to do whatever they like with the people under their control.

Mr. Wall: Does the hon. Member recognise that the present constitution and the new constitution of Southern Rhodesia prohibit the minority race, the Europeans, from doing—if I may use his words—what they like with the others?

Mr. Wade: I remember taking part in the debates when alterations were made, and I must repeat that we cannot stand by and do nothing and say nothing, because it is all bound up with our policy towards Africa, and what we do in Central Africa affects the position throughout the continent. The right hon. Gentleman said that the matter was not before him at the moment, but it is in the thoughts and minds of all of us as a problem which we have to face.
There is, perhaps, a case to be made for trying to resist change, but having recognised the wind of change and having done, as the Prime Minister did, a great deal to advertise it, it is surely folly to resist the consequences, and of all the dangers which beset us, the greatest danger of all is to resist the consequences of the wind of change.

6.38 p.m.

Mr. Aidan Crawley: The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) spent a large part of his speech reminding us about pledges. I cannot help feeling that he overdid this. Politicians and Governments frequently, and sometimes unwisely, feel impelled to give pledges, and very many politicians and very many Governments have found that changed circumstances force them to break these pledges.
I well remember just such an occasion in the early days of the Labour Government after 1945. I was then one of their supporters. Specific pledges had been given in the Labour Party conference on aspects of social insurance, but when the Government came into power and looked into the matter they found that they could not possibly honour them. Quite rightly, the Government broke them, and although there was a certain amount of recrimination I do not think that anybody who looks back to those days thinks that the Government could have done anything other than they did.
There is a good deal of doubt about what, if any, pledges were given in this case. I am sure that what is much more important than harking back to pledges is to face the facts as they are and to do what is right, whether it means breaking a pledge or not. One of the things which has hampered the solving of the problems of Central Africa has been what my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) called the legalistic attitude of the Opposition. They missed a tremendousopportunity through too narrow and dogmatic an attitude towards the terms of reference when they refused to join the Monckton Commission. Had they joined the Commission, they would have had an opportunity of learning about Central Africa in a detail which has not otherwise been possible and will probably not again be possible. They missed the chance of playing a positive part in trying to frame the future development of these Territories.
I think that their legalistic attitude towards Southern Rhodesia has also had severe and tragic effects. Their insistence upon the purely paper rights of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia has had a far greater effect than the reasons given by the hon. Member for Leeds, East in causing Sir Edgar Whitehead to lose the election which he recently lost. By losing it, the Southern Rhodesians have had the clock put back a very long way. Had Sir Edgar Whitehead won that election, in my opinion they would have been within a few years of a reform of their Constitution which would have brought an African majority and enabled Southern Rhodesia much more easily to play its part in the development of Africa and in any association which may be able to be formed. Since Sir Edgar has lost that election, all those things will be much more difficult. It is fatal, because certain paper rights insist, for us to threaten Governments over whom we have no control. It is fatal because it simply causes resentment, and resentment brings the sort of result which we now see.
Nevertheless, I agreed with the hon. Member for Leeds, East about one thing. I had hoped for a little more information from my right hon. Friend the First

Secretary. Of course we all understand his reluctance to say anything which might create difficulties. I am sure that he is hoping that the new personalities which have emerged on the Central African stage will get to know each other and establish some confidence between each other. Like the hon. Member for Leeds, East, I know Mr. Winston Field, and I know that he is a man of very outspoken and perfectly sincere views. I do not agree with very many of them, but he leaves one in no doubt about what he thinks and equally in no doubt that he is a perfectly honourable man. It is quite possible that he will reach a degree of understanding with Dr. Banda and Mr. Kaunda which may produce results.
Nevertheless, I think that there are some things which my right hon. Friend could do which would be helpful. The Federation is drawing to a close. It is tragic, but it is true. It cannot be brought to an end suddenly, because it is a complicated business. Perhaps the most complicated part of winding up an organisation of this kind is its finance. The hon. Member for Leeds, East mentioned the public debt of Southern Rhodesia. The Federation has an even larger public debt. Much of the public debt of the Federation is in the form of foreign loans, not only from this country, but from the United States and other countries. The Federal Government was the entity to whom those loans were made.
It is a matter of great difficulty, if the Federation is to cease to exist, to decide what entity shall take the Federal Government's place. It could be said that the debt should be divided between the three separate territories. If that were to be done, Nyasaland would be ruined before it got on its feet. What I am suggesting is that in any arrangement which is made some part of that debt will have to be guaranteed by Her Majesty's Government. It would be very helpful if, without going into too great detail, an undertaking were given that Her Majesty's Government would at least be prepared to consider guaranteeing a part of the debt if it could not otherwise be allocated.
There is one other and more negative point, a thing which I had hoped my right hon. Friend would say. When the Monckton Commission was in Africa, a plan was put out by the Dominion Party,


which is now in power in Southern Rhodesia, for a Greater Rhodesia. It was a plan which left out Nyasaland and which assumed that Southern and Northern Rhodesia under their present franchises and constitutions might form a single entity. I think that all that has happened since has made this plan totally impracticable. Indeed, I always thought it was. It would be reassuring if my right hon. Friend could tell us that that plan is completely dead or that, if it is not, Her Majesty's Government would not relinquish responsibility for Northern Rhodesia without making certain that no attempt to put it into force would be made.
Lastly, I want to say one thing about Southern Rhodesia. The hon. Member for Leeds, East suggested that Her Majesty's Government should not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia until there was an African majority. I wonder what the hon. Gentleman would do if he were in power and the Southern Rhodesian Government asked for independence. Would he send troops to Southern Rhodesia to take control of the country, or try to? Would he adopt economic sanctions to try to force Southern Rhodesia to remain in the Commonwealth and within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom? Does he really imagine that that would succeed? If economic sanctions were taken against Southern Rhodesia, the country would certainly be ruined and 3½ million Africans would be ruined at the same time. None of the political purposes Which one had in mind would be achieved. The only conceivable result of any such action would be to drive the Southern Rhodesian Government, particularly the present Government there, into some form of much closer association with the Union of South Africa and the whole system of apartheid would be brought much nearer Southern Rhodesian Africans.
I hope that Southern Rhodesia will not yet ask for independence. I hope that it will be possible for Her Majesty's Government to retain a great deal of influence there, but it will not be legalistic influence and it will riot he attained by using a political bludgeon. Nevertheless, the most likely way of helping or of retaining our influence and keeping

Southern Rhodesia out of a closer association with the Union of South Africa is to try to bring the Federation decently but swiftly to a close and to put in its place a new form of association which will link Southern Rhodesia with the countries to the north and keep it in the main stream of African development.
I therefore urge my right hon. Friend to use all the initiative I know that he is using with urgency. I do not believe that this problem will be solved if we go on indefinitely delaying, and delay might again result in deadlock. If there is deadlock again between the three territories of Central Africa, we shall not get any form of new association and Southern Rhodesia almost inevitably will ally itself to the territories to the south. This, in my opinion, would be a great tragedy.

6.48 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) was in his first remarks a little severe on the policies of the party of which he was once a member. I make it clear at the outset that I am not complaining that he has crossed the Floor. I always regarded him as a good old Tory when he was in the Labour Party, and I regarded his return to the benches opposite as a perfectly logical restitution of lost property. Even so, he might have been a little more restrained in the criticisms he made of the Labour Party. He seemed almost to suggest that all the accumulated ills of Central Africa were the responsibility of Her Majesty's Opposition. That is not a very distant deduction from what be was saying.
Above all, to say that the case put over the past ten years by the Opposition was legalistic seems to me the most absurd reversal of the facts. The case of the party on this side of the House when this measure of Central African Federation was being introduced was that it was being done against the consent of the people involved. That was not a legalistic argument, whatever else it was. It was a democratic one, and it had nothing to do with the law. It was concerned with the sentiments, feelings and aspirations of the people of Africa, and I do not think that the hon. Gentleman really scored a great hit in that respect.
I will come later to his references to the pledges given and abandoned, but first of all I must direct a few words to the First Secretary. The right hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on undertaking this heavy task of dealing with the Central African problem. I think that the right hon. Gentleman deserves the congratulations of everyone for the courage he showed in taking on such an apparently hopeless tangle. To be frank, I was surprised when he took it on, for I did not think that he was the man best suited for the task.
The right hon. Gentleman's capabilities are more like the willow than the oak, and I did not think that he was the kind of man who would be best suited for solving what is, I supose, the most painful and difficult problem of all the many painful and difficult problems this Government must solve. However, the right hon. Gentleman took it on, and I thought that I saw in his report to the House the other day and in his speech this afternoon some explanation of why he took it on.
What the First Secretary is really doing is presiding over the consequences of the misdemeanours of his colleagues—and because of his slightly morbid political psychology he derives some satisfaction from the process. At least, he is not as responsible as some of the others and he manages to carry the burden with greater ease.
It has been said that the First Secretary's speech today did not raise the temperature. That was a perfectly true statement. Certainly his scorching, red hot report from Africa the other day did not do so either. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman has been called upon to perform his usual task of making everything appear cool and well under control; that everything can be smoothed over and dealt with in his usual suave and diplomatic manner. Unfortunately, it is not that kind of problem.
Nevertheless, it is to the advantage of the Government that they have the First Secretary to deal with this extremely awkward question of the pledges which were supposedly given. I was shocked by some of the remarks on this subject we have heard, not from the First Secretary

because he treated the question of the pledges as a serious matter. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West, on the other hand, dismissed the whole matter and said, in effect, "They"—the pledges —"were given and broken. Maybe the Labour Party did something of the sort in 1946 about the friendly societies, although I cannot remember what it was they did." To put that sort of argument on all fours with the pledges allegedly given in secret by the British Government when setting up the new State in Africa seems the height of frivolity.
The right hon. Member for Blackpool, South described the pledges as a purely academic matter, or, if he did not quite do that, he said that the Opposition should regard them as such because the Opposition were not in favour of the pledges being carried out. Surely these pledges, undertakings, understandings or whatever they were serious matter? They have been treated so in another place and it is only right that they should be treated in the same way in this House. There is a direct conflict of testimony about what happened. Some people say that absolute pledges were given. Then the argument is put forward that they cannot be established in juridical terms—but if one leaves out the juridical gloss undertakings were nevertheless given.
The first important point to remember in this connection is that these were not casual undertakings given about side issues of the affair. They were not the sort of undertakings which someone engaged in complicated and difficult negotiations might think were subsidiary matters which had been overlooked. These were undertakings—if not pledges—given on the absolutely primary matter being debated in the House, in the country and throughout Africa at the time. They were pledges which were of the greatest importance.
In a devastating speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) went so far as to say that if the secret undertakings had been made known to the House at the time the House would never have passed the Bill. I think that that somewhat overrates the rebellious nature of hon. Members opposite. I do think that the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) might have rebelled, because


he has an honourable record in this respect, although I would agree that a good many hon. Members opposite would not have rebelled. Although I would not put it as high as did my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East, if those secret undertakings had been revealed—and even if the Bill had been passed—one result would have been that hon. Members would at least have better known what were the intentions and purposes of the Government. They would have had a clearer indication of what the Government were after and, even more important, the people of Africa would have known what was in the mind of the Government.
Thus, if undertakings were given—as they obviously were, for no one has denied that undertakings of a sort were given—there is no reason on earth that I can see why they should not have been revealed to the House and the world. What is utterly dishonourable is that they were not fully and publicly revealed to all concerned at the time. For a Government to put through a major Act of this nature affecting the whole future of Africa and to make undertakings of this seriousness and not to reveal them to the country is a gross offence against the proper conduct of business in this House and against the concept of democracy.
Instead of considering what was done —and this was the view of the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West—as being something trivial to be pushed aside, the Government's actions in 1953 were utterly dishonourable. It makes it all the worse when one realises that they bad to break their pledges later. The real dishonour was committed in 1953 when the Government, behind the back of the House of Commons, gave pledges and were not prepared, for one reason or another, to reveal them clearly to the House at that time.
All this has built up great resentment in the minds of some people; and no one can deny that. I am no defender of Sir Roy Welensky, but Sir Roy has his rights, too. He has a right to be treated honourably, and he certainly does not feel that he has been so treated. Whatever hon. Members opposite may argue about the undertakings, there is no doubt that whatever defender of the Government in respect of these pledges there may be—

and I do not think that the hon. Member for Lancaster will defend them; if he did he would be about the first to do so outside the Government Front Bench —the only argument in support of the Government and the only argument we have received from the Government side of the House has been to the effect that pledges do not matter.
I exclude from that remark the First Secretary himself who, with his brilliant sophistries, said that the pledge with which he was dealing was not a pledge. However, whether or not it was an exact pledge in juridical terms, it cannot be denied that large numbers of people in Africa and elsewhere, very eminent and worthy people, believe that the Government have behaved with the utmost dishonour. It is no good any hon. Member opposite contesting the proposition. We have read the debates in another place.
We read the speeches of the Marquess of Salisbury, who at one time used to be regarded as the best defender of the honour of the Tory Party. The First Secretary succeeded the Marquess of Salisbury in his place at the Foreign Office in 1938 when many people thought that the Marquess of Salisbury had resigned on a point of honour partly at the time. Whatever hon. Members may think—and I do not agree with the Marquess of Salisbury's policy—nobody is questioning him as an authority on this question of honour. And what the Marquess of Salisbury says of what the Government have done is that it is the gravest blot on our escutcheon. I can imagine that those are the most damning words in the Marquess's vocabulary. He could not think of anything more devastating than that.
I do not know whether the Government like it, but there is not only the Marquess of Salisbury. We can go through the whole list. The Times on two occasions, as the First Secretary knows full well, has torn to tatters the case put by the Government. It has torn the White Paper into little shreds until there is nothing left. As far as I know, there is not a single newspaper in the country which has dared to say that the Government have behaved honourably about these pledges. Only the First Secretary in the House of Commons has defended the Government's behaviour. If


hon. Members do not think it is a serious matter when the fate of millions of people in Africa is concerned that the word of the British Government should be questioned, they have given a further illustration of their unfitness to deal with such grave matters as this.
It affects the future. The First Secretary said the other day, and I think these were his words or it may be that these were the words of the Marquess of salisbury—I am not sure, I should not like to mix them up—at any rate one of them said that the First Secretary had returned from the trip to Africa with the germs of a constructive idea. They are the most uncontagious germs I ever saw. If there are any constructive ideas they were not revealed to us today.
On the critical issue of Southern Rhodesia which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East said, is the central issue affecting the whole future, what did the First Secretary have to say to us? He said that the question of intervening about the Southern Rhodesian situation was not before him at the moment. If I may be blasphemous and ungrammatical at the same time, who in the name of all the gods are they before? This is the central issue which we are supposed to be debating and, as an hon. Member has already said, this may be the last debate before it is decided what is to be done in Central Africa.
Yet the right hon. Gentleman says that this question is not now before him. This is the question of whether he should take any action to make it clear to the people of Southern Rhodesia, both to the Government and the mass of the people who have to live there, that Britain is not going to resign her last scrap of control over the territory before we have assurances about the future. The right hon. Gentleman says that that is not before him. It is a most ludicrous state of affairs. The right hon. Gentleman has said over many months that he will not take any action to hold up the procedure in Southern Rhodesia. Before the elections he said that he could not take any action, and now he gives not the slightest hint to the House of any action that he will take about Southern Rhodesia. It prompts in one's mind the suspicion that the Government have given further secret undertakings.
In view of our experience over the previous secret undertakings about the whole of the establishment of the Central African Federation, we should like to know whether any secret undertakings have been given to the Government of Southern Rhodesia in the past twelve months or earlier governing the possibility of any further British intervention in the territory. Are there any secret undertakings or not? If there are, do the Government stand by the undertakings or are they going to tear them up like the previous ones? We have every right to be told.
Although the right hon. Gentleman did not even indicate what was to be his policy about Southern Rhodesia, he went on to make some comments about what is happening in the country. What is happening in Southern Rhodesia is a tyranny, in the sense that the mass of the people who live there have no real political rights and in many respects very few other rights. The First Secretary indicated in his speech that in recent months measures have been taken in Southern Rhodesia which deprive the people there even of rights which they had before. Even an hon. Member opposite who talked of a white Southern Rhodesia complained about the meaning of the measures taken in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament, and particularly the recent measures making mandatory the death penalty for certain offences—measures which would never have been regarded as proper in any other civilised state.
The First Secretary, in his references to Southern Rhodesia, although he would not indicate his own policy, went on to say that he and the whole House would wish that nobody would behave in an unconstitutional manner. I hope that people in Southern Rhodesia will behave in a peaceful manner, because if the bloodshed starts nobody will know where it will stop. But it is no use any British Government saying that they hope that people who have no real constitutional rights will always go on behaving in a constitutional manner. The whole of history tells us that if people are denied constitutional rights long enough they will inevitably have recourse to unconstitutional methods. Indeed, all the most honourable people in history have done it, and of course they will do it


in Southern Rhodesia unless they are given their proper constitutional rights.
This is what they are being denied, not merely by the Government of Southern Rhodesia but by the First Secretary and the Government for which he is responsible. There is no doubt about it. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East envisaged the possibility that if no action is taken and the First Secretary continues with this policy of doing nothing, there may come about a state of affairs where we shall have one Government set up, arrogating all power and the last vestiges of control into their own hands in Southern Rhodesia—a white Government—and an African Government set up in some other Commonwealth country. It is quite possible. It nearly happened before, and it could happen in the future.
The business of Government is to try and take action in time to prevent this kind of development which will inevitably lead to bloodshed. If bloodshed comes, the responsibility will be not only on those who are governing in Southern Rhodesia and on those who are driven to unconstitutional action because they have no other method of redress. It will also rest on the right bon. Gentleman. One would think that by this time the Government would have learned something from what has happened in Central Africa. They have not learned anything from the Devlin Report. I advise the right hon. Gentleman to read the Devlin Report again, because it applies to Southern Rhodesia as well as to Nyasaland.
One of the things said in the Devlin Report which has stuck most in my memory was that many people in Africa preferred poverty and freedom to prosperous slavery—a sentiment which has always been regarded as most honourable. This, said the Devlin Report, was the sentiment of the mass of the people in Nyasaland. It was said, of course, at a time when this same Government, of which the right hon. Gentleman was an adornment, were determined not to listen. The Devlin Report told the Government that the people of Nyasaland were determined to govern themselves, but the Government brushed it aside and said that this was all wrong, that there was a murder plot, that other claims were a distraction and did not truly

represent the feelings of the people. But of course, after going out there, the Devlin Commission reported that what has been said from this side of the House year after year was right and that what had been said from the Government side of the House year after year was wrong.
The right hon. Gentleman should read the Devlin Report today and try to apply it to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. He will see that large parts of it do apply. Indeed, they apply all the more because, if people have freedom to govern themselves in Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia, the demand will be even more clamant in Southern Rhodesia. This is the problem. What do the Government intend to do about it? The first Secretary says that the problem is not before him at the moment. Of course it is. It is one of the most grievous problems confronting the Government, and they must say what action they intend to take. If they continue to postpone action month after month and year after year, they will pile up a situation in which the explosion at the end will be even worse, and theirs will be the responsibility.
The First Secretary, even though he was not directly responsible for the pledges given in 1953, has been a member of the Government longer than almost any other. He bears a deeper responsibility in these affairs than others. Let him consider this. Should not there be a little humility on the Government side in dealing with this problem? There never was such a story as this story in Central Africa. There never was such a story in which a Government went ahead despite the accumulation of warnings. I cannot recall a case in modern times when a Government said so persistently, in defiance of debates in the House, in defiance of all the statements made by the Opposition and in defiance of all the statements made by leaders of African opinion, that they knew better, that they would go ahead, pushing through their plans, because they were better advised by their people in Africa who told them the truth.
Who has been right? These events happened only ten years ago. The Government cannot possibly claim that their foresight was superior to that of those who contested their views. They may say that they started this great and noble enterprise because they wanted to pull it


through; but they did it in defiance of the wishes of the people expressed as best they could be at the time. That was the main charge made by the Opposition. But the Government went ahead. Their policy has totally collapsed. It took months and years to get it through the House, but it is now totally collapsed.
Everyone, except the First Secretary who will not admit it, knows that the Federation is absolutely dead. In ten years, the Government's whole policy has collapsed. It has left bitter enmities among the white people. It has left grave doubts about the future among the coloured people. It has left a situation in which there are grevious possibilities of bloodshed in the near future. Remembering how the Government have led us to this end, it is right to say that they should have a little humility. They should listen to a few of the other people. If they will not listen to the Opposition here, they should listen a little more to the spokesmen of the African people whose views and claims they denied so shockingly ten years ago.
If the Government will not listen to the Opposition here and will not listen to the leaders of the African people, will they, if they are determined to press ahead in their arrogance again, listen to the United Nations? The first Secretary knows that this country has not one honourable friend in the United Nations on this issue. It is very sad and melancholy for this country, when, in fact, we have a better record than that of any other country in the whole world in carrying through the exquisitely difficult task of abdicating from empire, when we have done it so much better in most parts of the world than any other country, that all this should be thrown away in Southern Rhodesia.
If the Government persist in their policy, this is what they will do. They will align this country with Portugal and South Africa. We shall find ourselves voting with them in the United Nations month after month, in vote after vote, and the more we do the more we shall kill the leadership which this country could exert throughout the world.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice referred to the changes which are taking place in Africa. He gave us a graphic description of the tumultuous scene and

the possibilities there. He dismissed in an extraordinary way the future influence which the United Nations could exert. I think it possible that the United Nations may find itself to be in Africa the institution which we want to see prosper. But this Government will never be able to assist in achieving the purposes of the United Nations in other parts of Africa if they remain determined to thwart its purposes in Southern Rhodesia. Cannot they see it? Cannot they learn?
The hon. Member who said that this may be the last debate which we shall have in the House on this subject may, in one sense, be right. It may be the last debate in which the Government have the chance to rescue us from the pitiful position in which we are placed, the pitiful situation in which this country, which could command great allegiance, support and enthusiastic friends all over Africa, is, under this Government, in danger of throwing all this aside because they will not listen to the ten thousand warnings which they have had.

7.18 p.m.

Mr. Humphry Berkeley: I am sorry that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), with whom I often agree, should have chosen to play so obviously party political a game in the references he made at the beginning of his speech to the pledges alleged to have been given in 1953. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) has reiterated the case, with an obvious desire to discredit and damage the Government.
It seems to me that, unless it can be clearly established that pledges of the firmest kind were given, to talk about the Government's dishonour because it happens to be politically convenient to do so is not the most helpful way of saving the situation in Central Africa. All this does, in effect, is to give extra ammunition to Sir Roy Welensky and others of his Ministers who, during the past three or four years, have made every effort to discredit the name of our Government. To a large extent, this has been behind the "Voice and Vision" campaign. It therefore seems to me quite gratuitous to impugn the Government's good faith unless there is very clear and documentary evidence as to the nature of these pledges, and it is hardly helpful to any of us, particularly when the Government


and the Opposition should be trying to get together to see how the future of Central Africa can be developed.
I have read the White Paper on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in great detail. As my right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State said, the verbatim record of the discussion is somewhat colloquial. At times the meaning is somewhat obscure, but I can trace three quite definite statements in it which imply that the British Government made it plain that the United Kingdom Parliament had the power to change the Constitution and that at least one of the principal delegates, Mr. Greenfield, clearly understood the position.
On page 5 of the White Paper there is a statement by Lord Swinton which reads:
… it would be possible I suppose for Her Majesty's Government if they could persuade Parliament to do it to pass an Act of Parliament tomorrow morning to take away the whole of responsible government from Southern Rhodesia and the whole of the functions which would be given to the Federation.
That was a statement made——

Mr. Robert Jenkins: Read on.

Mr. Berkeley: I will read on in a moment.
That was a statement made by Lord Swinton which clearly indicated that in his view the United Kingdom Government had the right to do this. My hon. Friend has asked me to read on. Lord Swinton went on to say:
You cannot legislate against the United Kingdom Parliament going off its head.
There are two quite separate points here. The first is Lord Swinton's view of the constitutional position, and the second—which I did not read out although I am happy to do so—is merely his political appreciation of what Parliament was likely to do. It merely confuses the issue if one joins them together.
Mr. Greenfield, after a statement by Mr. Lyttelton, said:
In this case it is 'the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away'".
If the allegations about pledges are based on these two pages of the verbatim record of the discussion and nothing else, in my opinion, having read it carefuly, nothing which could possibly be constituted as a pledge was given in public or private, judging from the evidence which has been

put before us. It seems to me of very great importance that this should be clearly established. If any hon. Member can find anything in the White Paper which amounts to a pledge, I should like to know about it.
I should like to get away from this question of pledges because it seems to me to be a red herring. I am not saying that it would not be an important issue if the Government had made and broken a pledge, but, as I do not believe that a pledge was made, it is I think rather fruitless to spend so much time discussing it.
I should like to look to the future, as was suggested by my right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State. There has been a considerable change in the situation since we had our last debate on Central African affairs. Since then we have had new Governments in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, and for the first time in the history of the Federation we have three territorial Governments all of Which are in some measure opposed, some of them violently opposed, to the continuance of federation. It must be absolutely clear to all of us that if the three territorial Governments are opposed to the present territorial set-up the sooner the Federation is brought to an end the better. What is now required is early and swift action on the part of our Government to bring this about.
My right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State said that the Government would have been in breach of their obligations to the people of Nyasaland had they not conceded the right of Nyasaland to secede from the Federation. By the same definition, the Government would equally be in breach of their obligations to the people of Northern Rhodesia if their immediate right to secede is not also granted, because, on a very limited franchise, 21,000 people voted for the United Federal Party, the only party in Northern Rhodesia in favour of continuing the Federation, and well oven 80,000 people voted against a continuation of federation, the bulk of them for U.N.I.P.
Therefore, even on this very restricted franchise, only 20 per cont. of the electorate was in favour of a continuation of federation, and only 180 Africans on


the Lower Roll were in favour of this as opposed to about 75,000 on the Lower Roll who were opposed to it. This is a convincing demonstration that federation in Northern Rhodesia is quite as unpopular as it is in Nysaland, and a Government, admittedly a coalition Government, have been returned with precisely the same mandate that Dr. Banda got when he won his election a year ago.
This is why I am anxious that our Government should take an early initiative. I am not terribly worried about the future of Northern Rhodesia. Whether federation breaks up in a few months' time, next year or possibly even the year after, the trend of events is clear beyond doubt. What I want to see is a constructive attempt to rebuild an association between these three territories. Measures have now been put in hand to bring about Nyasaland's withdrawal from the Federation. Unless the position of Northern Rhodesia is immediately recognised, we shall have, as it were, an exit permit for Nyasaland, with all sorts of arrangements being made specially for that territory and then we shall have to deal with the question of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia at a later date. This uncertainty is bound to be bad for the Rhodesias, but, if Nyasaland is to secede by herself, this is bound to be bad for Nyasaland because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) said, she is at present incapable of keeping herself and she will have to rely on a considerable subsidy from this country or from other sources.
What would be really damaging would be if the process with Nyasaland was completed before the process with Northern Rhodesia started because then it might be too late to bring Nyasaland back into any kind of association which could be formed. I do not believe, therefore, that we have ever had a better opportunity than now to bring about an early and speedy end to the Central African Federation, because, for the first time since matters started going really wrong, there is not a single territorial Government who would, I believe, lift a finger to save the present outfit. This must be the opportunity for the British Government to take an initiative.
I said that I was not terribly worried about Northern Rhodesia. I feel a deep sense of depression about Southern Rhodesia. I was in Salisbury for a few days in the New Year and I had the opportunity, as did the First Secretary of State, of having a lengthy talk with Mr. Winston Field. He is a charming, sensible, realistic and honourable man. In his attitudes towards the Federation and the two northern States, he seems to me to be utterly reasonable. Where his Government seem bound in the long run to flounder, however, is that it is not possible to talk to Africans as equals and colleagues in one territory and to lock them up in one's own territory.
I also, like my right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State, heard an account from both Mr. Field and Dr. Banda about their mutual conversation. They got on extremely well. I believe that Mr. Field is on friendly terms with Mr. Kaunda. If, however, he is arresting Nkomo and the Z.A.P.U. leaders and providing them with no constitutional outlet, I do not believe that this sort of co-operation between the three territories can last for long.
I felt a deep gulf between myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice when he spoke. I told my hon. Friend that I should be referring to his speech, but, unfortunately, it was not possible for him to remain. My hon. Friend talked about three categories of African States. I will not bother with the first, the Arab States, but he then talked about the black-led States and about the white-led States. This description of black-led States and white-led States is wholly artificial. The only reason why Southern Rhodesia is a white-led State and may still be a white-led State in five years' time is because it happens to have a constitution and franchise which gives the Europeans, who are less than 10 per cent. of the population, well over two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. It is as simple as that.
If my hon. Friend proposed to develop that theme on a coherent and logical basis, one might equally well point out that a year ago Northern Rhodesia was a white-led State, two years ago Nyasaland and Kenya were white-led States and twenty years ago Africa was a white-led continent. Where is all this getting us? It is a highly arbitrary state of affairs which cannot last with any degree


of permanence anywhere in the continent, except in the Republic of South Africa; and I believe that the end of that story is likely to be even more tragic than the chapter through which we are living.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Crawley) talk about Southern Rhodesia simply declaring itself independent and nobody being able to stop it from doing so, one should remind them that they are the very people who condemn Z.A.P.U. and Nkomo for unconstitutional action at the present time. My hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice feels strongly that Z.A.P.U. is behaving unconstitutionally and that unconstitutional action should not be taken, and yet he said publicly to us an hour or so ago that Southern Rhodesia should declare itself independent if we will not grant it independence and that nothing could be done to stop it going so. What greater incitement to unconstitutional action could there be than that?

Mr. Crawley: I did not suggest that Southern Rhodesia should declare itself independent. I merely asked what would happen if it asked for it.

Mr. Berkeley: My hon. Friend will note that I specifically referred to my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice as saying that Southern Rhodesia should declare itself independent. My hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West implied that if Southern Rhodesia asked for independence, we could not possibly refuse it because Southern Rhodesia would take it by force. I suspect that this is not the argument which my hon. Friend would apply in the case of Mr. Nkomo. If he were asked whether the principle of one man, one vote, should be applied to Mr. Nkomo, because if it is not he will create violence, I suspect that my hon. Friend would say that if Mr. Nkomo made trouble and acted unconstitutionally, he must be stopped. I say that one should not apply two different standards in one's arguments about these affairs.
My right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State, perhaps understandably, was non-committal about the possibility of Southern Rhodesia being granted independence. He indicated that he would

like to hear the views of hon. Members and he has heard the views of several of us. I should like to make my position clear. I could not possibly vote in favour of a Measure that would give independence to Southern Rhodesia on its present constitution. I would regard this as intolerable and a disastrous policy for us even to attempt.
That constitution is riddled with deficiencies, but there are two of those which would make it quite intolerable as an independence constitution. The first is that it provides for such high qualifications on the Lower Roll that, in effect, not more than 1 per cent. of the African population are eligible to vote.
The second and, perhaps, more serious defect of the constitution is that although it carefully provides that there can be no alteration in the qualifications of people who can vote without a referendum of the races—in other words, Mr. Winston Field's Government cannot take the franchise away from that small select number of Africans at present entitled to enjoy it—there is no such provision for the allocation of Upper-Roll and Lower-Roll seats.
It would be perfectly possible for Mr. Winston Field's Government to increase the number of A-roll seats—European seats—from 50 to 100 or 200 and still keep the number of African seats at 15. He could do this by a simple two-thirds majority, which he has, of Europeans in the present House. One of the defects of the constitution is that the number of Africans was carefully made small enough to provide for a two-thirds European majority in the Parliament. Equally, there is nothing to stop Mr. Field from reducing the number of African seats from 15 to 5 if he can do so through his two-thirds majority in Parliament. The actual number of seats granted to each roll is not one of the matters which are reserved for a referendum of the races.
Therefore, because I have met a number of members of Mr. Field's party and feel great reservations about their ideas of both racial and political progress, I think that it would be inconceivable for us to hand over Southern Rhodesia to independence on a constitution of that character.
Independence is something that we can give. It is a bargaining weapon which


we possess. Since we all know how restricted are the powers that we have in Southern Rhodesia, it is vital that this final weapon should be used constructively in Southern Rhodesia to set it on the road to majority representation and majority rule.
I have a further observation to make about Southern Rhodesia in relation to Mr. Nkomo and the unconstitutional action which he and many of his supporters have taken in the last year or so. My right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State said that he understood that Mr. Field was prepared to let Mr. Nkomo take his part in politics. I wonder what that means. Mr. Nkomo has been the leader of three Nationalist parties, all of which in turn have been banned. He naturally seeks a much wider franchise and the early introduction of African majority rule.
How is he going to advocate this? What steps can he take to bring this about? That is the crucial question. I know that Mr. Nkomo saw the First Secretary of State. I would now like my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General specifically to answer, as a distinguished lawyer, this question: what advice would he give a man who came to him and said, "I want to use constitutional means to improve the position of the Africans. What means are there that I can possibly use?"
The Southern Rhodesian Parliament is dominated by Europeans. There are 15 Lower Roll seats, 14 of them held by Africans who have been returned by only 1,500 voters between them and so represent no one. How can Mr. Nkomo constitutionally agitate to improve this position? I wish that I myself could find the answer, because this is the very question which he put to me when I was in Salisbury and spent about two hours with him in January.
All I could say to Mr. Nkomo was, "I cannot advise you how you can secure African majority rule. The only advice I can give you is to see the First Secretary of State when he is here, because unless people in England are convinced that you have satisfied every conceivable constitutional means of achieving your purposes, you will get no sympathy from them if you resort to unconstitutional measures."
I felt at the time that this was sadly deficient advice, and the fact remains, if we have no control over the franchise, that is for Mr. Field to decide what Mr. Nkomo is permitted to do. I do not call this giving Mr. Nkomo freedom to take part in politics.
That is why it is so important for us to see the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia as being the only weapon we now have by which we can determine the future of this territory and by which we can see that it does not go the same way as South Africa—as I believe it undoubtedly will unless other measures are taken.

Mr. Wall: How would my hon. Friend ensure that Southern Rhodesia does not become independent?

Mr. Berkeley: I am glad that my hon. Friend has come back because, as I warned him I would, I referred to him earlier in my speech. I find it very disturbing that someone who is prepared to condemn Z.A.P.U. for unconstitutional activities is prepared to encourage the Southern Rhodesian Government in unconstitutional activities. The granting of independence is a matter for this Parliament and our Government, and it is not for us, and certainly not for our Government, publicly to anticipate their actions in the event of an unconstitutional revolt.
I now want to say something about Nyasaland. I had three or four days there. I am very glad that agreement now seems to have been reached between Dr. Banda and Mr. Blackwood both about the Bill of Rights and also, I believe, about the number of minority seats which will be held by the European community under the independence Constitution. I have one observation to make about this because I think it needs to be said in the light of certain very hostile remarks which have appeared about Dr. Banda in certain newspapers in this country.
There is a certain irony in a man who has recently spent 14 months in gaol without trial being invited to produce, as Prime Minister, a Bill of Rights. I am delighted that Dr. Banda has agreed to do this, but I think that this fact might be remembered by some of the more irresponsible organs of the British Press which are only too


anxious, I believe, to blame and discredit newly emerging African countries.
Finally, I want to refer to Northern Rhodesia. I hope that the First Secretary of State will have another constitutional conference as soon as possible. There is very little to be said in favour of a constitution under which U.N.I.P. gets two-thirds of the votes and one-third of the seats. Indeed, this constitution has done two things. It has produced majority rule and it has brought about—helpfully, I think—a coalition between the two African Nationalist parties. But I do not believe that a constitution which contains such great anomalies as the one to which I have referred can last for very long. Again, I should like to see our Government taking the initiative to try to get a more sensible arrangement in Northern Rhodesia.
I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend that what we must try to devise amid the wreckage of this Federation is something which will last, something which is acceptable. Great skill will be needed. Probably a direct political association is now out of the question. I think that whoever is in power in Salisbury, even if there is a black Parliament, the whole concept of political control from there has become immensely disliked. Even if Mr. Nkomo, Mr. Kaunda and Dr. Banda were the respective Prime Ministers of the three territories, I do not believe that the Nyasas would be prepared to be ruled from Salisbury any more.
I think that future relations must be in terms of an economic association, a common services association or something of that type. It must be something which is obviously and beyond doubt the servant of the three territorial Governments and not the master. If that is done, I believe that we shall be able to create a new association and, with any luck, an association which will flourish.
One of the encouraging aspects of East Africa, despite the present trouble in Kenya, is the way in which the common services organisation there is working and growing. This is something we must try to achieve in Central Africa out of the wreckage which exists after ten years of federation.

7.50 p.m.

Mr. Albert Roberts: I intervene in the debate because some of the observations which have been made do not altogether coincide with my own view. I support the view expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot), but for different reasons. This is a situation which redounds on the Government with a certain amount of dishonour.
I am very pleased to be able to follow the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley), because when we last debated the Federation he was followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley (Mr. Mason) and to some extent I support his views. However. I was amazed when the hon. Member said that we must now start to rebuild. Why should we start to rebuild when we have the Federation? It must be remembered that the Labour Party had the patent rights of the Federation in the first instance. The most amazing fact is that of about 20 Labour Members of Parliament who visited the Federation, about 18 returned with the view that a prima facie case had been made out for its continuation. I do not believe in political dishonesty, and it seems to me that the First Secretary is now trying to evolve the theory, "If you cannot convince, confuse."
I am concerned with human beings. Nobody loves people more than I do, black, white or yellow. It is only a few months ago that I was in Angola. I am the only Labour Member of Parliament who has been in the terrorist area of that country. This is not a matter of supporting political views of one kind or another, but we have to remember what happened in Angola and that it was all engineered inside the Congo. I shall not make political speeches to give aid and sustenance to such people, to the people who invaded Angola at 50 places on a 400-mile front. The butchery and slaughter were nauseating and disgusting, and it is time that some of these facts were brought into the light.
I have also been to the Federation. A short time ago, I was in Salisbury, and on one pleasant Sunday afternoon I watched a football match in which both black and white were playing. That was true multi-racialism. What is so paradoxical is that Rhodesian football clubs cannot play in South Africa because of


apartheid and they cannot play in Northern Rhodesia for the same reason if they play against a white team.
On this side of the House we have always advocated multi-racialism, but what my hon. Friends are now trying to bring about is narrow nationalism. We all agree about the importance of the emergence of the Africans, but is not this a question of timing? Votes were given to the women of this country in 1928, but people have to reach maturity first. When we talk about masses of people seeking emancipation, we have to remember some of the primitive tribes inside the Federation and then go to Asia Minor and see the emaciation and poverty there. It is my view that economic freedom is far more important than political freedom, because if there is economic freedom, political freedom will follow.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) was in Blantyre when I was there with some of my hon. Friends. We saw direct intimidation by the Malawi Party. We saw houses burning and the tenants of those houses having to seek refuge in the forests, where we found them later in the day. We went to the police in whom I have every confidence because some of them come from my constituency and are honourable men. We were told that the events of that Sunday were easy to understand. The Malawi Party was having a meeting which was sparsely attended, and so it went with loudspeakers to round up the people. Inciting speeches were made and in consequence the black Africans plundered and set fire to houses. It is no use disguising the fact. The hon. Member for Lancaster must realise that a lot of intimidation has taken place in Nyasaland. We have no right to support such action.

Mr. Berkeley: I was in Nyasaland shortly after the election had taken place. There have been a great many allegations about intimidation, but I specifically inquired of the Governor and members of his administration who all said that the cases of intimidation which had been reported had been vastly exaggerated and that their influence on the result of the election was also certainly negligible.

Mr. Roberts: The great danger in Africa is the fragmentation of the country. It is difficult for the man in the street

to understand why we fight for Katanga to remain in the Congo to make the Congo a viable proposition while at the same time we break up the Federation, especially as Katanga had no connection with the Congo before the Belgians took control. It is things like that which must be recognised.
The Federation is a wonderful concept, and the only reason why it has not worked is that speeches in this Chamber since 1933 have been determined that it should not work. If it had been allowed to continue, I am convinced that Sir Edgar Whitehead meant what he said—and to some extent we have driven him into the political wilderness—when he forecast that the Africans would have control of the Federation within the course of two decades. What is wrong with that? The University in Salisbury is functioning well and it is multi-racial, and there are many other institutions in the Federation which function well and which are also multiracial.
Housing and education inside the Federation have been mentioned but hon. Members should make comparisons with some other parts of Africa and some other parts of the world, particularly the Middle East and the Far East. We have talked about the slums in Salisbury, and I have seen them. I would sooner live in the slums in Salisbury than in the slums of some of our major cities during the arctic weather which we have been experiencing. If more financial aid had been provided to produce employment opportunities as the Africans were educated, we could have overcome our difficulties more easily.
Although it has been said that there is no hope for the Federation, I hope that at least there is a chance that Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia will work out some common policy. It is not a question of mistrust, but of having confidence and political maturity and attempting to conduct affairs properly. In the last eighteen months confidence in the Federation has gone. There has been a cessation of building and the economy has weakened.
It is said that political questions can be solved by giving full control to the black Africans. I am all for that when the time is opportune. It has been said


that we ought not to support Sir Roy Welensky, but I am not against Sir Roy Welensky and I have the courage to say so. I have talked to hundreds of people in the Federation who left this country during the slump and who went there with their families and braved malaria and black-water fever, I know that there are business tycoons in the Federation, but there are also thousands of decent people who want to develop a truly multi-racial society.
I doubt whether my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has ever been in the Federation. He has been to Ghana and when he was once challenged about Ghana he admitted that it was an authoritarian State. I am not one of those who believe in handing over lock, stock and barrel to people who say that once they get power they will not import a Westminster democracy. I realise that they cannot have a complete model of a Westminster democracy and that it has taken us centuries to get where we are. But while I do not say that they should wait for centuries, if there had been more co-operation between the two sides on this issue, the outcome would have been far more favourable than it is.
The point is that we are now telling these people what to go for, and even violence has been mentioned. The hon. Member for Lancaster knows that the black Africans in Southern Rhodesia are very happy indeed. They are at work, and they have provided work for those who have come from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The trouble is that these people have been, and are being, deceived. They seem to think that if they get political independence everything will be free and easy. This independence will come, but at the moment we see advertisements in the paper asking for money to feed the hungry. Are we going to allow the economy to disintegrate and then answer appeals for funds to feed the hungry? Are we going to give independence to Nyasaland and then make them dependent on the British taxpayer?
The truth is that to a large extent seeing is believing. If people had more opportunities for going there and seeing what exists, I am sure that they would change their views. If there is to be a breakdown of the Federation it ought to be placed on record that this country

is missing a golden opportunity. We missed a similar opportunity in South Africa in the latter part of the last century, and we are missing it now in this territory, because we are bringing about this fragmentation of Central Africa.
I am pleased to have had this opportunity to express my point of view. I am a Socialist and a trade unionist. I want to see these countries come out on top. There is no doubt that if federation could have continued they would have been a shining example to the world. Instead of that we have intervention—and we have had it for a long time—from the Americans, who seem to think that if someone puts a bottle of Coca-Cola into the hand of an African he becomes civilised.
I went to the Copperbelt and met rational people who were amazed at the amount of subterfuge in which the Americans are engaged. They are financing people who are working underground, and, as the hon. Member for Haltemprice said, as we go out they will move in. There will be no political freedom for thousands of Africans there because it will be the act of some people who consider themselves either the second or third Messiahs. That is the tragedy of the situation. We have had far too many debates on the Federation. Had there been more common sense, we should have found the right answers.

8.3 p.m.

Mr. Robert Jenkins: I, too, am one of those who went to the Federation. I think I went with the first party that was arranged by the Central African Federal Government for Members of this House to see what was going on. I had the opportunity of talking to all kinds of people, black and white, trade unionists, farmers, and men of all descriptions in all parts of the three territories. I came back a firm believer in maintaining the Central African Federation, and I support the desire of the hon. Member for Normanton (Mr. A. Roberts) to maintain the Federation. With the exception of the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall), every hon. Member who has spoken has said that the Federation is finished and done with. I am not prepared to believe it.
One thing that has astonished me about the debates on Central Africa is that no reference has been made to the magnificent work of those white settlers who left this island and brought order out of chaos throughout the world. In 80 years white settlers have transformed Central Africa from a country composed of barbarians to a reasonably civilised community. I am sure that the House would wish to express its thanks to these British settlers for their magnificent work.
We are in a mess at the moment. There are difficulties ahead of us. To a large extent the Government do not know what they are going to do. They are holding conferences, and they have appointed Commissions, and I should like for a few moments to give the House the history of the last three years since the trouble really started.
As the hon. Member for Normanton said, this idea originated in the mind of that far-sighted Labour statesman the right hon. Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths), It was adopted by Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, as he then was, in 1951 when he became Colonial Secretary, and it was encouraged with vigour by the then Mr. Lennox-Boyd. The Monckton Commission then went out there, and from the moment the Monckton Commission made its Report the grand concept of a multi-racial society in Central Africa began to crumble.
Subsequent to that Report the Minister responsible for the territories in this House began to give way to the Nationalists. Incidentally, the Nationalists were inspired to go ahead by the "wind of change" speech made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, but when my right hon. Friend made that speech he never thought that it might result in a hurricane or a tornado going through Africa, which is what has happened.
The Constitution was settled by a conference in 1952. Incidentally, when the Rhodesias came together to discuss this they did not want Nyasaland to be part of the new Central African Federation, but she was wished on them. Appeals were made to the leaders of these two territories to take on Nyasaland as a poor partner whom they could help. Nyasaland was forced on them because it was said it was in the interests of the black population that they should join

the Rhodesias, yet today when the Federation, so it is said, is about to be broken up and Nyasaland is to be allowed to secede, it is said that this is being done for the benefit of the black population.
Notwithstanding what is contained in the White Paper and the arguments which have taken place today and the disputes about whether any pledges were given, and also the discussions about what took place at the original conference and whether those pledges if given were an instrument to get an agreement so that the Clauses which did not include the pledges could be enshrined in the Act, one thing that is certain is that those who were present at the conference, men of distinction like Lord Malvern, Sir Roy Welensky, Lord Boyd, Lord Chandos and Lord Colyton have all said unequivocally that undertakings and pledges were given which were riot enshrined in the Act. Thank goodness that they are alive today to be able to rise in another place and say so. We have no doubt where the truth lies. It is certain that when those undertakings were given, quietly, round the conference table, they had a great effect upon bringing about a settlement of the problems.
I want to refer to the effect which the Monckton Commission has had on the present position. In the Federal Parliament in November, 1960, Sir Roy Welensky said that he would not have agreed to the Monckton Commission had he believed that its terms of reference would include secession. He said:
I received explicit assurances to this effect from the British Prime Minister in November, 1959.
I submit that the Monckton Commission's recommendations sold the pass for the Central African Federation, since after it came out no African Nationalist would co-operate with the Federal Government, in the belief that all that had to be done was to persuade the United Kingdom Government to break up the Federation.
I could give a number of instances of this, but I do not wish to weary the House, or to prevent other hon. Members from speaking. There is one illustration which will show how bitter some of the white Africans are at the thought that they have been let down by Ministers in this way. I was present at the Rhodesias and Nyasaland Club dinner on


10th July, 1962, when the Chief Secretary said:
This is an example of faith in the future of the Federation for which I and Her Majesty's Government stand, and we want you to understand that if you put money into the Federation we shall be behind you.
That was less than a year ago. It is therefore reasonable for us to accept that the responsible people in the Federation are losing confidence in the future intentions of Her Majesty's Government.
Looking at the matter in retrospect, it is clear that the Federation has been a great success story, in finance, employment, education, health, the building of hospitals, communications and roads, exports and power—of which the Kariba Dam is an illustration. I have listened to every Central African debate since I became a Member, and I have never heard anyone say that the Federation was incompetent or inefficient. No charge has been made today that the Federation is being broken up because the administration is inefficient and incompetent. Yet the Government and many hon. Members opposite are anxious to dismantle it, although it is a fine conception which could have proved to be an outstanding edifice of civilisation and multi-racial co-operation.
I want to say one more word on the question of Northern Rhodesia and the Federation. If a person is let down by people it is very difficult for him to have confidence in them afterwards, and if he is let down successively over a period of months or years, he turns away from those who have let him down, with distrust and, sometimes, almost hatred. In 1960, the Lennox-Boyd constitution for Northern Rhodesia had been in operation for one year. It was intended to last for ten years. In June, 1960, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia said:
In the face of this clear and direct statement of Her Majesty's Government's position on the constitutional future of the Territory I trust that no political leader or leader of any political organisation in Northern Rhodesia will continue to mislead his followers into an expectation that radical changes in our constitution are just round the corner.
In February, 1961, the proposals for the constitution were published. In June, 1961, those proposals were amended, in a statement made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House. Later, after intimidation and threats by U.N.I.P., further concessions were made. Although

the June, 1961, proposals were considered by everybody in this House and in the Federation as being the basis for the final constitution, continued intimidation caused further concessions to be made which vitally changed the constitution and ensured that an African Nationalist majority would be elected in Northern Rhodesia.
The June proposals made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House had made it possible for Sir Edgar Whitehead to carry the new Southern Rhodesia referendum in July, 1961. In fact, Sir Roy Welensky helped in the canvassing to get that constitution through. One of the principal cases advocated in the election —at meetings and elsewhere—was that the June proposals were the basis for the final constitution for Northern Rhodesia, as announced by the British Government. The argument was, This is reasonable. Therefore, vote for this new constitution in Southern Rhodesia and you can trust the British Government to see you through". The referendum was won by the Federal Party, but when the elections were held subsequently the amended proposals for the Northern Rhodesia constitution had the effect of ensuring that the extreme Right white people won that Southern Rhodesia election. They no longer trusted the word of the British Government in respect of the final constitution of June, 1961, and therefore instead of adopting a moderate attitude at the ballot boxes they went over to the extreme Right.
I have welcomed the opportunity to put these facts on record. It seems to me that the Government are about to let down Sir Roy Welensky's Government, the white settlers, the copper mine workers, the coal miners and the men from Durham, Northumberland, Yorkshire, Newcastle and South Wales who went out to Central Africa in their thousands, and who, incidentally, when the only copper that we could get for our munitions during the war came from the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia, worked twenty hours a day to mine it for us.
The civil servants will also be let down, as they have been let down in most places where changes of this kind have occurred. Industry is beginning to sag. Even worse, if this process of giving the black Africans the right to govern themselves


is allowed to develop too swiftly, and no remedial action is taken within the next two or three years, those responsible black Africans who have trusted us in the past are also going to be let down.
No one in this House seems to have taken the view that there is still a possibility that the Central African Federation will continue. I take that view because I believe in it. I believe the Government are being prepared—no more than that—to hand over the last bulwark of the British way of life to unscrupulous, power-sated black politicians whose rule will destroy the great edifice of civilisation built up during the days of Rhodes and onwards. I say to the Government that to withdraw support from Sir Roy Welensky now, when he is on the threshold of achieving a multiracial society in Central Africa, would be one of the greatest catastrophies in the long and meritorious history of the British Commonwealth and Empire.

8.21 p.m.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: I had not originally intended to take any part in this debate, but I have been tempted and provoked by some of the things said from the benches opposite, especially by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall).
I was particularly tempted by the speech of the hon. Member for Dulwich (Mr. Robert Jenkins) because it is not often that an hon. Member on this side of the House gets a chance to rush to the rescue simultaneously of a Conservative Prime Minister, the Leader of the House, the First Secretary and Lord Monckton, a former leading member of a Conservative Cabinet. If one understood the analysis to which we have just listened, the hon. Member for Dulwich was arguing that the Central African Federation had been destroyed by his own Government starting with the Report of the Monckton Commission aided and abetted by the "wind of change" speech of the Prime Minister and by the policies of the present Leader of the House. I am not inclined to take quite such a vindictive view of the policies of the Government.
It does not seem to me that the hon. Member's analysis fits the facts at all. The truth is that during the last ten years we have witnessed in Africa one

of the most tumultuous revolutions which have occurred in the history of mankind. Ten years ago I think there were only three independent indigenous African nations, Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia. Today there are twenty and there will be several more soon. The only thing which can be said about the Prime Minister's "wind of change"speech is that it was an extremely courageous one in the context in which it was delivered, but it was a rather belated speech. The Prime Minister and the present Leader of the House were recognising the processes of historic change taking place in Africa and trying to adapt the policies of a Conservative Government to them.
I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Normanton (Mr. A. Roberts) that this is related in practice to the duty of political wisdom to find how historical trends are going and to try to do one's best to help to nuke sure that they take place as peacefully and constructively as possible. We on this side of the House, without in the least under-estimating the tremendous difficulties which the new African nations will face for many years ahead, cannot do anything but instinctively feel on their side because what is taking place in this African revolution is, above all, an assertion of a demand for basic human self-respect. This, I think, lies behind the compulsions which have brought new African nations so quickly to independence.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice said that the Opposition had little right to make a lot of fuss about the alleged pledges the Government of the time gave to the Central African leaders because we did not, of course, believe that those pledges should have been given. This is one of the main charges that we make against that Government.
I think that the first major debates in which I took part in this House were those on the Central African Federation Bill. My recollection of those debates is that, although they were very fiercely contested, they were not contested simply between the Government and the Opposition; there were doubts expressed by hon. Members opposite as well on this side. This was particularly true of Scottish Members. The Church of Scotland, with its historic associations with Nyasaland, had an intimate knowledge of conditions there,


and very strong representations were made to all Scottish Members of Parliament, irrespective of party.
My recollection of those debates is that if Lord Chandos, as he now is, had come before the House and told hon. Members that in fact he had made arrangements in earlier discussions for the Federal Government to have the right of veto over any future demand of secession from Nyasaland, this would have been highly unacceptable to a substantial number of hon. Members, including some of his own hon. Friends. It is a very dishonourable process that we should now discover that these private pledges were given at that time. I am bound to echo the words of the Marquess of Salisbury in another place when the Government disclaimed that they were pledges. It seems that pledges in the present Government's definition are not pledges so long as they are made in secret. It is a matter on which the Opposition are bound to attack the Government at this stage, and we have certainly had no satisfactory defence from anyone in the Government on that point.
The striking thing, looking back over the tragic ten years of Central African Federation—this is the answer to the hon. Member for Dulwich—is the degree to which the criticisms of the original Federation proposal by the Opposition in this House have been proved right. It is extremely difficult over a space of ten years in the world as it is today, moving as quickly as it does, for any politician to look back on his speeches of ten years ago and feel that he showed an accurate foresight, but when we go back to the fight put up in this House by the Opposition on that Bill we find that we have been proved absolutely right in the warnings that we gave then and in the forecasts of what we said would finally have to be conceded by the British Government.
There are one or two other points which I wish to mention. First, I want to take up the views expressed by the hon. Member for Haltempriec—I am sorry he is not in his place at the moment—attacking the American penetration into Central Africa. I think that it would be a very great mistake if that kind of attitude were in any way to be shared by the British Government.
I had some opportunity in Central Africa last summer to see something of the work which the Americans are doing there, and it seemed to me that they were giving help in poor territories in which we need as much help as we can get on an international basis. I am told that Dr. Banda's Government are giving a very warm welcome to volunteers from the American Peace Corps, and I am sure that the First Secretary will give as warm a welcome to that kind of help.
It seems to me that one of the great challenges which faces this country and the United States is to arrive at a means of co-operating constructively together in the work of bringing help to these new African nations. It would be a great pity if Britain, because of her colonial past, felt that the United States were usurping her obligations, just as it would be equally a pity if the United States felt that, because of their dislike of our colonial past, they could not be associated with us in the projects in Africa. It is extremely easy for hon. Members on the Conservative back benches to poke fun at Mr. Mennen Williams, but I suppose that in some ways he is the alter ego of the Marquess of Salisbury. Although the Marquess of Salisbury may put his views with greater sophistication than does Mr. Mennen Williams, I think that if one were to form an estimate of which of the two sets of views had done the greater service for the West in the new nations in Africa, whose loyalty may be very important to us in the years ahead, one would decide that it was the rather militant views of Mr. Mennen Williams rather than the old-fashioned views of the Marquess of Salisbury.
I hope that the British Government will apply themselves to co-operative arrangements with the new Governments in Central Africa. This is particularly important in Nyasaland, which is a desperately poor country. I wish that we had been given some more information from the First Secretary about the kind of help which we propose to give to Nyasaland, in the years which lie immediately ahead, in the development plans which she has been working out with very great care and earnestness. One matter in which there is room for co-operation with the Americans, and also room for friction if we do not make the right sort of arrangements, is the way


in which we share the burden of assisting in development.
I got the impression in Nyasaland, and I have had it in some other parts of the world, that what tends to happen is that we, as the traditional colonial Power, find ourselves giving a grant in budgetary aid which is used to maintain the Administration—which is vital but not visible aid. On the other hand, the Americans, coming in as newcomers, tend to give their aid in more visible forms, more ostentatious forms—perhaps in the form of bright new buildings and institutes on which one can stick a pleasant label saying, "This was given by the United States". It is important that we should try to bring about methods of co-operation so that not only the dramatic and exciting development but also the undramatic although equally vital development shall be generally shared between the two countries.
Finally, I wish to say a brief word about the situation in Southern Rhodesia which is, of course, the most difficult of all the three Territories as the Federation breaks up. I hope that the British Government will do everything they can to influence the present Southern Rhodesian Government towards allowing speedy constitutional advance to prevent the kind of violence which has been feared in a number of speeches made today. One of our charges against the Government's policy over recent years is that they have wantonly given up some of the political instruments of influence which they had—the reserve powers. But what is immensely true in the present situation of Southern Rhodesia is that our powers of economic influence with that country are very great. I think that it was singularly unfortunate that one of the earlier actions of the First Secretary in his present office last summer was to make a substantial financial grant to Southern Rhodesia. However much we sympathise with some of the economic and social problems faced by the African population of Southern Rhodesia, it is important to use this means of influence which we have to persuade the Southern Rhodesians that, even at this late stage, they ought to change their forms of political advance.
The truth is that it is the Southern Rhodesian European minority, perhaps

above all, which faces the most acute difficulty following the break-up of the Federation. It has been an argument by those who still claim to believe that the Federation should be held together that Nyasaland would suffer most from a break-up because Nyasaland is the poorest country. But Nyasaland is a poor, agricultural country and can suffer certain economic setbacks without the people noticing it too badly, while the European minority, on the other hand, has had a luxury and boom economy, and over the last year or two, when it has become increasingly clear that the future of the Federation was in great doubt, that economy has begun to sag very sharply. One has only to look at the present municipal budget in Salisbury, compared with that a year or two ago, to see one barometer of how much the level of economic activity has dropped.
The manufacturing interests in Southern Rhodesia which had such a sharp boom after federation was created have a very considerable motive for wanting reasonable terms of association with Northern Rhodesia, because these new secondary industries have been built up on the basis of having a market protected by a customs barrier with Northern Rhodesia. If they go on with the present political policies and go on refusing to allow Mr. Joshua Nkomo and his colleagues to have adequate constitutional outlets, they will put themselves in a catastrophic economic position. It is sometimes said from the benches opposite that if Her Majesty's Government exercised the kind of economic pressures that I am advocating Southern Rhodesia would simply be driven into the Republic of South Africa. I do not think that this is very likely. I do not think that the Republic of South Africa, for political reasons, would very much welcome the kind of European minority which would be associated with it. On economic grounds the arguments against Southern Rhodesia going in are even stronger, because the infant Southern Rhodesian secondary industries will not be able to compete at all if they find themselves in a common market with the Republic of South Africa.
Therefore, I should have thought that there is a considerable section of the European minority in Southern Rhodesia that is very much open to economic


pressures wielded by this country. This is one, case in which this form of economic sanction, if you like to call it that, is a perfectly proper way for us in this country to try to prevent the kind of disaster that Southern Rhodesia will be heading for, unless its political policies on African advance change.
This debate has been rather poorly attended. It is a sign that most people in the House on both sides now believe that the Federation has come to an end and think that in that sense the issues across the Floor of the House are a little less sharp than they were in the past. If the attendance at this debate were to be taken as a sign of complacency and a feeling that the problems of Central Africa were now gradually being put behind us. it would be unbelievable smugness, because although in my view Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, moving towards self-government and self-determination, have a reasonably sure future now, although they have difficulties, the more I think about the future of Southern Rhodesia as part of the whole Southern tip of Africa the gloomier I become. It is impossible to feel that there is now any peaceful way out of the political impasse which has been created in South Africa. Southern Rhodesia will go the same way as South. Africa unless there is a change in policies there. I believe that there is still time. I believe that the influence of this country and of this Government may be crucial. I pray that it may not be too late.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. John Farr: I trust that the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson) will excuse me if I do not follow him too closely in his argument. I disagree with the analysis he made towards the end of his speech as to why some benches on both sides of the House are sparsely occupied. Except for two or three of the speeches towards the end of this debate, one might have been excused for thinking that one was attending the funeral service of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Hon. Members on both sides have referred to the impending doom, to the certainty that the Federation will not continue. I do not look at the matter in that light. I think that the Federation without a doubt will change, but I believe that it

is a structure of such value that, although it may be radically changed, there is a possibility, and indeed a probability, of the framework, however much it may be dismantled, being retained to keep together, to the benefit of the three nations concerned, the Federation that we know.
The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) and the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) castigated the Government because of understandings which had been reached and which, they claimed, had been broken. I wish to inform them that they need not take the word of the Government that no such undertakings which were given have been broken, for they need only study the White Paper published at the beginning of February to get the matter in perspective. The whole thing is clearly stated in that White Paper, which is a verbatim record of the discussions which took place on 19th January, 1953, relating to the review of the Constitution.
I have studied this record as closely, I think, as my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley), and I would say that it makes it emphatically clear that Her Majesty's Government have not ratted on any undertaking they may or may not have given. In any case, even without the White Paper, how could any Government, of whatever political complexion, be so rash and foolhardy as to give what would virtually amount to a veto to no less than four Governments; saying that the Federation would not be disbanded unless they were all agreed? No Government in this country would do such a thing, and there is no point in anyone saying that this Government would do it.
The hon. Member for Huddersfield, West made another interesting point when he said that he thought that it was the fault of Her Majesty's Government that we had lost the chance of building a multi-racial society in the Rhodesias. I do not believe that it was this Government's fault. I was there in about 1956 and at that time there was an influential body at work, not only in Central Africa but throughout the Kenyan, called the Capricorn Society. Hon. Members may or may not have heard of it. At the time of my visit it was in its heyday, so to speak, and the society was attracting a good deal of favourable support from all


sections of the community, coloured and white, and various Governments associated with the Federation were warmly supporting its efforts. However, it died a natural death and nothing came of the Capricorn Society.
Several hon. Members have spoken in a manner which has made me wonder if they really want to do their best for the people in the Federation, whatever the colour of those people, or whether their chief and prime aim is to ensure that only one section of the population, perhaps only one colour, has its interests looked after. I cannot help taking the view that some hon. Members feel that the wishes of any nation newly emerged—however small its population or backward or ignorant its population—must be respected without any guidance from, for instance, ourselves, when we may have responsibilities towards them, particularly until they achieve independence. I have in mind the nation of Nyasaland with its small population of about 2 million people. They are independent now, but their leaders tell us that it is the wish of the population—and I am sure that this is so in so far as they understand the issues involved—that they should secede immediately or as soon as possible from the Federation.
As I have said, many hon. Members, and certainly quite a number of hon. Members opposite, seem to feel that merely because that wish has been expressed by these people who, however kindly we look at them are very backward, that in itself should be sufficient and their wish should be acted on immediately. I do not agree. I think that we have to do not only what they may or may not want themselves, but what we really think is best for the people of Nyasaland. I would ask those hon. Members to ask themselves whether they think it to the best interest of the people of Nyasaland to make the complete and utter break with the Federation which some hon. Members have implied is impending.
As hon. Members know, Nyasaland is one of the major reservoirs of labour for the rest of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. No fewer than 500,000 out of a population of 2·8 million are nearly always engaged in labour elsewhere in the Federation or in Portuguese

or South African territories. I would counsel hon. Members who feel that the wishes of a newly emergent African State are absolutely sacrosanct, instead of merely repeating the cries of the leaders of these people, to think for a moment whether, particularly in the case of Nyasaland, it is best to have a complete and utter break.
I should like to add my plaudits to the sustained and painstaking efforts of my right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State. He has certainly grasped a hot potato in handling these affairs and, as is most becoming, he is handling them very gingerly at the moment, but I feel that this is a problem which given common sense and, above all, given time, will not prove to be insoluble. Moreover, my right hon. Friend struck the right note when he said towards the end of his speech that it is essential to appreciate that the situation in Central Africa is not due to any fault on the part of the Government. Of course it is not. The present precarious position in Central Africa and other parts of Africa is due to the rightful desire of the African people throughout the continent to be more proportionately represented in government. Nevertheless, I shall be sad to see the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland drift apart or break up into ruins as envisaged by some hon. Members.
I do not say that for sentimental reasons, although having spent nearly a couple of years in the Federation I am well aware of all the wonderful work which was done by Cecil Rhodes and of the historical associations which his name brings to memory in connection with the Federation. I say that I would be sorry to see the Federation completely break up for entirely different reasons. It seems to me, having travelled in all parts of the Federation, that the three territories of which it is composed are in a very real sense complementary to one another.
In the North there are the Nyasas who, as I have said, largely provide a reservoir of labour for much of the Federation. Much of the heavy industry in the North of the Federation, in Northern Rhodesia, is dependent on the only source of coal which lies in Southern Rhodesia at Wankie. Economically, of course, Southern Rhodesia depends to a very great extent upon the Copperbelt


in Northern Rhodesia. The three countries are united also in another vast project, the Kariba Dam scheme, which is only just beginning to show the benefits of harnessing the enormous power which lies in the River Zambesi.
My right hon. Friend asked hon. Members on both sides to give him their views about whether a conference should be called in the fairly near future in an effort to thrash out the present difficulties. I join with other hon. Members who have said that such a conference would be very desirable. I feel that the preparatory work for it should begin at once. While there is, as there is now, a certain amount of fluidity in the affairs of the three nations of the Federation, we should try during the conference to crystallise this fluidity into some form of association between the three territories, be it only economic.
I cannot myself foresee an association or federation embodying one responsibility for defence. There is a chance of having a federation embodying one responsibility for foreign affairs: but I think it absolutely essential that we retain the fabric of federation in a really close and harmonious economic association beneficial to all concerned.

8.52 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: I do not propose to spend very long on one theme of the debate, the theme of Government pledges on this subject. This is not because I think it an unimportant theme—it is very important—but I do not consider that it is quite as important as the actual situation in Central Africa today.
I say only this to the Attorney-General on the subject of the pledges. I hope that neither he nor anyone else will suppose that any hon. Member on this side of the House thinks that the Government had not power to agree to Nyasaland's secession or that they were not right to agree to Nyasaland's secession. We think that the Government were right to do both those things. But the trouble—we are bound to point it out—is that they had promised not to do them. They really had; there is no doubt about it if one reads the documents. Call it a pledge, if one likes. It was certainly not a legally binding pledge;

it could not be. But, so far as Ministers' words mean anything in the documents which have now been published, there can be no doubt that they gave the assurance, promise, pledge, whatever it may be called, that they would not agree to the secession of territories unless all the Governments concerned so agreed.
Since this has been denied by several speakers, I think that I ought to give just two confirmations of it. One is the letter, a public one, after all, to the British Council of Churches, of which, so we are now told by the noble Lord, Lord Swinton was largely the author. It says:
.. as the Constitution"—
that is, of the Federation—
will be based on a scheme which has been agreed between the four Governments concerned and will itself be so agreed it seems to Her Majesty's Government that it would in any foreseeable circumstance be morally and politically indefensible for Parliament to enact amendments which had not been similarly agreed.
If that is not an assurance, I do not know what words mean. There was the briefer but, perhaps, even more sweeping assurance of Lord Chandos when he said in the negotiations:
Nothing can liquidate the Constitution unless all four "—
that is, all four Governments—
are agreed on it".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 18th February, 1963; Vol. 246, c. 1160–1.]
I am not a supporter of Sir Roy Welensky, but I was in the Federal Parliament in Salisbury when he made his famous tirade against the British Government. When he quoted those words and others, it was very difficult to deny that Sir Roy Welensky had allowed himself to be led up the garden. It was rather naive of him because, apparently, he believed assurances of Ministers on pledges which they were in no position to give since they could not—and here we are on common ground—possibly pledge away the right of this Parliament to decide. But, apparently he did believe all this because, I suppose, he wanted to believe it—he is a very shrewd politician—and that, I suppose, is the only explanation.
This is a profoundly discreditable incident, and the Government, because those pledges or assurances were given,


but which should not have been given—in order to do the right thing in the case of Nyasaland—have had completely to go back on them. That is a sad and discreditable thing which surely we must all deplore.
I turn to the speech of the First Secretary of State and the main subjects of the debate. We would have little to debate if we debated only what the right hon. Gentleman told us. I think that he made only one real announcement, and that was the decision that the negotiations on the secession of Nyasaland, which has been agreed to by the Government, should go on between the Nyasaland Government, and I suppose Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and the Federal Government. I should have thought that it was a most disastrous decision that these negotiations should go on with this moribund Federal Government, not one constituent part of which desires it to continue. It seems to me quite disastrous to give the only people who wish to delay a decision on the winding up of the situation—that is, the Ministers of the Federal Government—endless powers of obstruction. I cannot understand how that decision has been arrived at. I think that it will have the most disastrous reactions in Northern Rhodesia where, surely, exactly the same process must be gone through. As the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) said, surely it is disastrous that this whole process should be gone through again in the case of Northern Rhodesia when the Government, as, of course, they will have to do, come to meet its demand for secession. Surely the conference ought to deal with the two matters together.
For the rest, we must discuss what the First Secretary of State did not say rather than what he did say. The first startling omission from his speech was that he made no acknowledgment of the right of Northern Rhodesia to secede. What is the object of keeping silent on this matter? He knows that he has got to do it. Having granted, properly we think, the right of Nyasaland to secede, how can be possibly deny the same right to Northern Rhodesia? Would it not be a thousand times better to acknowledge that here and now and to put doubt out of the minds of the

Northern Rhodesian African movement? We cannot banish from our minds the suspicion that, merely because he does not want to face the opposition of some of his hon. Friends, he simply omits to make that clear statement. But he has got to make it sooner rather than later, and he will face just as much opposition from behind him when he does make it. Surely, it would be a hundred times better for him to make it tonight. It carries with it the obvious corollary that he admits that the Federation is at an end and must be dismantled by its constituent parts.
My hon. Friend the Member for Normanton (Mr. A. Roberts) asked why we should dismantle the Federation. I do not think that it is any question of the British or United Kingdom Government dismantling the Federation. It is that all three of the Governments which compose the Federation desire that it should cease to exist. How, therefore, can we keep it in existence when every one of its constituent parts desires to go its own way, not only Governments which are in the hands of Africans but also a Government which is in the hands of Europeans, in Southern Rhodesia? Surely, therefore. the time has come when it would be a thousand times better for the First Secretary and the Government here to say frankly and clearly, in a way that could be understood in Africa, that they recognise the right of Northern Rhodesia to secede and, therefore, the necessity of the winding-up of the Federation.
On all sides, one thing on which everyone is agreed—it is about the one thing in the speech of the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) with which I agreed—is that it is necessary that decisions should be reached quickly on these matters. The main impression from the First Secretary's speech was of extreme dilatoriness, that he was hanging out and hanging up all these decisions as long as he possibly could. Surely, that is a terribly dangerous policy to adopt, whatever we think the decision should be.
Many hon. Members on the Government side, and one of my hon. Friends also, have spoken about federation and emphasised both the great economic benefits which it has had for the territories and the great economic difficulties


in which the constituent parts and Governments might find themselves when the Federation is wound up. There is great force in those arguments, but hon. Members who have used them are utterly beside the point.
Perhaps I may give an analogy. Every one of us could make a case of great force for a federation of the Governments of Central Europe, for example. It has often been done—the Danube Basin Governments, for example. One could easily prove that a federation of, say, Yugoslavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia would have enormous economic benefits for the area. Nobody would propose it, however, for the reason that we know it to be quite impossible. One of the Governments—Austria—is a democracy in the Western sense, one of them is an orthodox Communist Government and one of them is an unorthodox Communist Government. Neither politically nor economically could they conceivably federate.
The difficulties today in Central Africa of federal association and of a political and economic link—above all, a political link—are in some ways even greater. Men can change their political opinions. In theory at least, the Yugoslavs or the Austrians might change their political and economic systems and be able to federate themselves politically and economically. The difference between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the one hand, and Southern Rhodesia, on the other, is greater than that, because men cannot change the colour of their skins.
With clear black majorities from now on in the two Northern Territories, and so long as there is—to put it frankly—white dictatorship rule in the Southern Territory, it is a waste of our breath to talk about any possibility of a political federation between the three territories even if the economic advantages were twice what they are and even if the price which had to be paid for the dissolution of the Federation were far greater even than it is. It just cannot be done.
Everyone on this side of the House, I am sure, is in favour of the best and closest degree of economic co-operation between these Governments which can be obtained. But we feel intensely that any attempt to retain by pressure or suasion,

even by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to maintain a political link which all these three Governments reject is the high road to preventing there being any possibility of keeping economic co-operation going. This economic co-operation must be voluntary. It must be something upon which all three Governments agree voluntarily. They can only do this when the bond—and all three feel it to be that now—of the Federation is loosened and they can look at the position afresh and come to see how they can trade with each other.
Do not let us exaggerate the difficulties. Sovereign, independent Governments can trade with each other. They can sell electricity to the one, can carry the copper of the other and can send their labour from one territory to another. This is not an impossible thing for sovereign independent Governments to do, still less for Governments which are linked, to some extent, through their connection with this country.
The inevitable dismantling of the Federation which must follow from the fact that none of its constituent parts wishes it to continue in no way precludes sensible trading arrangements between the three territories. But what does make even sensible trading arrangements difficult is the contrast between the way in which the three territories are governed. I must refer again to an incident which was perhaps small in itself but which was of enormous and disastrous significance.
The man who is in effect the Chief Minister of Northern Rhodesia, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, goes to Salisbury and finds that he is a prohibited immigrant. He is kept and examined for hours at the airport and is not allowed to go into the city. How can a Government whose Chief Minister is treated like that across the border be asked to federate? It is astonishing to us that hon. Members opposite seem to ignore these factors which are the absolute governing and determining factors out there.
I do not wish to indulge entirely in gloom, although I think that this is a gloomy subject today. However, I think there is one brighter aspect of the situation and that is the position in Northern Rhodesia. I think that both in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland there is at any rate hope. I happened to be in Lusaka when the new Government was


formed and I saw the new African Ministers a day or two before they became Ministers and again a day or so afterwards. I speak particularly of their leader, Mr. Kaunda, but also of the others when I say that I found that the most encouraging thing was that they were just the same after they became Ministers as they were before. They did not seem to have their heads turned in the very slightest.
We are very fortunate in having in Mr. Kenneth Kaunda one of the outstanding African leaders of today. There is, I believe, in Northern Rhodesia the possibility of building a multi-racial society. After all, there are not only very important financial interests, in the copper companies, but a considerable number of white inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia, and it may be said that there is a better chance, at any rate, of a harmonious multi-racial society there than anywhere else in Africa.
However, it seems to be subject to two things, to the British Government making up their minds and making up their minds quickly on two things. I have referred already to acknowledging clearly and frankly the right of the Northern Rhodesian Government to secession. The second is acknowledging that sooner rather than later—I will not put it more strongly than that—that there must be a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia. Unless those two things are frankly and freely acknowledged by the Government, there is still a grave danger of the situation in Northern Rhodesia going sour. After all, I do not think that the First Secretary doubts that everyone, all the races, now expects—some look forward to it and some apprehend it, but everyone expects—the development first of internal self-government under a new constitution and ultimately independence in Northern Rhodesia.
Some rather hard words have been said during the debate about great capitalist tycoons—the word used. I am bound to say from such contacts as I had with the great copper companies that they seemed to be by no means the least progressive forces there. They seemed to me to have a very long-sighted view and to be very willing to take part in what must be an experiment, and they consider a hopeful experiment, of working under and working

with an African Government. There have been these favourable and hopeful possibilities in Northern Rhodesia, but they turn a good deal on courageous decisions by Her Majesty's Government, the granting of the right to secession, the acknowledgment of the right to secession. I cannot understand why that has not been done.
I appreciate the argument that the new constitution has only just begun to function and that we ought to leave it for a good period of running in. But let us remember that this constitution has worked unexpectedly well but very much by luck rather than by skill. It is a situation profoundly unsatisfactory to everybody. If we acknowledge the need for a new constitution, that does not mean that the new constitution could or would come into force immediately. A great deal of work would have to be done, a new electoral system would have to be worked out and so on, and it would be many months, if not a year or so, before a new constitution could come into effect, and there would therefore be a period of running in of the semi-African Government of Northern Rhodesia today. All that is immediately needed, therefore, is the acknowledgment that, like the right to secession, there is the right to and the necessity for a new constitution.
I turn with reluctance from Northern Rhodesia to the situation in Southern Rhodesia where, as I think hon. Members on both sides have acknowledged, the prospect is far less hopeful. I do not see how anyone could visit Southern Rhodesia today without feeling the most profound tragedy there, and I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House should address themselves almost exclusively to the question of how that impending tragedy can be averted.
I do not for a moment think that it is a question of bad men or good men in Southern Rhodesia. When I was there this winter I got the impression of men of both sides, and all races, caught in the terrible situation of racial antagonism, and, I fear, race hatred, but worst of all perhaps, a blank incomprehension between the races. If no intervention is made, if nothing is done to alter that situation, how can it do anything but first drift and then drive towards disaster?
I was in Salisbury for the first time just before the election, and I spent my


time studying the election campaign. Whatever one may think of the new Rhodesia Front Government—and it has hopeful features; the character of the Prime Minister has been referred to by my hon. Friend in flattering terms, and I share that view—the election campaign was a terrible thing to see. As the House probably knows, people there considered that by far the most effective piece of propaganda by the Rhodesia Front was a simple poster called the "legs" poster. It showed a picture of the white legs of a white child and the black legs of a black child going into the same school, and under it was some such caption as—
Is this what you want to see for your child?
with the clear implication that multiracial education, the education of white children in the same school as black children, was something unthinkable, something humiliating, something which the white population must avert at all costs. That was the general tone of the Rhodesia Front election campaign; that it was that spirit which got them their majority.
I do not know whether the pleasant personal character of the Prime Minister, and I dare say some of his colleagues, can alter the spirit of racialism—and one cannot call it anything else—which was evoked by that campaign directly on the white side, but also on the black side. Inevitably, if that sort of propaganda is being carried on by one side it evokes a racialist spirit on the other side. I saw Mr. Field on several occasions. I agree that he is a most agreeable gentleman. He seemed to have a warmly paternal attitude to the African population. But I ask anyone who knows the Rhodesias far better than I do, is it not many years too late for a paternal attitude? Is there any chance of that approach, however sincere, however warmhearted, however excellent his relations with some African leaders, Dr. Banda and the like, in the situation of Southern Rhodesia, having much effect?
This was not the attitude of many members of his Government. I am afraid that I would have to characterise them as determined, able, and ruthless racialists who knew very well what they were at; they ought not to be dismissed as cranks as some people are apt to

dismiss them; I am afraid they are men who are determined that the white hegemony or dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia should be maintained at all costs and for all time.
This was the position at any rate of a substantial faction of the Rhodesia Front Government. It would be quite wrong to say that it is the universal attitude among the European population in Southern Rhodesia. Of course it is not. We know that there are much more liberal elements than that inside the present Government, and certainly outside it. To my mind the fate not only of Southern Rhodesia but very likely of the whole of the southern part of Africa depends on the contest between the types of opinion, of many shades and characters, which exist in Southern Rhodesia today.
There are Southern Rhodesian whites who have earned the love of Africans. Dr. Ranger has been referred to. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said that he was by no means an extremist, and had opinions which would be considered rather conservative in this country. I noticed that the hon. Member for Haltemprice laughed when my hon. Friend said that, but I can confirm exactly what my hon. Friend said. I met Dr. Ranger at a meeting with a good many African nationalists and several white Liberals. Dr. Ranger was already a very famous —indeed, notorious—man in Southern Rhodesia, who was under bitter attack from the Rhodesia Front Government and who had also been under attack from the previous Government of Sir Edgar Whitehead, which had sought to deport him and had made him a restricted person.
In those circumstances I imagined that I should be meeting someone who held views well to the left of my own. Therefore, when I spoke to him and to some of the African leaders who were present, I stressed as strongly as I could the limits to the action which any British Government could take in Southern Rhodesia, in order not to raise false expectations. But I found very ready agreement on the part of Dr. Ranger and, as the conversation went on, I found myself getting at cross purposes with him. It came out in the end that in his general world outlook, in his views on economic and


historical questions—he is a professional historian—were much more in common with the opinions of many hon. Members opposite than with my own.
It is the measure of the situation in Southern Rhodesia that a man, with somewhat conservative views, but who has a feeling for racial equality, earns himself banishment. I find this incident, and the forced resignation of men like Sir Robert Tredgold, together with the developments in the legal situation, all of a most ominous prospect. I must refer again to the measure undertaken by Mr. Winston Field's Government in which the death penalty is to become mandatory for offences against property.
Can anyone in this House defend that? We hold different views on the question of capital punishment. Some of us are against it altogether and others believe in it for the crime of murder. But can anyone in this House really defend capital punishment for crimes against property, in which no harm may be done to anybody? No one need even be injured, but if this law is passed the courts will have a mandate to award capital punishment and nothing else. Remember that this is in a situation in which the vast majority of the population have no opportunity whatever in the making of this law, in the administration of it, in the amendment of it and in which their opportunities for constitutional and democratic opposition to all this are non-existent.
No one, of course, is going to condone or excuse violence on anybody's part, but, equally, we should be blinding ourselves to all historical experience if we supposed that if we cut off all constitutional and democratic outlets for the vast mass of a population, we should not get violence. Look at the history of this country. Before there was a democratic vote, how did the mass of the population make itself felt—so far as it did—in public life? It is called in the history books by means of "riot and rick burning." Of course that was inevitable, but no one, even in this country in the nineteenth century in the worst period, actually extended capital punishment to these offences.
What we must all ask is, what can the United Kingdom Government do in this situation? We can only press with all

our force on Her Majesty's Government that they should use all their remaining powers—by their own folly they are small enough—all their influence and, I do not hesitate to say, all their pressure, to avert a head-on collision which otherwise will inevitably take place in Southern Rhodesia.
I say one thing about the United Nations question. We have got ourselves into the worst conceivable situation there. In the United Nations we say we are entirely responsible for what happens in Southern Rhodesia and that the United Nations has no business at all to interfere in the matter. Then, in this House and elsewhere, we say that as a matter of fact we have no power to alter things in Southern Rhodesia. Is it any wonder that we find our best spokesmen and best officials simply will not carry that message for us at the United Nations? It is impossible to get men like Sir Hugh Foot to take up that position. It is madness, which was expressed by several hon. Members opposite, to try to keep the United Nations out of Southern Rhodesia. Surely we should welcome the United Nations there.
There is nothing Her Majesty's Government need be ashamed of there. It is not being done by Her Majesty's Government. Let the United Nations see as closely as it can what is happening in Southern Rhodesia. It would see, not only the things to which I object and have spoken about, but it would face the realities of the situation, the limits—and, of course, there are narrow limits, to what the United Kingdom Government can do directly. The United Nations would have to face the situation; then perhaps it would stop passing what are at best pious resolutions and help us to avert the terrible disasters which otherwise impend.
So specifically we put it to the Government, let them refuse independence, the last actual powers they have there, to Southern Rhodesia until the country is at any rate well on the way to a genuine democratic Government.

Mr. A. Roberts: Would my right hon. Friend say that the United Nations ought to look at the situation in Ethiopia before looking at the situation in Southern Rhodesia?

Mr. Strachey: I cannot agree with my hon. Friend. I do not know enough about the situation in Ethiopia to speak about that, but for this country I should very much rather that the priority was in Southern Rhodesia. I should very much rather that the United Nations was forced, by close inspection, to see the real situation in Rhodesia and that we did not attempt, as we often so foolishly do, to keep the United Nations out of Southern Rhodesia and prevent any inquiry or attempt by the United Nations to look at that situation. I repeat that we ask the Government to refuse the last step of independence to Southern Rhodesia until and unless she is really beginning to implement at any rate a democratic and multi-racial society, and, more important, that in the financial settlement—and it will be no easy one—which the end of Federation necessitates our whole attitude—I say this quite frankly—to Southern Rhodesia should be governed by whether or not the Southern Rhodesian Government are moving in the direction that I have indicated.
There must be no more grants or loans on easy terms of £3½ million to a racialist Government. [An HON. MEMBER: "Economic sanctions."] Economic sanctions if you wish to call it that: at any rate, economic pressure, economic persuasion. This is the real way in which the British Government can make their influence felt in Southern Rhodesia. Otherwise, like Pontius Pilate, we must wash our hands of the situation because those are the only powers remaining. We shall be told, of course, that if we do that Southern Rhodesia will at once, unconstitutionally and by force, declare her independence and join up with South Africa. I do not know whether that is so and I do not know how she would be received, but I do know that the British Government cannot possibly allow themselves to be blackmailed by that threat.
We must stand by the multi-racial policies which we have pursued throughout Africa. If the Government give them up in this case, they will ruin the splendid record, which has been referred to before in this debate, of turning the old Empire into a free Commonwealth—a policy which they have inherited from the Labour Government but which to their honour they have pursued ever since.
They will ruin the splendid record of the country, almost at the last moment if they give it to the white supremacy Government of Southern Rhodesia.

9.32 p.m.

The Attorney-General (Sir John Hobson): The debate that we have had today has shown, I think, that hon. Members on both sides of the House are principally interested in the solution of the problems which, in the anxious situation which confronts this country, the Government and the House are the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the First Secretary. I am bound to say that the speech of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) seemed to be more concerned with the things that the Government ought not to do than the things that the Government should do. We have had a great deal of advice of every kind from both sides of the House, and sometimes, rather surprisingly, some of it has appeared to come from quarters that were perhaps a little unexpected.
I would begin what I have to say by dealing with the question of the pledges. It is true to say that they are, of course, past history and to that extent are irrelevant to the problems of tomorrow, but they have been a recurring theme during many of the speeches today. The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West referred to this matter. The hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) said that charges of this kind were of a serious nature, and of course they are bound to be. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mr. Berkeley) that to establish these charges is injurious to the interests and image of this country in Africa and elsewhere, and I therefore feel that it is my duty to spend a little time in considering the matter.
Coming, as I do, to these problems without any preconceived notions and without in any way having been concerned with them, I cannot see how any fair-minded person can extract either from the contemporary records or from the history of the matter that Her Majesty's Government have broken any pledges or abandoned any undertaking as a result of the decision to grant Nyasaland the right of secession from the Federation by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. I am grateful for


the support of my hon. Friends the Members for Lancaster and Harborough (Mr. Farr), who have clearly studied the records set out in the White Paper with some care.
We ought to be clear what was exactly the charge made by Sir Roy Welensky on 19th December—a charge which has frequently been repeated since and has been repeated this afternoon. It is an allegation that in 1953 a pledge or an undertaking or a promise was given by Ministers on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that the Federation should be permanent and lasting or at least should be preserved inviolate and unaltered, whatever might be the views of the British Parliament, unless and until at least the Governments of the Federation and of the three territories all agreed otherwise.
I agree that it is not a question whether the law did or did not entitle the Government to act but a question whether a promise or an undertaking was given. It is, of course, true that the Ministers at that time, and Her Majesty's Government at that time, were determined that Federation should continue and succeed and were indeed full of hope and confidence and faith in the great and imaginative experiment which they were initiating. That hopes have turned out to be dupes; that best-laid plans have "gang agley" is a matter for discussion and regret, but it does not imply in any sense that anything dishonourable was done or that there has been the breaking of any pledge or promise.
No doubt Sir Roy Welensky is entitled to feel disappointment and chagrin that the hopes and expectations which he then equally nursed have been disappointed. But neither he nor hon. Members are entitled to make serious charges of breaches of faith unless promises or undertakings were made which have been broken. There is a world of difference between a disappointed hope and a broken promise. The former, of course, I concede; but the latter is, I submit to the House, entirely without foundation.
It is true that in 1952 the Government of Southern Rhodesia wished to preserve for each of the three territories the right to be able to secede unilaterally by any territory, as it were, giving notice. This was not conceded by British Ministers

for obvious reasons. But that cannot have anything to do with the question whether Her Majesty's Government at that time tied the hands of their successors and of the Parliament of the United Kingdom by promising that the Government of each territory and of the Federation should each have a veto in perpetuity, whatever the views of all the other parties might be.
The only occasion upon which any such pledge is alleged to have been given is at the discussion of the conference on 19th January, 1953, the full record of which has been published by the Government as a White Paper. Whatever may be said about the recollection of those who were present at that time when speaking in another place, the truth is that all that was said is recorded in that brief White Paper and can be read and assessed.
But before reading the White Paper it is, I submit, necessary to remember what was the background of these discussions, what was the purpose of the discussions and what was going on in the course of them. The draft Constitution at that stage was in its final stages, and I am informed that the Articles which are now Articles 98 and 99 of the Annex to the Constitution Order in Council which dealt with the amendment and review of the Constitution were then in substantially their final and present form and were the subject of the agenda for discussion on 19th January.
It must therefore have been plain to all persons who attended that meeting on that day, first of all that it was not within the competence of the Federal Legislature, far less within the power of any territory, to provide for the secession of any territory.
Secondly, that subject to this and some other exceptions the Federal Legislature could itself by a two-thirds majority pass any "constitutional Bill" amending any other provision of the Constitution. Thirdly, that the United Kingdom Parliament could make any amendment of the Federal Constitution and, if it wished, grant to any territory the right to secede. Fourthly, that within the first ten years the Federal Legislature could not alter its own Legislative list even by a two-thirds majority without the approval of


the Legislatures of each of the three territories. Finally, that the review conference had no powers itself but that its recommendations only would have to be dealt with either by the United Kingdom Parliament or by the Federal Legislature in accordance with the Federal Constitution.
That was the position on the draft Constitution as it stood, and these were almost the last two Articles in that Constitution that came up for discussion on that day.
It is plain from the verbatim record and from the Minutes that the topic of discussion on 19th January, 1953, was the Review Conference to be held in seven to nine years' time and that the statements of British Ministers were made solely in relation thereto.
It is also notable that both the two Secretaries of State concerned—Lord Swinton and Lord Chandos—have now publicly denied that they ever intended to give any such pledge, promise or undertaking as the Federal Government now claim was made.
It only remains, therefore, to see whether by inadvertence either of them used words which could fairly have been construed as a pledge and which were so taken by the other participants. This is a problem which we can all see by reading the White Paper and the terms.
Mr. Eastwood, as everybody who has read the White Paper will remember, opened the discussion by raising the question whether the review conference might provide an opportunity for secession. Lord Swinton at once pointed out, perfectly correctly, that the results of a review conference could only be put into force by an amendment of the Constitution.
He assumed that they would be passed through the Federal Assembly, because the Constitution provided, subject to the ten year frozen period for the Legislative list, that in most instances that could be done, but he did not at that stage of the discussion mention that such amendments could also be passed by the United Kingdom Parliament.
Lord Chandos then spoke and expressed not an undertaking or a promise or a pledge but an opinion as to what he considered to be the position under the draft Constitution as it then stood—namely, that without the unanimous consent of the four Governments in fact the

Constitution could not be liquidated. He asked in the same breath, and twice asked, for an assurance of the lawyers that this view was correct. That assurance never was given to the Conference by any lawyer who was present. [Laughter.] That certainly is true.
His view was not accepted, whatever he may have had in mind and whether or not he was, as one may suspect, mistakenly bearing in mind the freezing of the Legislative list which required the consent of all four Governments under what is now Article 98. Whatever may have been in his mind and whatever was said, it certainly was not accepted by either Sir Roy Welensky or by Mr. Greenfield, because Sir Roy Welensky immediately afterwards correctly pointed out that it was only the Legislative list which could not be altered without the consent of all four Governments, during the "frozen 10 year period", that other amendments to the Constitution could be made at any time by a two-thirds majority of the Federal Legislature, and that even the Legislative list could be altered after the ten year period without the consent of all four Governments.
Mr. Greenfield went even further and twice made it clear with complete accuracy that, whatever the position was under the draft Constitution, it was possible to upset the Constitution upon the intervention of the United Kingdom Government as the Sovereign power. His quotation from the Burial Service was happy, apt and accurate.
Lord Swinton accepted that quotation immediately as accurate but expressed a strong opinion as to the improbability of the United Kingdom intervening. He went no further and he certainly gave no pledge that it would not do so. No one else questioned or contradicted what Mr. Greenfield had said so accurately as to the power of the United Kingdom to upset the Constitution as it pleased.
Lord Chandos concluded by inverting his question to the lawyers by asking whether major alterations to the Constitution could be made with the agreement of each and all of the Governments concerned; and again got no answer. That question does not seem in any event to have anything to do with a pledge or promise as to the circumstances in which the Constitution would not be altered. He was only asking whether it could be


altered with the consent of all four Governments.
It has been necessary to analyse this discussion and its background in some detail. It certainly seems plain that no one can fairly read into what Lord Swinton or Lord Chandos said any pledge or promise or undertaking which would limit in any way the powers of intervention of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. Each expressly recognised those powers and, whatever else is doubtful, it is clear that Mr. Greenfield accurately stated and accepted the position that there were no fetters on the United Kingdom.
In any event, the discussion was about the form of an Annex to the proposed Order in Council and no one could have supposed that whatever was put into that Schedule would in any way affect or detract from the legislative powers of the United Kingdom Parliament. That no pledges were given, nor were any understood to have been given, is made even more clear by a consideration of the subsequent history after 19th January, 1953. As has been stated today during the course of the debate, when the Bill and the Order in Council were under discussion it was made perfectly clear that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament were reserved. Not one word of complaint or protest, publicly or privately was made by anyone who had attended the Conference on behalf either of the Federation or any of the three territories; and if they thought at that time that they had such an undertaking it is inconceivable that they would not then have drawn the attention of Ministers or others, either publicly or privately, to the fact that this was in conflict with what they thought had been agreed. The significant fact is that not a word of complaint was heard from any such quarter.
But it does not stop there, for we have the further position in 1957. There was a joint announcement of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation on 27th April, 1957, to which, significantly, both Sir Roy Welensky and Mr. Greenfield were parties. That Declaration was wholly and absolutely inconsistent with the existence of any such pledges as are now alleged.
By paragraph 7 of the Declaration it was declared that the United Kingdom Government would not initiate legislation dealing with any matter included within the competence of the Federal Legislature except at the request of the Federal Government. That was the only shackle made in the announcement on the powers of the United Kingdom Government to legislate. The subject, or one of the subjects which gave rise to that Declaration, which Sir Roy Welensky himself had drawn to the attention of the United Kingdom Government, was legislation in the United Kingdom for the Federation. The document itself also dealt with the review of the Constitution.
If Sir Roy Welensky at that time believed that he had pledges on these two vital topics, as he now alleges, how could he possibly have agreed or accepted such a limited and truncated announcement as that which was in fact made? The fact is that neither he nor Mr. Greenfield could possibly have accepted that announcement in that form in 1957 had a pledge in fact been made in 1953.
But it does not stop there. Between January, 1953, and December, 1962, not one word is ever heard in public or in private from Sir Roy Welensky or Mr. Greenfield or anybody else about the existence of these pledges, when they are paraded for the first time——

Mr. M. Foot: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman permit me to interrupt?

The Attorney-General: I have had a very short time indeed.

Mr. Foot: But the right hon. and learned Gentleman has not been interrupted.

The Attorney-General: Apart from the utter failure between January, 1953, and December, 1962——

Mr. Foot: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman permit me to interrupt him just once on this matter?

Hon. Members: Give way.

Mr. Speaker: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not give way the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) cannot persist.

Mr. Foot: May I ask the Attorney-General again to permit me to interrupt him? This is a matter of the honour of the House of Commons.

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not give way, the hon. Gentleman must not persist.

Mr. Foot: It is a perfectly natural process for people to ask the Attorney-General to allow himself to be interrupted in this sense, and now the right hon. and learned Gentleman has graciously given way. Is it not clear that the reason why this matter was not raised by Sir Roy Welensky and others in 1954 and 1957, the dates the Attorney-General gave, was that they did not think at that moment that the British Government were going back on their pledges?

The Attorney-General: That may be a comment, but it does not stand up at all on what happened in May, 1962, when the previous Lord Chancellor announced in another place that the questions of dissolution and secession were solely within the competence of the United Kingdom, although consultation would take place in the ordinary way before the United Kingdom Government dealt with either of those steps by legislation. But at that stage, even when it had become clear that the United Kingdom were taking the view that they were entitled absolutely to deal with those steps by legislation in this country and were announcing that they would do so, provided only they had consultation and no more, once again not one single word of complaint, protest or suggestion that this was wrong came from the Federation.

Mr. Healey: Yes, there were repeated protests. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman not aware that this was precisely when the dam broke? It was the statement by the Lord Chancellor just over a year ago that Her Majesty's Government reserved the right to do what they liked on this which led to the first statement in Salisbury about pledges made. The plain fact is that not only did Sir Roy Welensky believe that these pledges had been made but all the Ministers who had made the pledges believed so too.

The Attorney-General: With great respect, as far as the United Kingdom Government were concerned, not one word was said to them until December, 1962, just a month or two ago, as a result of what had been said by the Lord Chancellor in March, 1962. I hope therefore that the House will think that what I have said about the discussions in 1953 makes it clear beyond doubt that nothing that was then said can be held to have created an obligation of either a moral or an ethical nature which has shackled or prevented Her Majesty's Government from acting as they have done in the circumstances prevailing today in Central Africa.
While I have spent some time in dealing with past history, a charge of deliberately breaking the pledged word cannot be left unanswered or allowed to go unmet, but I should like in the few minutes left to me to say a few words about the process of adjusting the constitutional position which has arisen as a result of the decision in December over Nyasaland. The House will recall that following the London Conference in November, 1962, a new constitution for Nyasaland was agreed and details were published in Command Paper 1887 The new Constitution confers on Nyasaland the normal pattern of internal self-government, except that there are transitional limitations which take account of the particular circumstances of the territory. These relate especially to the spheres of finance and the public service.
The new Constitution is, for administrative and legislative reasons, being introduced in two stages. The first stage came into effect on 1st February this year and involved the replacement of the Executive Council by a Cabinet presided over by Dr. Banda. Also, at this stage, two of the three official Ministers were withdrawn, a deputy-governer and a director of public prosecutions were appointed and two of the three ex officio Members were withdrawn from the Legislative Council. The Governer's powers for the time being remain unchanged, but the full Constitution will be brought into force later in the spring as soon as the drafting can be completed and at this stage the Governor's powers will be restricted to the reserved subjects which include finance, the public service, public safety and order and the operational control of the police. There


are no present changes in the franchise or in the composition of the elected element of the Legislative Assembly. Such matters are reserved for future consideration.
At the London Conference it was agreed that the new Constitution should contain a Bill of Rights. Such a Bill will be embodied in the second stage of the drafting and will follow, broadly, that in force in Uganda, subject to certain modifications which were agreed by all the parties at the conference.
There is, of course, the difficult problem outstanding of the financial position upon secession. My hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) asked me what was the position in this respect. As hon. Members will be aware, the territory already receives from the United Kingdom a sizeable grant-in-aid towards its recurrent Budget. There can be no doubt that, in consequence of secession, Nyasaland's budgetary gap will be substantially increased. However, the precise extent of Nyasaland's increased liabilities will not be known until all the various complex matters, which it is now the task of the Working Party to investigate, have been resolved and their financial implications worked out. As my right hon. Friend has said, Her Majesty's Government will then be ready to consider to what extent, and over what period, the Nyasaland Government may need financial help in the efforts which the territory and its leaders will have to make to bridge the budgetary gap. The House will not expect the Government to go beyond that at this stage, but my right hon. Friend has already said that our approach will be sympathetic.
I am sorry that I have not had sufficient time to deal with others of the points which have been raised in the debate. There is, at least, this to be said of the debate, that there is a pretty well unanimous view that the difficult problems which lie ahead need infinite care, patience and discussion. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) said, we should encourage a spirit of give and take among all those concerned in Central Africa. My right hon. Friend is grateful for the many constructive suggestions which have been made during the debate and will certainly take into

account all that has been said today. He will, I know, be encouraged in the difficult task which lies ahead of him if the House can give him its good wishes for the solution of the problems of Central Africa.

Question, That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution, put and agreed to.

PURCHASE TAX BILL [Lords]

Read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. J. E. B. Hill.]

Committee Tomorrow.

POLICE PENSIONS

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Police Pensions (Amendment) Regulations, 1963, a draft of which was laid before this House on 19th February, be approved.—[Mr. Woodhouse.]

Mr. Eric Fletcher: As this is a rather complicated matter, it would be useful if we could have a few words of explanation from the Joint Under-Secretary of State about it.

10.0 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. C. M. Woodhouse): I gladly accede to the hon. Gentleman's request.
When I presented the Police Pensions Regulations, 1962, in their consolidated form, I said that we should from time to time have to make fresh Amendments. This is such an occasion, although I do not think I need detain the House long with these Regulations because they are entirely consequential on the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962. I will not pretend that these Regulations are simple even in their present form, but I think that they are much simpler than they have been before partly because of the consolidating Measure of a few weeks ago, so that there is now only one set of Regulations to be amended instead of three sets for England and Wales and another three sets for Scotland.
For the sake of clarity, instead of making verbal amendments, we have restated the essential paragraphs as amended in the new Regulations so that the Regulations now before the House


consist virtually of long paragraphs in inverted commas which can be transferred bodily into the consolidating Regulations either in place of or in addition to the existing paragraphs.
I wish to explain briefly why we have to go through this procedure on these Regulations. It is because the Pensions (Increase) Act, like its predecessors, although it applies to police pensioners, does not apply to police widows and their dependants who are dealt with by Regulations. The reason for that is basically twofold. First, some of the awards to police widows and dependants are related to National Insurance awards, and these are kept in line with the cost of living separately. Therefore, if the Pensions (Increase) Acts were also to apply to them the effect would be to compensate the same people twice over for the same increase in the cost of living.
The second reason is that some of the awards in the case of widows and dependants of policemen are on a flat rate instead of one varying according to the date on which they were granted. It would be inappropriate to apply to such flat rate awards the graduated scale of increases which was introduced in Section 1 of the 1962 Act.
Broadly, the position is that the police awards dealt with in these Regulations fall into two categories—flat rate awards, and other awards. To take the flat-rate awards first, the increase is achieved by substituting the new actual rates after increase for the sums in the present Regulations. The House will find an example in Regulation 3 which replaces the corresponding paragraph on page 65 of the consolidating Regulations. These flat rate awards will attract the maximum increases offered under the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962—in other words, a 12 per cent. increase for all cases, together with the bonus of £20, which is the highest level for those over 70. The latter is, however, subject to the same limitation as in the 1962 Act if the increase would exceed a quarter of the pension in payment. This follows precisely on the 1962 Act and it is for reasons which my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury explained during the Committee stage of that Measure.
As to the other awards—that is, those which are related to the amount of the dead officer's pay either at the time of his retirement or, if he died while still serving, at the time of his death—widows and dependants who get these awards will receive increases equivalent to and subject to the same conditions as the increases of similar awards provided in the 1962 Act, both Sections 1 and 2. This is achieved by Regulation 2, which provides that these awards shall be treated as if they were specified in the Schedule to the 1959 Act, which was the last Pensions (Increase) Act.
The one other point which, I think, the House would like to have drawn to its attention is the addition of the new Regulation 84B to the existing Regulations. This provides that the increase in a child's allowance shall be payable so long as the allowance is itself payable under the 1962 Regulations. This provision is consequential upon Section 5 of the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962.
As the House knows, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to consult the Police Council for England and Wales and the Police Council for Scotland on such Regulations. This has been done and both bodies have approved the Regulations. As can be seen from Regulation 8, the Regulations have been drafted to have effect retrospectively from 1st January this year, when the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962, came into force.

10.7 p.m.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: I am very glad that the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department was prompted into saying a few words of explanation about Regulations which at first sight appear, and are, extremely complicated. I am sure that the House is grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his lucid explanation of what the House is this evening being asked to do. It is just as well to have it clear on the record what we are doing for the benefit of these widows and dependants of police widows.
It is, perhaps, at first sight somewhat curious that the widows and dependants of policemen are dealt with separately from the widows and dependants of other persons to whom pensions are payable by the State. As the Minister has indicated, the preparation and submission of the appropriate Regulations dealing with


police pensions has not been free from technical difficulties during the last few years.
It was a result of certain protests that we made in previous years that, first, the Police Pensions Act was passed in 1961 which enabled Statutory Instrument 1962 No. 2756 to be made. That was itself a consolidating and amending Order which was debated in the House shortly before Christmas and came into operation as recently as 1st January, 1963. It might therefore, at first sight appear anomalous that so soon afterwards we have to pass a set of Regulations amending those Regulations which came into force on 1st January.
As I understood the Minister to explain, the reason is that we have had the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962, which received the Royal Assent in December and came into operation on 1st January this year and provided in statutory form for a substantial increase in all pensions to Service men, policemen and other persons and their widows and dependants but not to the widows and dependants of policemen. They were excluded from the 1962 Act.
As the hon. Gentleman said, there are both historical and practical reasons for their being deliberately excluded. Therefore, it has become necessary to deal with their case by some regulations under the earlier Acts. I do not think that the House would wish me to repeat all the details the hon. Gentleman has been kind enough to give, but I will lust make two observations.
First, as I understand it, the increased pensions being given to these police widows and dependants are no less favourable—in some cases perhaps slightly more favourable—than the increases being given to other widows and dependants. I do not think that anybody in the House would regret that that is the case, because, after all, policemen are exposed to certain very definite and continuous risks, and since the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime depend upon having both an efficient and contented police force, it is most desirable in the public interest that we should do everything possible to ensure that policemen are adequately paid and that proper provision is made by way of pensions for

their widows and dependants. It is very satisfactory to note that that is being done by these Regulations.
Secondly, it might be to the benefit of those directly affected by the Regulations, which are complicated, if the hon. Gentleman published or made available through the police machinery some simplified memorandum or document stating in a clear, intelligible form exactly what is the effect of the new Regulations.
I echo the wish of the hon. Gentleman that these Regulations will receive the approval of the House.

10.13 p.m.

Mr. Woodhouse: By leave of the House, perhaps I may reply briefly to the last two points raised by the hon. Member. I appreciate, and entirely agree with, the point he has made about police widows' pensions being at least as favourable and perhaps even more favourable than others. I agree entirely that the House and the country will accept that this is right. The hon. Member also suggested the issue of a simplified memorandum explaining the significance of these changes. It is our intention to issue such a leaflet to all local authorities and to the Police Federation.

Resolved,
That the Police Pensions (Amendment) Regulations 1963, a draft of which was laid before this House on 19th February, be approved.

CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS [MONEY]

Resolution reported,
That, for the purposes of any Act of this session to amend the law relating to children and young persons, it is expedient to authorize—

(a) the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of—

(i) any expenses incurred by the Secretary of State in conducting or assisting other persons in conducting research into any matter connected with his functions or the functions of local authorities under the Children and Young Persons Acts, 1933 to 1956, the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Acts, 1937 and 1956, the Children Act, 1948, the Children Act, 1958 or the said Act of this Session, or any matter connected with the adoption of children; and
(ii) any administrative expenses incurred by the Secretary of State under the said Act of this Session;


(b) any increase attributable to the said Art of this Session in the sums payable out of moneys provided by Parliament by way of Rate-deficiency Grant or Exchequer Equalisation Grant under the enactments relating to local government in England and Wales or in Scotland; and
(c) any increase in the sums payable out of moneys so provided under the said enactments in respect of general grants which may a rise—

(i) from the inclusion, in the expenditure relevant to the fixing of the aggregate amounts of those grants, of expenditure under the said Act of this Session; and
(ii) from any provision of that Act authorising the variation of any general grant order made before the commencement of that Act for a grant period ending after the commencement of that Act so as to take account of additional expenditure incurred or likely to be incurred by local authorities in consequence of the passing of that Act

Resolution agreed to.

ANGLO-CANADIAN TRADE

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn—[Mr. I. Fraser.]

10.14 p.m.

Mr. William Shepherd: I want this evening to draw the attention of the House, I hope of the country and even more of the Canadian Government, to the very serious situation of Anglo-Canadian trade. I should be exaggerating if I said that the Anglo-Canadian trade problem was the biggest trade problem facing this country. Some time ago, we had considerable problems balancing our account with the United States of America, and I have no doubt that that trade will be subject to a good deal of fluctuation over the years, but we have managed, by virtue of some energy and ingenuity and as a consequence of some substantial reductions in United States tariffs, to get near to balancing our account and on occasions to having a favourable balance.
This contrasts very sharply with our Canadian experience. I want to make it clear that I am not in any way criticising the Canadians, for this is a problem which we should and must solve together. The record of Anglo-Canadian trade over the past ten years is devastating from the British point of view. I asked my hon. Friend the Minister of

State, Board of Trade, a Question about this the other day and he gave me an Answer which was devastatingly uninformative. However, over the past ten years this country's adverse balance of trade with Canada has been about £1,410 million, an average of about £140 million a year, which the House will readily agree to be a massive burden for us to bear.
It would be quite agreeable for us to shoulder this burden had we not other very great burdens. If one looks at the British balance of payments one sees, for example, that we have to provide for help and assistance and military effort overseas about £350 million net per annum, after accounting for receipts which we receive from one or two sources. To balance this adverse balance of trade with Canada, we would have to be able to obtain a £500 million favourable balance with other nations, and that is clearly not a practical proposition. We have not succeeded in balancing our account, and with these burdens I do not think we shall do so.
What is the situation which faces the average British trader seeking to improve his trade with Canada? It is by no means easy. There are difficulties connected with Canadian trade which are probably unequalled in respect of trade in any other part of the world, and I repeat that these are not conditions which are the making of the Canadian Government, which, I know, wishes to help us in our trade as much as possible. The first problem which we have to face is that of mastering the distances as compared with the proximity of the Americans to Canada. We have to try to sell to a very large country with a relatively small population. The costs of selling by a British manufacturer in Canada are inordinately high, and many British firms have lost a great deal of money in a vain effort to establish themselves in the Canadian market.
The main difficulty, of course, is the vastness of the immediate American market. We see this when we look at the figures. At the moment the American market supplies about 70 per cent. of the total Canadian imports. We are supplying only about 9 per cent., and I am sorry that in the last few years our percentage has been declining. It is against this background of what have been substantial imports in the last year or so,


increasing imports and declining exports, that we look at this situation of Canadian trade as being very serious indeed.
I think there are some things which hamper British exports to Canada to which the Canadian Government might well direct their attention. The first is the method by which the Customs determine the value of goods for customs purposes. As my hon. Friend knows, there is a fair market value assessed according to the value in the United Kingdom and it so happens that the Canadian Government, not unnaturally, are able to establish with greater ease what is the fair market value in the United Kingdom for a given line of goods than it is to establish fair market value in, say, Italy, or France, or Germany, or even in the United States where fluctuating values are often to be found between one State and another. So I think we can say without doubt that, on the whole, we in England get, not intentionally but by virtue of certain historical relationships with Canada, rather the worst of the deal when it comes to determining the value for customs purposes.
This is made worse by the fact that any difference in the value between the fair market value established in the United Kingdom and the value invoiced in Canada can bring into operation the antidumping duty automatically, and so the poor British exporter trying to jump the surcharge, or the high tariff, or the American competition, may find himself facing a higher duty because he has tried to cut his price to get into the market. This is one aspect about which my hon. Friend might talk to the Canadian Government and try to make the path much easier for the British exporter.
Then there is, of course, the question of the general level of tariffs which Canada raises against all exports, including our own. We all know that the Canadian economy is not in its most buoyant phase, and the Canadian Government have real problems of their own which no one can possibly deny. We also realise that having to compete with the very powerfully entrenched industries in the United States, the Canadian Government must defend their own native industries against the competition which could come in, particularly from across the border.
But, having said that, there is still room for the view that some encouragement must be found in some way for British goods to flow more freely over the Canadian frontiers than they do at the present time. If some solution is not found for this problem we may well face a situation where we should, most regrettably, have to limit the amount of goods which come into this country from Canada. If our international trade situation deteriorates any further, we might find ourselves in the position where we will be incapable of providing the necessary dollars to pay for Canadian imports.
We must reflect on the fact that but for this deficit of £1,400 million in Canadian trade over the last ten years our currency reserves would have stood at over twice their present level. I repeat that if this loss of about £150 million a year, largely in dollars, continues, we may reach a situation in which we are unable to provide the necessary gold and dollars to pay for these supplies from Canada.
It is therefore necessary that the British and Canadian Governments get together and try seriously to solve the problem. It could be solved by differential tariffs, but I am sure that my hon. Friend will tell me that this is not practical under present conditions. I will accept that. But some method of improving the relationship between Canadian and Britsih trade is urgently necessary if the two countries are to get together to develop to their mutual advantage.
Nobody in England has any hard feelings towards our friends in Canada; indeed, we know that they welcome our goods and, within certain limitations, do all they can to help us. But the loss of as much as £1,400 million in dollars over ten years is much more than this country can afford. For the future, there must be an alternative trading arrangement which will provide some sort of parity between British and Canadian trade.
International trade is the exchange of goods. As things are arranged between Canada and ourselves at the moment, this exchange is not a fair and equitable one. I hope that my hon. Friend will take the opportunity of visiting Canada at the earliest possible moment, to express to our Canadian friends our concern at


the situation and to endeavour to do something to put Anglo-Canadian trade on a more satisfactory basis.

10.26 p.m.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. Alan Green): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) on selecting this subject. He is quite right to say that this is, within a difficult trading world, a particularly difficult trading problem. I am not going to try to fool him by pretending that I have a perfect and simple solution to offer him tonight. But I hope that I may reassure him to this extent; we are concerned at the problem and are seeking, in collaboration with Canada, ways of overcoming it. From what my hon. Friend has said it is clear that he knows that the pattern of our trade with Canada is very intricate. It is not a simple bilateral matter. It is particularly for this reason, as he said, that the difficulties belong as much to Canada as to us.
The first point that I must make is that the crude adverse balance is not as great as it looks, because exports are valued f.o.b. and imports c.i.f., My hon. Friend knows this, but perhaps others do not always know it. Much of the difference in these costs, f.o.b. and c.i.f., is expressed in sterling earnings. In addition, we have a surplus of invisibles with Canada. It is notoriously difficult to assess with accuracy the value of these two elements—the invisibles and the difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f.—and to attribute precise values to each separate country with which we trade. This is because services such as insurance and freight are generally of a comprehensive kind which cover several countries simultaneously and are not tied to one point of destination, as is a direct export.
I know from what my hon. Friend says that he appreciates this fact, but I hope that he will not mind my making this point in the interests of those who may not do so. The second point that we must bear in mind, if we are to go along with the Canadians in finding, a solution which is in our joint interests, is the changing nature of the Canadian economy. No country, including the United States and Britain, is a fully-developed country. The point to be borne in mind by all our people and by all Canadians is that Canada is a particular example of a developing nation. It is

inevitable, therefore, that the pattern of Canadian imports and exports must be subject to change. Exactly the same considerations apply to our own economy. On both sides of the Atlantic changes in the economic pattern are inevitable, and I personally welcome them. If there are not these changes, we have a static economy, better referred to, I think, on occasions by right hon. and hon. Members opposite as a stagnant economy. Therefore, I welcome the fact that these changes are there.
All I want is for both sides of the Anglo-Canadian equation to accept change and to benefit from it. It is unlikely in the extreme that the two sets of changes will dovetail neatly into one another so that we can, even in any one decade, achieve a neat bilateral trading balance, and I am sure that my hon. Friend is not after that. But I agree with him that a truly chronic and large-scale imbalance in trade creates difficulties as fundamental for Canada as they are for us. This is the first thing to be agreed between ourselves and any Canadian Government. I believe that successive Canadian Governments have been very much aware of this. They have undoubtedly wished to see, in Canada's own continuing interest, an increase in our exports to them.
The facts of our particular trading equation are as follows: between 1958 and 1961 an increase was being achieved. Our direct exports to Canada—not our exports of invisibles and so on—rose from £188·1 million to £221·8 million. In the same period our imports from Canada rose by even more, from £308·6 million to £349·4 million. This, as I indicated earlier, is not so adverse as the crude figures suggest. One could say that in that period of time, from 1958 to 1961, there was some healthy two-way stretch in the fabric of Britain-Canadian trade.
But 1962 was a wholly different story. In that year, one of economic crisis for Canada, our imports remained about the same—£349·3 million—but our direct exports went sharply down to £187·9 million. I think it is this fact that has drawn my hon. Friend's attention to the general problem.
It was the intention of the Canadian Government that their imports overall should be reduced in 1962 because of


their balance of payments problems while their exports were at least maintained. The combination of devaluation of the Canadian dollar with the imposition of surcharges was designed to produce this result, and it did for Canada's own peculiar, particular national reasons. Because of the nature of our trade with Canada the weight of the surcharges fell especially heavily on us. The Canadians assured us that these surcharges would be purely temporary and, as my hon. Friend will know, we have energetically sought their removal, and in addition the Canadians have gone quite a long way towards removing them. I hope very much that the rest will go very quickly. The Canadians, in other words, were faced with a particular and sharp variant of our own general continuing problem over balance of payments. This really was the situation. They took their own local action to correct their particular immediate problem, and we, who have the continuing problem, were, so to speak, the real recipients of the effects of Canada's own local action.
Having said that, I would just like to say a word, if I may be permitted to do so, to our own exporters, because they have a rôle to play in this, too. Canada in the true sense of the word is a developing country, both in the range and in the volume of the things she needs to import if she is to grow year by year. She is, thus, a market of present and future interest which we must cultivate. But she is also a very difficult market. The Canadian market is sophisticated and, therefore, exacting. There are, as my hon. Friend has already said, huge competitive supplies available immediately across her border with the U.S.A., and she has, in addition, the inevitable problems associated with a relatively small population in a relatively huge area. All these factors

make her a very hard market—and I have some personal experience of trading in the Canadian market—but in wealth per head of the population, she is a rich market and, therefore, one worth entering.
My conclusion is that only the highest quality of goods, backed by tip-top service, will do in Canada. We in this country can, and generally do, provide that combination of quality and service. Also, I believe that it is a real Canadian interest, perceived by many Canadians, to buy that combination from us to an extent greater than she has been doing. I think that this is truly a Canadian interest, but it is up to us to provide that worth-while combination—worthwhile for the Canadians to buy.
So I suggest that what is now required is two things—final removal of the extra protective barriers erected by Canada to fend off her crisis of last year, accompanied by a renewed thrust from British exporters of goods and services to the Canadian market. This is the sort of thing that I hope to put simultaneously to the Canadian Government and to our own exporters, because this is a simultaneous operation and somebody has to do it, and it happens to fall to me at this particular moment in time to try to do this.
Finally, I should like to assure my hon. Friend that in the near future I very much hope to go to Canada. I believe that if I do go, even I will be welcomed in going there. My aim and object certainly is to go there as soon as I possibly can in an effort to achieve these two things—to encourage British exporters and to encourage the Canadians to accept British products.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-one minutes to Eleven o'clock.